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ABSTRACT
A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE MARITIME SECURITY RISK OF PIRACY AND
LESSONS LEARNED FROM AGENT-BASED MODELING
Joanne Marie Fish
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. Jesse T. Richman

This dissertation takes a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding pirate
activity. Maritime piracy presents a dynamic ever-evolving problem. In today’s globalized
world, contemporary maritime piracy presents a transnational threat. It is a complex
socio-economic and political problem which the modern world considers to be criminal
activity. Like all complex problems it must be deconstructed to fully comprehend it.
All criminal activity, maritime piracy included, has certain elements of supply and
demand. For the activity to occur there must be a certain level, or supply, of targets. At the
same time, we can posit that there must be a lack of other opportunities for the pirates,
who calculate that the risk of engaging in piracy is worthwhile. This risk calculation is a
function of the potential rewards minus the sum of the risks. An increase in pirate attacks
creates a demand for better maritime security. An increase in maritime security causes an
increase in risk to pirates. Improved pirate capabilities may decrease this risk. The result is
a constantly evolving complex problem. This study proposes a parsimonious agent-based
model, focused on the socio-economic and political variables that encourage piracy, with
utility across many specific regional domains. By simplifying the details of certain aspects
of the model, the focus is placed on the issues at the heart of the problem. This allows for
new insights into the dynamic relationship between these factors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

For long as people have sailed the seas they have encountered risk. Everyday ships
are sailing on the waters of the world, carrying goods, enabling trade and making our
modern world work. Every day they take risks to do so. Maritime piracy is just one of
many maritime risks. No matter where or when they sail, there is a risk of maritime piracy.
Sometimes this risk is negligible and at other times it becomes quite significant. Therefore,
maritime piracy is always a consideration. Regulations and laws address the issue. Ships
engage in best practices to protect themselves from pirate attacks. When the risk is great
enough, maritime security forces conduct counter-piracy operations. All these efforts focus
on deterring or preventing a pirate attack without considering what motivates the activity
in the first place.
The risks of going to sea are great. How these risks are viewed depends on who is
looking at them. Mariners look at them in terms of what is the risk to their vessel. Social
scientists, policy makers, insurance actuaries, businessman and engineers all look at risk
from within their own paradigm. Social scientists and policy makers look at past events to
identify trends and indicators which may allow for predictions of future events. They often
use “soft science” approaches for these purposes, although some fields of study employ
empirical methods to analyze events and data. Engineers use “hard science” approaches to
analyze data and calculate performance.
Combining these methods allows for a more systematic evaluation of maritime
security risk. Systems engineers analyze complex systems and look for ways to reduce risk
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and improve system performance. They take a holistic look at all the elements that
compose the system. They then focus on areas of risk. As they increase their
understanding of particular components and/or processes involved in that risk, that
information is applied to the larger system.
This dissertation applies a cross-disciplinary approach to the problem of maritime
piracy by using systems analysis to look at the issue as part of a broader system of related
activity. This technique identifies critical components of the larger maritime system and
the interactions between these components. In this work, the larger issue of maritime
security is considered, but the focus is on maritime piracy. This project applies a systems
engineering approach of risk analysis to the topic of maritime security, a subject which has
predominantly been the domain of International and National Security studies. Because
maritime security risks are primarily unlawful acts of terrorism and piracy, relevant
criminology research is considered. Additionally, modeling and simulation techniques are
used to gain insights into what motivates maritime piracy. By taking a systematic look at
maritime security risks, it is possible to think about where maritime piracy fits within this
broader topic. Then, by specifically focusing on the piracy threat, we improve our
understanding of the issues associated with it. Lastly, the new knowledge gained can be
applied back to the original system to provide us with a better understanding of the larger
issues. This new information can then be used by policy makers, both government and
corporate, to more effectively address the maritime piracy problem.
While this work is explicitly concerned with maritime security, there are broader
implications for security studies in general. No matter the issue of concern, it can likely be
thought of in terms of some sort of system. That system itself is part of a larger, more
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complex system. When dealing with a particular issue, expanding the scope of
consideration can provide new insights. Narrowly focusing on just one aspect of an issue
may neglect important related information which is essential to gaining a comprehensive
understanding of the issue. Cross-disciplinary approaches are particularly well suited to
this since they offer varying approaches to the problem under consideration, highlighting
information which would have been overlooked by a narrower approach.

BACKGROUND
Mariners have encountered piracy throughout history. The maritime laws which
apply to the issue have evolved over time. In many parts of the globe, there are deep
cultural roots to this practice that may provide for localized acceptance and even support
for what is otherwise considered an illegal act. The very definition of what is and is not
piracy has changed with time. The frequency of pirate incidents varies across time, waxing
and waning, depending on many considerations. All of this makes piracy a multifaceted
issue for which the motivations must be considered.
The safety and security of international shipping has always been an important
issue. Shipping is the backbone of international trade and shippers and investors want
their cargos to arrive safely. Markets drive commerce and thus drive shipping. Maritime
risks are multi-faceted. There are two different types of events to be considered: maritime
safety accidents and maritime security incidents. Maritime safety accidents are
unintentional events which may occur because of natural causes, an action of the crew, or a
third party. These include events such as fire, equipment failure, and collisions. Safety
accidents may also be navigational in nature, caused by either weather or geography.
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Maritime security incidents are intentional actions. These are comprised of unlawful acts,
primarily maritime terrorism and piracy. When considering the risks from this category,
the concern is how to enhance ship security without jeopardizing the ship’s organizational
efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, while the two types of events are distinct in
nature, a maritime safety issue may result in an increased vulnerability to maritime
security risks. While thinking about the broader range of maritime risk, the focus here will
be on maritime piracy. The key question is how great is the risk for such an event and what
actions can be taken to reduce the risks. In order to answer this question, we must have a
complete understanding of the issue, including what motivates piracy.
Risk, in its simplest definition, is the possibility that something bad may happen.
The study of risk is an evolving field closely related to the subjects of probability and
economics. Security, on the other hand, is the state of being protected or free from harm.
The two concepts are inversely related. An increase of risk results in a decrease in security
and vice versa. The three related processes of risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk
management are used to better define and understand the implications of specific risks.
When maritime risk management is discussed in terms of effective maritime security, what
are people referring to? In a general sense, maritime risk management refers to the
application of flexible and advanced risk modeling and decision-making approaches to the
maritime industry. These techniques are applied to the design, production and operation
of assets within the maritime domain. How the security risk in this domain is identified
and managed is equally important to maritime safety.

5
RESEARCH DESIGN
The book Advanced Risk Analysis in Engineering Enterprise Systems1 provides a look
at the emerging discipline of engineering enterprise systems. This provides a structured
approach for analyzing and managing risk in a complex system. A systems approach
requires a broad look at the bigger picture surrounding an issue. Just as we can think of a
system in terms of sub-systems, we can think about how a system fits into an even larger
system. These systems of systems are referred to as enterprise systems.
This concept of an enterprise system is used to think about maritime piracy and
informs the approach used for this dissertation. Maritime piracy is thought about in terms
of where it fits in the bigger issue of maritime safety and security. How the issue impacts
the maritime shipping industry is considered in terms of a system within a larger system.
When we seek to understand how a system works, we look at the components of the
system, consider what we know about those components, and how they interact. When we
want to have a better understanding of the system, we seek to increase our knowledge of
the various components. We then use that improved understanding to update the over-all
system.
As Pinto and Garvey say; “Engineers and managers must develop a holistic
understanding of the social, political, and economic environments within which an
enterprise system operates. Failure to fully consider these dimensions, as they influence
engineering and management decisions, can be disastrous.”2 This need for a holistic
understanding also applies to policy makers. They need to understand the system they are
concerned with. While they may not need to define the system with the same degree of
1
2
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technical specifications, they do need to understand how the system of interest is related to
other systems. They also need to develop that holistic understanding of the social, political,
and economic environments within the larger enterprise system that their issue of concern
exists.
Thus, this research expands our understanding of maritime piracy by thinking about
it with a systems analysis approach. In the context of a system of systems, individual
concepts are explored to provide a better understanding of the concept. How has the
concept evolved and how is it thought about today? How do the concepts relate to each
other? Background and history are provided to develop our holistic understanding of the
issues. Surveys of the situation are made to understand the current status and identify the
gaps in that understanding. Finally, a model is developed to allow for new insight into that
gap in our knowledge.

OVERVIEW
I begin with background information on the maritime security problem of piracy.
First, I discuss the historic origins of maritime piracy, to include the societal motivations
and norms. Then the evolution of maritime law is considered, followed by a discussion of
the current definition of piracy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of contemporary
piracy.
Chapter 3 surveys existing models of maritime piracy. Since the goal is to expand
our understanding of maritime piracy, it is important to understand what kind of modeling
efforts have already been done. Chapter 3 provides an overview of existing piracy models.
My work is then able to build on those efforts.

7
Because risk is a central concept of this work, Chapter 4 takes a detailed look at
how the idea has developed. It looks at the current concept of risk, not only from the
technical application of the concept for the purposes of analysis, but also how our modern
society thinks about risk. Then it focuses specifically on maritime risk and how it relates to
the topic of maritime safety and security.
Chapter 5 takes a survey of the data that is available to deepen our understanding of
maritime piracy. Existing sources of piracy data are reviewed, followed by some basic
analysis of the data. A spectrum of piracy is proposed that enables a clearer understanding
of how piracy varies in both sophistication and motivation. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of sociological data sources that are available to help understand the motivation
for piracy.
Now, with a deeper appreciation for what maritime piracy is, as well as how it fits
into the larger framework of maritime security, I present a Piracy Opportunity Model. The
model takes an abstract approach to the relative opportunities that are provided on land
compared to the opportunity of pirating. Chapter 6 focuses on the design and development
of the model. Chapter 7 presents the model results and considers possible improvements
and extensions of the model. Chapter 8 discusses model implications, and presents
thoughts on future work. Lastly, Chapter 9 provides the conclusion of this research.
To summarize, the focus of this research project is to apply a cross-disciplinary
approach to Maritime Risk Assessment, specifically maritime security, with an emphasis on
maritime piracy. The project explores the application of a systems engineering approach to
risk analysis by thinking about the issue as a component of a larger issue and exploring the
connections between the issue and other variables. While it is beyond the scope of this

8
work to provide a complete system diagram, figure 1-1 provides a simple diagram of the
key portions of the system that this dissertation will consider.

Figure 1-1. System diagram of high seas - land interface
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CHAPTER 2
PIRACY

This chapter takes a deeper look at the issue of maritime piracy. A selective
discussion of the history of maritime piracy, using illustrative examples, provides an
understanding of how the issue has changed across time. It is not intended to be a
complete history. Additionally, the information which is available must also be considered
in context. As many have noted, the label “pirate” is an evolving concept and has been
applied to various people throughout history for political or economic reasons. Historical
records written by pirates themselves are scarce and therefore the accounts of piracy have
an inherent bias. Starting with the origins of the concept of piracy, the chapter explores the
cultural context. The segue between the past and present is a brief discussion on the
development of maritime law which leads to the current definitions for maritime piracy.
With this framework established, the chapter concludes with a discussion of contemporary
maritime piracy issues, including counter-piracy polices and operations.

MARITIME PIRACY
For as long as men have gone to sea, some of them have engaged in piracy. Maritime
piracy has deep cultural roots, which may provide for localized acceptance and even
support for what is otherwise considered an illegal act. This makes piracy a multifaceted
issue for which the motivations must be considered. Despite these considerations, an
understanding of the historical development of the issue clearly demonstrates that socioeconomic and socio-political variables are important.
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While the Mediterranean and Southeast Asia are perhaps the best documented
areas for early piracy, anywhere boats traveled along the coast, the potential for piracy
existed. Thus, where there was maritime trade, there was likely maritime piracy; although
perhaps the concept of piracy, the very idea that the activity was not acceptable, may not
have yet existed. This activity can range from simple opportunist piracy motivated by dire
circumstances all the way up to sophisticated and organized criminal activity. Individuals
who find success at piracy will be encouraged to continue pirating, especially if there is a
lack of other opportunities for them. The longer they pirate, the more sophisticated their
activity may get.
States almost unanimously agree that piracy is illegal. In fact, piracy falls under the
category of jus cogens, which are the highest level of international law. These laws are
peremptory norms which an overwhelming majority of states, crossing ideological and
political divides, have agreed to and to which no derogation is permitted.1 The basis of
these international laws comes from customs and treaties, and with respect to piracy,
refers to piracy on the high seas where “any and every state may seize a pirate ship…arrest
the persons and seize the property on board.”2 Each state also has the authority to exercise
their jurisdiction over acts of piracy in their own courts. As Malcolm Shaw states, this
makes the crime of piracy “quite exceptional in international law, where so much emphasis
is placed upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction of each particular state with its own
territory.”3

Shaw, 126-127.
Shaw, 615.
3 Shaw, 616.
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However, willingness to get involved in enforcing the international laws which
prohibit piracy depends on complex considerations. Whenever you move cargo and goods
by sea, from one location to another, there will be a chance (or risk) that someone will take
your cargo. This risk can be lessened by gaining control of an area. But, maintaining
control requires resources to be expended.
When pirate prey is international shipping and the risk of attack becomes too high,
international attention demands counter-piracy actions be taken. In early times protection
of merchant shipping was provided by a combination of great empire power and the power
of mercantilism. The ability of the large mercantile companies to have what were
essentially their own private navies disappeared as the mercantile companies either ceased
to be commercial entities or were transformed into modern corporations.4 This left
enforcement of order on the seas to state powers with capable naval forces. For many
years the British navy was unmatched upon the seas. More recently a combination of
United States and Soviet naval power dominated the oceans. Today, the most effective
control is with cooperative international efforts. These efforts alone are not enough to
eliminate piracy. Ship owners and operators must take all reasonable actions to reduce
their vulnerability. The better their knowledge of the risk for a pirate attack the better they
can prepare.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Pirates must have a target ship and ships are found in port and along shipping lanes.
As early as trade occurred by sea, piracy soon followed. Ships with limited navigational

4
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abilities would travel near shorelines and those who inhabited the shore would intercept
the ship and take the cargo. Such raids were a normal part of survival and economic
development during the early history of man.
Piracy has roots in the ancient world where taking from others was seen as a
legitimate means of survival. The term pirate comes from the Latin pirata and from the
Greek peirates meaning attacker. In describing archaic Eastern Mediterranean societies,
Alfred P. Rubin claims “The word ‘peirato’ and its derivatives seem to be applied to
traditional Eastern Mediterranean societies operating in ways that had been accepted as
legitimate for at least a millennium.”5 In ancient times, Greco-Roman laws, developed for
and by the Greeks and Romans to instill order and further their economy, were either not
recognized and/or understood by non-Greco-Roman societies. By means of Roman
hegemony, Roman rules and laws were imposed on those they traded with or conquered.
This jus gentium or law of the people is the basis for customary international law and forms
the basis of Western culture. Rubin goes on to explain that the first recorded references
were “not bound to ‘piratical’ acts on the ‘high seas,’ but to a conception of ‘piratical’
villages forming a society [poleis] on land that refused to accept Roman supremacy.”6 Thus
the label pirate was as much about an older tradition which was originally viewed as
legitimate being unacceptable to the new order.

Roman Roots
As trade through the Mediterranean increased so did incidences of piracy. Greek
and Roman mariners who traveled the Mediterranean were victims of piracy. Early
5
6
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mariners navigated by remaining relatively close to the shorelines and thus were easy
targets for those who lay in wait behind headlands. These incidences of piracy were clearly
simple targets of opportunity. It is unclear that the concept of piracy even existed during
this time frame. In his book, The Law of Piracy, Rubin says:
…the fundamental Greek and Roman conception of “piracy” distinguished between
robbers, who were criminals at Roman law, and communities called “piratical”
which were political societies of the Eastern Mediterranean, pursuing an economic
and political course which accepted the legitimacy of seizing the goods and persons
of strangers without the religious and formal ceremonies the Romans felt were
legally and religiously necessary to begin a war.7
Rubin further explains that the Romans dealt with “pirates” as enemies who must be
met in war and defeated.8 Thus when Roman authority was not accepted, it was imposed
by force. The Romans applied the term piracy to those “whose views of law and
intercommunity relations appear to have reflected millennium-long tradition that had
become an obstacle to Roman trade and inconsistent with Roman views of the world order
under Roman hegemony.”9 While Rubin is making this case about the communities of
Eastern Mediterranean people, the same argument can undoubtedly be made for other
communities of coastal people who took advantage of passing ships.10 Life was rough and
survival was a priority. Nevertheless, as rule of law gradually replaced the chaos of nature,
the definition of acceptable behavior shifted.

Rubin, 12.
Rubin, 12.
9 Rubin, 12.
10 In fact, Rubin speculates this may have been what Sir T.S. Raffles was thinking when he called some of the
Malay sultanates “piratical” (Rubin, 12).
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Asian Roots
In addition to the Mediterranean Sea, another geographic area where maritime
piracy has a very long history is Southeast Asia. Martin N. Murphy describes Southeast Asia
as the “ideal environment for piracy and one where pirate traditions go back virtually
uninterrupted to the fifth century.”11 Just like the in Mediterranean Sea, where there is
access to the water and passing ships, piracy will occur. If the Mediterranean is the
crossroads of European trade, Southeast Asia is the crossroads for global trade. When
European colonizers arrived in Asia in the 18th century, they found piracy to already be
embedded in the culture as a way of life. However, as Martin states, piracy was likely a way
of life in the archipelago long before there was a significant European presence in the
region. “It is a region where pirates can hide in the creeks, small rivers and mangrove
swamps that puncture the coast, and amongst the thousands of other small craft that ply
their innocent trade between the islands.”12 Even a boat laden with a day’s catch of fish
could be a target for someone who would rather take someone else’s catch than expend the
effort to fish for themselves.
As Angus Konstam writes, the establishment of new trade routes brought European
and American merchants into contact with what had been regional piracy. This pirate
activity had likely been ongoing, but had not impacted many from other regions. Equally
important, the merchant ships were seen “as lucrative prizes for many who would
otherwise have been content to eke out a peaceable living from the sea.”13 Increased trade
by European powers increased the targets for piracy. European presence brought western
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culture. It also brought exposure to another way of life, with perhaps a higher standard of
living. But it also brought western norms and laws. When these were not accepted they
were imposed, often forcibly.

The Mediterranean
During the time of the early Roman Empire, piracy in the Mediterranean Sea peaked
around the 3rd century BC.14 The growing prosperity of the empire provided an increase in
trading vessels transiting the sea. Many of the islands and coastal areas not controlled by
the Romans provided bases for pirates. The Romans began a series of expeditions to clear
these pirates out. In some cases, the accusation of piracy was used as an excuse to invade
and conquer an area. The last of these efforts was a massive military operation under the
leadership of Pompey the Great in 67 BC, which resulted in the Romans having control of
the Mediterranean, or the as they called it the Mare Internum (the inner sea).15 The
Romans would maintain this control for four centuries until their empire began to crumble.
Without sea control, piracy would return to the Mediterranean. First in the western
Mediterranean, while the Byzantine Empire continued to control the eastern
Mediterranean. But by the time of the Crusades, piracy had returned in force. The first
Crusade was authorized in 1095 by Pope Urban II in an attempt to restore the Holy Lands
to Catholic control.16 Christian ships attacked Muslim ships and Muslim ships attacked
Christian ships. Often these ships were powered by slaves – Muslim slaves on Christian

Konstam, 15.
Konstam describes Pompey’s campaign in more detail in Piracy: The complete History (Great Britain:
Osprey Publishing, 2008), 20-22.
16 The Crusades lasted for two centuries until the last Catholic outpost fell in 1291. During this time, there
were six major Crusades and many smaller ones.
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ships and Christian slaves on Muslim ships. Attacks that were made in the name of warfare
were justified by the aggressor but often seen as piracy by the victims. The Greek Orthodox
Byzantines were sometimes targets as well, since the Western Church viewed them as
almost as much of a threat as the Muslims.
Since piracy was essentially a form of warfare, it was necessary to make a
distinction between lawful piracy (in terms of the laws of war) and unlawful piracy. Lawful
piracy became “privateering,” whereby a privately operated vessel was authorized by a
legal government to prey on enemy shipping. This authorization was communicated with a
commission during times of war, or a letter of marque in peacetime, that provided
instructions for the conduct of the privateer. The privateers were authorized to keep a
portion of whatever they captured as their payment for the services provided. In essence,
the use of privateers was an economical way to compensate for a lack of naval power.
English privateering began in the 1200’s when Henry III issued the first privateer
commissions to vessels from certain English ports to attack the French. The commissions
specified that half of what was captured was to be paid to the King.17 But even before this,
piracy was viewed by some as “a source of revenue rather than a hindrance to trade,”18
and they were sometimes employed by one side against the other during the Crusades.
This wartime practice of commissioning private ships as privateers became
common practice among western powers as an adjunct to naval power and was adopted by
other cultures that interacted with European colonial expansion. It should be noted
however, that while the European powers clearly recognized their own privateers, they
often labeled the privateers of their opponents as pirates. Additionally, during peacetime, a
17
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letter of marque might be issued to allow individuals “to seek redress for depredations they
suffered at the hands of foreigners on the high seas.”19 The first letter of marque was
issued in 1295 and directed against Portugal.20 A letter of marque authorized the ship to
seize something of equal value from a ship of the same nation as the ship which had caused
their depredation. These two practices were easily confused and sometimes difficult to
distinguish from piracy.
Janice E. Thompson claims that “Privateering commissions represent an effort by
the state to both exploit and control individual violence in the international system.”21
Privateers operated at their own expense, which saved the state money on warships, as
well as the crew to man them, and the state shared in the profit of their exploits. While the
use of privateers was an accepted aspect of warfare and naval warfare was frequent, it was
not a continuous state of affairs. During times of peace, some privateers just carried on as
pirates. This activity was not sanctioned by the state, but as James Cable said, “the factors
that had encouraged the employment of privateers in time of war aggravated the difficulty
of suppressing them in time of peace.”22 This is one of the complexities of the issue; what is
seen as a legitimate aspect of naval warfare, the taking of a competing nation’s ship,
becomes illegal during peacetime.
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The Golden Age
David Cordingly claims that the “great age of piracy,” in which western piracy
flourished, was from the 1650’s until about 1725.23 Others refer to the “Golden Age” of
piracy with definitions of it lasting from 1650 to 1730, although many shorter inclusive
time frames are also defined. These are the pirates who form the basis for the
romanticized popular image of maritime pirates. The era included different waves of
piracy, all of which operated from bases in the Caribbean and along the eastern seaboard of
North America. Marcus Rediker subdivides the Golden Age into three distinct periods.24
The first of these were the buccaneers; these were English, Dutch or French pirates and
privateers who targeted the Spanish colonies and shipping in the Caribbean and eastern
Pacific Ocean. The buccaneers were active from about 1650 to 1680. The second was the
Indian Ocean pirates who sailed the Pirate Round; a sailing route used primarily in the
1690’s which took pirates traveling from the Atlantic around the Cape of Good Hope into
the Indian Ocean after Muslim ships and ships of the East India Company. The route also
saw a brief resurgence of piracy from 1719-1721. Last was the increase of piracy that
followed the end of the War of Spanish Succession. This wave lasted from 1716 to about
1726 and was comprised primarily of privateers employed during the war. At the end of
the war they were left without legitimate targets, but continued attack merchant vessels.
Narrower definitions of the Golden Age focus only on the period of time that
followed the end of the War of Spanish Succession. The Treaty of Utrecht was signed in
March and April of 1713. Some fighting continued until early 1715, by then additional
treaties had been signed and all hostilities ended. Following the Peace of Utrecht, all
23
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outstanding letters of marque were cancelled. Konstam describes the situation: “As many
as 6,000 former privateersmen – all trained to prey on merchant shipping – found
themselves unemployed and the major British and colonial ports were soon filled with
former privateersmen, all looking for work.”25 Some took positions on the expanding
merchant fleet. Others turned to piracy. At the height of their activity in 1720, there were
roughly two thousand pirates operating in the Atlantic Ocean and jeopardizing legitimate
trade.26 When they sailed as privateers, many were considered national heroes. After the
end of the war, their continued activity became a liability and they were hunted down. It
took concerted naval effort to capture these pirates. The penalty was death by hanging.
While most historical accounts treat these individuals as criminals, a recent book by
Colin Woodward takes a different approach. Woodward focuses on the timeframe of 1715
to 1725. He is concerned with a specific “clique of twenty to thirty pirate commodores and
a few thousand crewmen.”27 He tells the story from the perspective of British tyranny and
paints the pirate activity as a maritime revolt that “shook the foundations of the newly
formed British Empire.”28
In the summer of 1713, Benjamin Hornigold and a small band of pirates arrived in
what was left of the port of Nassau on New Providence Island in the Caribbean. They
encountered few residents, all living in dismal conditions. The island had been attacked
and sacked four times during the war by the Spanish and French and conditions had never
been restored. Using Nassau as a base of operations they began to amass their captured
cargoes among the ruins. They established a market through Richard Thompson, the
Konstam, 152.
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largest and wealthiest land owner on Harbour Island, which is located approximately fifty
miles north of Nassau. Together with John Cockram, they became “the leading blackmarket traders of the Golden Age of Piracy.”29
The pirates continued to amass assets and treasure in Nassau and their numbers
expanded. By January 1716, Hornigold had over 100 men and a small fleet of ships. He was
unopposed in his authority. New Providence had become an outlaw state and every day its
population was increasing. “Most of the islands’ pirates were mariners who long suffered
abuse and exploitation in the navy and merchant marine.”30 They rejected the traditional
system, electing their Captains, dividing the food, plunder and work equitably and making
most decisions democratically. By mid-1716, the pirates began to fortify Fort Nassau with
ships’ cannons. As news of the pirate republic spread, disaffected people continued to
arrive; sailors, runaway slaves, free blacks and mulattos, indentured servants, poor
farmers, prostitutes and criminals – just about anyone who was dissatisfied with their lot in
life. “The presence of this rogue state was destabilizing the slave societies around it.”31
As the pirate republic continued to strengthen, the activities of the pirate fleets
became more prominent. The pirates were interfering with trade routes and disrupting
transatlantic commerce. They defied the Royal Navy, blockaded colonial cities and put the
populations into “a state of terror.”32 Eventually, their actions reached the point where
King George I became determined to suppress the pirates. On September 5, 1717, he
signed A Proclamation for Suppressing Pyrates.33 Phase one was to offer a pardon to any
Woodward, 90. John Cockram was one of the leaders among Hornigold’s mariners. He married one of
Thompson’s daughters and settled on an adjacent island.
30 Woodward, 132.
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pirate who surrendered to a British Governor. Phase two was a counteroffensive against
the remaining pirates. British authorities took control of Fort Nassau at the end of July
1718. At the time, the population on New Providence was estimated at 500 to 700 pirates
with approximately another 200 non-pirates.34 Many of the pirates surrendered, those
who did not were hunted down and executed. The island never again became a pirate
haven, although when Great Britain was again at war with Spain in 1719, privateering
commissions were given to many of the former pirates.
Whether the pirate republic fueled the “democratic sentiments that would later
drive the American revolution”,35 as Woodward claims in the prologue of his book, may be
debatable. However, the claim that it was “a zone of freedom in the midst of an
authoritarian age,”36 is clearly true. The pirate republic did not last for long, but it offered
an alternative to the poor, disenfranchised men and women of all races. As an exhibit at
the Whydah Pirate Museum in South Yarmouth, Massachusetts said, “pirate ships were
islands of freedom in a world of few options.”37 Desperate people were willing to take
desperate actions – after all they did not have much to lose.
Although naval efforts were able to essentially eliminate western piracy, or piracy
committed by those they had sovereign control of, other acts of piracy continued. An
example of this was the Barbary pirates. These pirates had operated from the north coast
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of Africa, also referred to as the Barbary Coast, since the collapse of the Western Roman
Empire. As European maritime trade expanded, the pirates were considered a serious
threat.

Barbary Pirates
The Barbary pirates were also referred to as the Barbary corsairs. Corsair was
originally the French term for privateers, but later it became associated with pirates in the
Mediterranean. While western history commonly refers to the Barbary Corsairs as the
“Barbary Pirates,” they operated for the Ottoman Empire in much the same way as
European privateers operated for their sovereign states. For example, Christian Corsairs,
primarily operating out of Malta, were seen as privateers who paid a portion of their take
to those who wrote their commissions.
Konstam points out that the term “pirate” was not in wide use until the 17th and 18th
century. He makes the distinction that that they were Barbary corsairs when they were
being strictly controlled by the Ottoman Sultan – up until Turkish rule collapsed in 1659.
After that time, the beys were only nominally under the control of the Turks. They
essentially operated like independent city-states. They answered to no one other than the
corsairs who kept them in power. For these reasons, the maritime powers of Europe
refused to recognize the authority of the Barbary rulers, who by then were elected from the
ranks of the corsairs. So, Konstam refers to them as Barbary pirates from the mid-17th
century on “to reflect their lack of international recognition.”38
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As always, the line that divides a pirate from a privateer can be a very thin line, or
perhaps a very wide gray line. Letters of marque were often interpreted with
“considerable discretion.”39 Just as Barbary Corsairs sometimes attacked ships whose
nations had negotiated immunity, Christian Corsairs occasionally attacked Christian
shipping. To borrow an often-used phrase about terrorists and freedom fighters: One
man’s pirate is another man’s privateer.
As the western powers brought piracy under control, the Barbary Pirates continued
to operate under the authority of the Bey of Tunisia against those who refused to pay him
the required tribute for freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. While richer
nations paid the tribute fees, lesser nations suffered the consequences. An Islamic Barbary
attack on the Island of San Pietro illustrates this. At that time, The Kingdom of Sardinia
refused to pay tribute, so the Bey commissioned a small group of privateers (Barbary
pirates to the rest of the world) to attack the Island of San Pietro as “part of a centuries-old
extortion scheme.”40 The ships arrived off the shore of the island on September 3, 1798
and sent their crews ashore before dawn when the islanders were asleep. When daylight
arrived, a coordinated attack occurred. The sailors totally ransacked the island, looting
anything of value, including the people. “An astounding 950 people, including 702 women
and children,” were captured and taken back to Tunis to become slaves or be ransomed.41
The motivations for counter-piracy operations were mixed. While the major
western powers were eliminating the scourge of piracy from the Caribbean Sea and
Atlantic Ocean, they were paying tribute to the Bey and allowing the situation in the
Cable, 97.
Zacks, 3.
41 Zacks, 4. For a more detailed description of the incident, and the events that followed leading to the
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Mediterranean Sea to continue. To some extent, this situation was in their commercial
economic interest, since it caused more harm to the smaller nations. But by the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, it was clear that the Barbary corsairs only served their own interests.
Additionally, public opinion on slavery was swinging to the anti-slavery camp and this
included the use of slaves to power galley ships. British naval forces bombarded Algiers in
1816 and forced the Bey to release 1,600 slaves. In 1830, the French occupied Algiers and
the Barbary Corsair operations were effectively stopped.42 While, the corsairs have ceased
to operate, their legacy remains as a reminder of how cruel and unpleasant piracy can be.

Colonization of Southeast Asia
On the other side of the world, the situation in Asia also illustrates how exploration
and trade struggled to replace the traditional ways of maritime life which Western culture
called piracy. As Europeans and Americans expanded their trade routes across the globe in
the 18th century, they encountered “regional pirates whose influence had rarely been felt
beyond their own shores.”43 By the early 19th century, the southern end of the straits of
Malacca was renowned for piracy and the colonial powers continually struggled to control
it. Some of this piracy can be attributed to American and European privateers and pirates
who decided to sail the Pirate Round. This was dealt with in much the same way as piracy
in the Caribbean.
The regional piracy was of a different nature. While the Europeans were motivated
by commerce and its expansion, the Asian way of life was different. The Sultans saw the
way Europeans conducted commerce as beneath them, but felt it was their birthright to
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profit from the trade that passed through their waters. The region had served as a trading
entrepôt long before the Europeans arrived. There is certainly a parallel between this
attitude and the attitude of those who inhabited the coastal areas of the Mediterranean.
Both believed passing ships to be fair game. For the Asians, when proper tribute was not
being paid, they would take their portion. For this they were labeled as pirates by western
powers.
To get a better understanding of the opposing positions on this issue, let us step
back and review a bit of the regional history. The spice trade had long been established in
southeast Asia beginning with the 7th century emergence of Srivijaya as a city-state, located
on the Indonesian island of Sumatra. As Srivijaya expanded, it became a thalassocracy, or
seaborne empire, with its focus along the coastline and in the ports. It covered both sides
of the Malayan Peninsula, as well as Sumatra, controlling the straits of Malacca. Srivijaya
essentially functioned as a “toll-keeper” for the trade between the Middle East, India and
China.44
By the 11th and 12th centuries, Srivijaya was in decline. By the 14th century it had
faded away. In the 15th century, it was replaced by the Sultanate of Malacca, an Islamic
kingdom with influence that stretched as far north as the Philippine islands. The city-state
of Malacca was the hub of an influential intra-island trading network and was considered
one of the major world ports of its time.45 Again, geographic position and maritime skills
were leveraged to build prosperity.
This was the political organization that the Portuguese found during the
explorations of Vasco da Gama in 1498. Shortly after da Gama’s voyage, the Portuguese
44
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established trading posts throughout Asia. They defeated Malacca in 1511, with the
intention of establishing a monopoly over the spice trade. They spared the Hindu, Chinese
and Burmese inhabitants but slaughtered all the Muslims. The Sultan was able to flee from
the invading Portuguese and he established a new Sultanate of Johor. Without a complete
understanding of the spice trade, Portuguese rule merely forced many regional traders to
other ports and Malacca began a period of decline.
The Dutch arrived in the region, in the form of the Dutch East India Company, in the
early 17th century.46 They seized Ambon in the Maluku Islands in 1605 and Banda Island
in 1623. After repeated attempts, they ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641. They
maintained their control of the spice trade with “divide and rule” tactics. This exploitation
allowed the Dutch to temporarily gain a monopoly of the Spice trade, but it had long term
negative consequences for the native peoples it impoverished. This included the both the
people working the land and the sea peoples who has traditionally made their living by
policing the waters and collecting port duties. By dispossessing the sea peoples of their
traditional rights, the Dutch turned them into “pirates.”47
Expanding from their base on the Indian continent, the British would arrive as the
English East India Company.48 As early as 1685 they established a pepper trading post at
Bencoolen (Bengkulu) on the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia. They acquired control of
Penang, on the Malayan peninsula in 1786. In 1819, Stamford Raffles arrived in Singapore

The Dutch East India Company was established in 1602. It would come to be considered the largest and
richest private company in the world with a fleet of more than 150 merchantmen and almost 50 warships.
(Konstam, 250) The Netherlands granted the company the power “to make war, conclude treaties, acquire
territories and build fortresses.” (Thompson, 10).
47 Trocki, 69.
48 The English East India Company came into being 1600 when Queen Elizabeth I of England signed a charter
which established the “Honourable East India Company” and gave it a monopoly on the trading rights in
India. (Konstam, 250).
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and negotiated the right to establish a trading post. By this time the thriving spice trade
had become a lucrative business for the European powers.
The rivalry between the Dutch and British for colonial power was not helpful to
improving the piracy situation in Southeast Asia. However, in 1824 these two European
powers signed the Anglo-Dutch Treaty which effectively divided the area into two separate
spheres of influence. Britain retained Malaya (current day Malaysia and Singapore) while
the Dutch were granted the area around Sumatra as the Dutch East Indies (current day
Indonesia). The British gave over Bencoolen to the Dutch, while the Dutch gave control of
Penang to the British. A further treaty between the British and the Sultan of Johor gave the
British possession of Singapore and established the Straits Settlements. This effectively
ended the Johor-Riau Empire.49
While provisions within the Anglo-Dutch Treaty called for cooperation to suppress
piracy, commercial competition prevented these efforts from being truly effective. On the
surface, it was easier to control the piracy that resulted from the end of the privateering
authorized during open hostilities. Less transparent, was the motivation behind some of
the “regional piracy.” Gerrit Knapp provides an example of this when he credits Dutch
supremacy in Indonesia as manipulating Papuan pirates. As he says;
…robbery and barter were two complementary sides of one activity. For a long
time, this activity was intrinsic to the political economy of the area. In such
circumstances, violence was lingering never far beneath the surface. Those persons
acting as pirates, the aggressors as it were, were certainly not part of a marginal
criminal group on the fringes of society. On the contrary, the phenomenon was
taken for granted and members of the elite were often heavily involved.50
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An Alternative Perspective
From examples such as this, it is clear that there is often more to the story than
official dispatches might indicate. Additionally, colony powers, who recorded history, did
so through the prism of their own paradigm. As Carl A. Trocki says in his book Prince of
Pirates, there is a continuing need to “deconstruct and examine carefully the legacy of
colonial history and its impact on our current understanding of the history of Southeast
Asia and of Malaysia…” This region had a long and rich history before the Europeans
arrived. To only think about history in terms of the colonialist paradigms slants our
perceptions. Not only were the colonials biased by their values, they also sometimes
labeled something for political efficiency. As Trocki says: “No country’s history is so well
documented yet so poorly understood as that of a former colony.”51
Most histories of the region fail to consider the role of the entrepôt as the
foundation of Malay power.52 Malay negeri (or states) were not self-absorbed riverine
enclosures as so many colonial histories describe them. They made themselves into the
center of “expansive maritime networks with lines of communication reaching throughout
the Southeast Asian seas and stretching from Africa to China and Japan, and from the
Persian Gulf to northern Australia.”53
Trocki writes about Temenggong54 Abdul Rahman who was the sea lord of the Riau
entrepôt. “Riau was part of the ancient Kingdom of Johor,55 the maritime state which had
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received all the import and export duties and had jurisdiction over all foreigners.
55 At this time, Johor referred only to a vague geographical area, much of it composed of islands. It should not
be confused with the current Malaysian state of Johor.
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dominated the southern part of the Malay Peninsula and eastern Sumatra since 1512.”56
His authority came from the Sultan and his governance was concerned with the orang laut
or sea peoples who lived on the various islands. The entrepôt was the last in a succession
of similar urban centers, dating back to Srivijaya. It maintained control of the international
maritime commerce that passed through the region. The people supported their way of life
with trade revenues. Any decline in trade could have a serious impact, as the revenues
were used to import the food supply. During these declines, “the sea peoples had to fend
for themselves by becoming pirates.”57
When thinking about the 1819 treaty between the Sultanate and Britain it is easy for
us to understand the British desire to gain control of the region. For the Sultan, the treaty
was “an attempt to reorganize an empire based on the traditional pattern.”58 Allowing the
British to establish a trading post would encourage trade, of which the Sultanate hoped to
get a cut. This assumption failed to recognize that the British wished to establish a freetrade zone. Conflicts ensued, which eventually lead to the 1824 treaty that was settled in
favor of the English East India Company. As a result of this second treaty, the Temenggong
lost all of his legal authority in Singapore and was forced to relocate to Teluk Belanga on
the west side of town, away from the Singapore river.
These arrangements failed to recognize the political and economic realities of the
situation and piracy became a stubborn problem. The orang laut traditionally patrolled the
many channels and straits of the region. Under the Temenggong, they assisted in collecting
the port duties from the vessels. The Temenggong also ran what amounted to an
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intelligence network concerning shipping traffic. Port people passed information about
who had or had not paid the proper duties. Those who had not paid would be attacked.59
All this was prohibited by the treaty. The allowance that the Sultan and Temenggong were
granted was insufficient to pay the sea peoples, so they continued with their former duties
on a free-lance basis – they became “pirates.”60 Trocki provides cultural context:
As long as the Malay political system of the region was operative, the
activities of the sea peoples had been violent but perfectly legitimate. The sea
peoples possessed the seas and what floated on them by hereditary-feudal right
from the Sultan of Johor. So long as their chiefs held a valid title from the Sultan,
their “patrol” activities regarding trade were a legitimate naval operation.
Some groups of ‘orang laut,’ however, did not come under the recognized
chiefs. These were ‘perompak’ – wanderers and renegades who included hereditary
outlaw bands with no fixed abode. ٭There were also ‘perompak’ who were
temporary bands of outlaws under down-on-their-luck rajas and foreign
adventurers. At this time, certain groups were disorganized and in a turbulent state
because of recent economic difficulties. They too had a traditional role in Malay
politics, supplying much of the dynamic of political history in the region. ٭٭During
the years 1787-95, when there was no legitimate ruler resident in the archipelago,
everyone was a ‘perompak.’ But it should be understood that this was an
exceptional period in Malay history.61
Under the 1824 treaty a power vacuum was created in the local political system and
so “piracy” reigned.62 Throughout the decade that followed the topic of piracy and how
best to control it would occupy much of the Europeans’ attention. The fact that all this
activity was considered piracy demonstrated how the Europeans failed to understand the
local culture.63 They declared war on the pirates and set about eliminating them, but
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continued to struggle with the problem. By 1835, the British appointed Abdul Rahman’s
son Ibrahim, who had succeeded his father as Temenggong, the “colony’s official pirate
suppressor.”64 This arrangement can best be seen as a compromise by both the British and
the Malay which allowed Singapore to move forward. In this role, Ibrahim had to tread a
careful path while many of the Malays transitioned to agricultural pursuits.65
Singapore once again became a maritime empire; however, this time it was under
the control of the British East India Company. Past maritime empires had existed by
unifying the sea peoples. The British established their maritime empire by eliminating
competition. The anti-piracy campaigns they waged in the name of peaceful commerce and
free trade wiped out native commerce. They eliminated the sea peoples and replaced them
with their own naval and merchant forces.66

A Different Path in Asia
Trocki writes specifically about the relationship between the Malay and the British,
but the same is true with most colonial conquests. The relationship is unequal. The
colonial powers hold the ultimate balance of power, so in confrontations, the native rulers
have no choice but to submit.67 However, some were harder to subdue than others. The
Moro Pirates, also known as the Sulu Pirates, inhabited the small islands in the Sulu Island
chain. They were Muslim outlaws of the southern Philippines who engaged in piracy
primarily against the Spanish as early as the 16th century. Religious motivation was
people to include the Ancient Romans who labeled traditional activities as piracy and went about eliminating
it.
64 Trocki, 18.
65 For more on this transition of the Malay polity see Trocki, Chapter 4, “The Temenggong and the Chinese
1844-1860,” 98-123.
66 Trocki, 207-208.
67 Trocki, 18.
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partially responsible for the wars that ensued in this region. While some of these pirates
functioned as privateers in these wars others were outright pirates. Across the four
centuries of the Spanish-Moro Conflict, the Spanish were never able to fully suppress
them.68 Another group of pirates from the Philippines were the Ilanun pirates who savagely
attacked shipping and coastal villages until they were eliminated by a naval expedition in
1862.69
The geographic area of continental Asia is extremely large and the coastal regions
vast. There were plenty of places where boundaries were not definitive and when
contested, jurisdictions overlapped. In remote places, communities could easily exist
outside state-based norms and here those who would be labeled as pirates could exist
within a world of their own. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is Giang Binh (or
Jiangping as it was known in Chinese) a region where the Sino-Vietnamese border was
poorly defined during the latter part of the 18th century. Giang Binh is located in the Red
River Delta area at the mouth of a small unnavigable river. The land is agriculturally poor
and unsuited to farming. The area backs up to nearly impenetrable mountains. For these
reasons, the economic opportunities here are limited. Robert J. Antony describes it as the
most notorious clandestine port of this era. From 1780 until it was razed by royalist troops
fighting the Tay Son rebels in 1802, it was a lively border town that specialized as a black
market, handling stolen goods and provisioning pirates who utilized the port. Antony
describes it as an “integral node in the vibrant shadowy economy that crisscrossed the
South China Sea, linking and forming an extensive network of licit and illicit trade.”70 At its
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height, Giang Binh was the hub of an extensive network of black markets and ports friendly
to pirates which stretched southward along the Vietnamese coast and northward up the
Chinese coast.71
The customs and traditions for the communities of Chinese that inhabited the
coastal areas of the South China Sea are very different from those of their western
counterparts. Along the rivers and in the ports of southern China there were floating
villages where the entire community lived and worked on boats. These boat people lacked
the long lineage of landed people due to their mobility and focus on the nuclear family.
They were socially remote and scorned by the onshore society. For the most part they
were beyond government control and created their own voluntary associations.72 “Petty
piracy,” as described by Dian H. Murray, was a survival tactic for those who had no other
means to survive within society and there are examples of it throughout history. In China,
where fishing is a seasonal pursuit, petty piracy was a means to supplement the meager
income of fishing. “During the summer when fishing was poor and dangerous, it was easy
for financially pressed fishermen to take advantage of the southerlies [southern winds] to
sail north to plunder and rob along the coast. Then, with the changing winds and the
approach of the fall, these part-time “pirates” would return home and resume their
fishing.”73 Clearly, piracy was employed when other opportunities were not available and
cases of this sort of piracy, engaged in as a survival tactic, are not the same as those that
occur for other motivations.
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However, Chinese piracy developed into a much more sophisticated form than this
simple opportunistic piracy. Prior to centralized authority, minor warlords controlled the
areas along the coast. Their ships engaged in “trading, raiding or conducting piratical acts
with equal ease.”74 During certain dynasties, the power of these warlords was reduced, and
the problem of piracy lessened. Piracy would again flourish when control was relaxed. As
a result, Chinese piracy became highly organized. The pirates formed large fleets and
controlled long sections of the coastline. During the 15th century, the Chinese government
adopted the practice of paying local rulers to suppress piracy. “While this policy certainly
reduced regional involvement in piracy, it also meant that some of these dubious local
rulers became little more than bandits who enjoyed the protection of the emperor.”75 All of
this set up a pattern of socially accepted piracy.
By 1790 demographic pressures, including overpopulation, had caused an increase
in the amount of survival piracy. “But it was still the petty piracy of individual enterprises
undertaken on a short-term basis.”76 This rapidly changed. By 1795, the pirates had
organized into gangs, many of which were based on family ties. Eventually the gangs
became so large that they took on patron-client relationships to continue to expand. In
many cases the pirate leaders adopted the young gang members as their sons. Murray
credits the Tay Son Rebellion in Vietnam for enabling this rapid escalation. Many of the
Chinese pirates served as privateers for Tay Son. During the reign of the Tay Son, the
Emperor continued to use his “Navy” and the pirates used Vietnam as a “nest” from which
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to operate. Receiving 20-40 percent of the profits from their booty, they reaped great
profits under the Tay Son rule.77
By the time of the rebellion’s ultimate failure in 1802, the character of piracy had
totally changed. With the larger Vietnamese ships, armed with cannons, they were no
longer simply concerned with survival. The gangs were substantially more complex and
had become a formidable force. In 1805, a confederation of between 50,000 and 70,00
pirates controlled the coastal trade and fishing industry in Kwangtung province.78 “The
pirates reached the pinnacle of their power when they were able to extract protection
payments from every type of vessel afloat. Merchants, boat owners, Pilots and fishermen
alike were forces to buy protection before setting out on any voyage.”79
The concept of a protection racket is not unique to Chinese piracy, but it does
demonstrate that this form of piracy was endemically a part of these societies. The
existence of Chinese piracy may be partially attributed to the internal focus of the Chinese
empires. Traditionally, because of geopolitical considerations, the Chinese focused more on
threats from the land than from the sea. China was domestically focused with little interest
in the development of overseas trading arrangements.80 While the Chinese authorities put
a “tough, new sea-war policy” in effect in 1805 it was ultimately tensions from within the
pirate confederation which led to its demise.81 These tensions became apparent in 1809.
The beginning of the end came on January 13, 1810 with the surrender of the first of the
pirate fleets.
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The Lessons of History
These are but a few examples of historical piracy. Clearly, the definitions of “pirate”
and “piracy” are somewhat open to interpretation. Not only did European colonial powers
introduce their western form of laws to a region which had previously functioned with
their own societal rules and norms, but they also biased most of the written records of this
activity. Adrian B. Lapian cautions that colonial records of piratical raids should not be
taken as fact since the line between sea peoples and sea robbers is not clear.82 Trocki’s
Prince of Pirates presents a totally different perspective: from the point of view of the
indigenous population;83 it is clear they did not consider themselves to be pirates. They
were sea peoples who only resorted to piracy when forced by events outside their control.
In fact, in the introduction to the second edition of the book, Trocki says the title “Prince of
Pirates, was a calculated piece of irony…”84 The Temenggongs were Sea Lords; however,
British authorities called them “pirates.”
In summary, there are important take-aways from this historical context. The
behavior of taking goods from vessels passing near the coastline was a common practice of
the ancient world. It happened independently across all coastal regions at various times. It
was viewed as a legitimate means of survival. When this behavior became an impediment
to the expansion of trade, the norms associated with it began to change. These new norms
came primarily from the expansion of western culture. The terms pirate and piracy have
been evolving and therefore do not always equally apply. The deep cultural roots of
“piracy” may provide for localized acceptance and even support for what is otherwise
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considered an illegal act. The murky distinction between pirates and privateers adds
confusion to the issue. As Rubin writes in the preface to The Law of Piracy; “The use of the
term ‘piracy’ as a justification for military action seemed to me inconsistent with its use in
courts of law.”85 It is clear that the term has not been consistently used. While colonial
powers might have labeled a particular activity piratical, in some cases as a justification for
their actions; from the perspective of those who engaged in the activity, it was a defensive
response to the infringement of western imperialism on their way of life. These
considerations make piracy a multifaceted global issue.
Piracy in an evolving issue. The term has been used to characterize behaviors as
unacceptable when they were previously seen as a normal means of survival. At times,
piracy was engaged in when sea peoples were forced to adapt to the changing
environment. While the activity is primarily concerned with the attacks on ships and the
water domain, it cannot be separated from the land environment where the people live. To
gain a fuller understanding of the issue, the motivations must be considered. And for this
socio-economic and political variables are important.

DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME LAW
Starting with the Romans, norms of behavior set by the pater familias were
expanded into written Roman law.86 Initially Roman law applied only to the Romans, but
as the Roman Empire expanded the law was applied to all Roman citizens.87 Laws define
proper conduct within a society based on recognized values and rules. International laws
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define behavior between states, including actions of the citizens of those states. These laws
are based on tradition and are codified by treaties and international agreements.
Roman maritime law grew primarily from Greek maritime tradition.88 As the
Roman Empire spread, so too did what became known as maritime customary law. There
would be a lull in maritime activities during the Dark Ages, but by 1000 AD, Italian trading
city-states were developing. By 1400, Venice was the greatest maritime power of that time.
To administer maritime customary law, they established maritime tribunals in various
ports to allow “trading people the competency to iron out their own troubles.”89
Although Hugo Grotius had formulated the concept of mare liberum or free seas in
1609, it was not generally accepted.90 Throughout the centuries of global discovery by
European powers, claims had been placed on many regions of the globe, including portions
of the oceans. Many of these maritime claims were overlapping and conflicted.91 In the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the concept of mare clausum or closed seas was
proclaimed by Portugal and Spain and supported by the Papal Bulls of 1493 and 1506.92
Under this concept the oceans of the world were divided between these two maritime
powers. These claims were not accepted by other maritime nations and were contested
through piracy, privateering and outright naval warfare.
In parallel with these conflicting claims to the ocean, the concept of territorial seas
began to emerge. In 1598, the book De Jure Belli Libri Tres (Three Books on the Law of
Anderson, 195.
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War) was published by Alberico Gentili. In this text, Gentili put forth the idea that a
sovereign could legitimately treat adjacent waters the same as their land territory. “The
genesis of this concept appears to have been based on control over piracy and other acts
that might threaten the security of a sovereign.”93 By the 17th century, this concept became
clearly defined as three miles, which was the line of sight from the shoreline to the horizon
at sea level. It was also the range of cannon at that time and therefore a distance which
could reasonably be expected to be controlled from the shore. While the three mile limit
was not uniformly adhered to, it was generally accepted. Over time, and as weapons
technology advanced, arguments were made for longer limits. At the same time, not all
nations had the capability of securing larger territorial seas. Extensive debates on this
issue occurred, the latest during the UN negotiations for the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS defines territorial waters, or a
territorial sea, as those waters establish by a state “up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”94
By 1815, nearly continuous naval warfare was over and British naval supremacy
was established.95 Great Britain slowly gave up its sovereignty claims over portions of the
sea to open the way for British ships to sail freely over all of the seas.96 Joined by the
United States, Great Britain pronounced that the seas should be free and reinforced this
concept with freedom of navigation activities. Gradually more and more nations agreed
with this position.97 The concept of freedom of the high seas, or freedom of navigation, has

Brittin, 65.
UNCLOS, Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Section 2 Limits of the Territorial Sea.
95 Cable, 97.
96 Brittin, 123.
97 Brittin, 123.
93
94

40
become a customary international law. Today, it is codified by UNCLOS in Article 87
“Freedom of the high seas.”98
In the relative naval peace which followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, focus
turned to the task of eliminating piracy. By 1856 international agreements began to outlaw
privateers in accordance with international maritime law.99 France, Britain, Russia,
Prussia, Austria, Sardinia (Italy) and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) were all parties to the
Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the Crimean War. Attached to the treaty was the
Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law signed by the same signatories. This
declaration abolished the practice of employing privateers. Not all states agreed with this
direction, significantly, the United States argued that privateering was a way for weak
navies to defend against more dominant navies.100 However, by the turn of the century,
states had banished privateers to the annals of history.101 Section VII of The Hague
Convention of 1907 spelled out the requirements for merchant vessels to be employed as
warships. These requirements mandated the ship be placed under proper naval authority.
Thus, the ability to legally employ violence on the high seas was relegated solely to state
powers.
These changes to the maritime law reflect the how the concept of piracy evolved.
What began as customary law was progressively refined with the passage of time. Just as
western culture drove the concept of piracy, it shaped international maritime law. While
UNCLOS, Part VII, High Seas, Section 1 General Provisions, Article 87 Freedom of the high seas. The article
reads: “1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this convention and by other rules of international law. It
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation,” (the other continues
with other items to be included).
99 Thomson, 70-71.
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privateering served a legitimate purpose, it confused the issue of piracy. Eventually, it
ceased to serve the greater good. What remained, and has never been totally eliminated, is
piracy. The next section will look at how piracy has come to be defined.

DEFINITIONS OF PIRACY
The general definition of piracy is robbery or illegal violence at sea. Most of the
time, piracy is a crime of opportunity. The issue of piracy is not simple and therefore a
general definition is not adequate for today’s global environment. Piracy in territorial
waters and ports is the responsibility of the sovereign nation. As mentioned in the
previous section, territorial seas can extend up to 12 nautical miles from shore. In these
waters, it is often not considered to be piracy, but rather a form of armed robbery.
Individual nations have specific laws which apply within their territory. National laws and
rules regarding piracy/armed robbery vary, just as how capably these laws are enforced
varies. The willingness of these powers to engage in anti-piracy efforts fluctuates greatly,
depending on a multitude of factors. In some cases, the government might even be
complicit with the pirates.
Eventually, although it is not clear exactly when, the concept of piracy, which began
for political purposes as a means of justifying warlike naval activity, came to be associated
with criminal activity on the high seas. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958
defined piracy as jure gentium in article 15.102 It is considered to be a crime against
international society, and as such it falls under universal jurisdiction.103 Every nation has a
responsibility to take action against this crime. The mostly widely accepted legal definition
102
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of piracy is Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b). 104
This legal definition is the result of much international debate and compromise, and
is therefore technically more discriminating than the general definition. Conversely, the
definition is not the most utilitarian as it imposes two constraints on the issue. First it
limits piracy to actions which are taken for private gain. Second it limits piracy to the high
seas. Both limitations deserve more discussion.
The first limitation attempts to draw a distinction between maritime piracy and
maritime terrorism. However, as discussed in the last chapter, it is often difficult to
determine the motivation – whether it is politically motivated or for “private ends.” As Eric
Ellen points out “very often, the identity of the attackers is in doubt and their motives
unclear.”105
Limiting piracy to acts on the high seas respects the sovereignty of individual states,
but if those states do not have their own piracy laws this limitation puts the incidents
which occur in littoral waters or ports outside of a legal definition. The majority of
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incidents occur either in port or within territorial waters. While the limitation of the high
seas is politically sensitive of state jurisdictions it leaves vessels vulnerable in waters
where states are unable or unwilling to properly police these criminal actions.
English courts defined piracy as “any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act
of war.”106 In an attempt to find a more pragmatic definition of piracy, the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) defined piracy as “An act of boarding or attempting to board any
ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to
use force in the furtherance of that act.”107 The IMB used that definition until 2009 when
The International Maritime Organization (IMO)108 defined armed robbery against ships as:
.1 any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
other than an act of piracy committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons of property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
.2 any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above. 109
The politically driven distinction of the act of piracy being committed for private
gain was useful for gaining consensus on international law.110 The distinction divides these
actions on the high seas into maritime terrorism committed for political ends and maritime
piracy committed for private ends. This distinction is not always discernible since it
requires knowledge of perpetrator’s motivations. Additionally, those actions committed
for private gain cover a very large group of actions from small time piracy committed by
Murphy, 1983, 8.
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those driven by desperation to highly organized criminal activity. The motivation for this
spectrum of maritime piracy varies greatly. The small-time piracy is more apt to appear
when there is a lack of other economic opportunities, especially when the perpetrators
consider themselves victims of social injustice. This form of piracy is more likely to be
successfully addressed by offering alternative – and legal – economic opportunities.
Conversely, highly organized criminal activity, such as what exists in the South China Sea, is
a far more complex issue.

CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PIRACY
During the first half of the 20th Century, maritime piracy was virtually nonexistent,
with only a few sporadic incidents reported around the globe.111 This was likely in part
due to the way pirates had been hunted down and hung for their crimes, with their bodies
left to rot as a deterrent to other would-be pirates. As well, this was the time of great naval
powers, who sailed and controlled the seas. Surely there were local regional incidents of
piracy, but those were not the type of events to capture wider attention.
Following WWII, without open naval conflict, most nations decreased the size of
their navies. Up until the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union vied
for control of the seas, but for the most part merchant ships were left to fend for
themselves on the high seas. While private yachts were once the primary target for piracy,
gradually the scope of the problem expanded such that now even the largest of merchant
ships are vulnerable in certain waters. The high seas are a vast global commons beyond
the sovereign jurisdiction of any one nation. Due to “vagaries of jurisdiction, sometimes

111

Konstam, 304.

45
confused and tumultuous international diplomatic relations, and divisive international
political issues,” pirates often find a permissive environment which essentially allows them
to operate with impunity.112 A topic which had nearly vanished from public concern is
back. So now I shift to consider what modern maritime piracy looks like.
Obviously, there are some similarities in all maritime piracy incidents. One
commonality necessary for piracy to take root in an area is a maritime tradition which
provides the necessary skill set. Martin N. Murphy says that trading patterns are one of the
factors that determine the acceptability of piracy. He posits that “piracy has deeper roots
in Southeast Asia than in West Africa because important trading routes have bisected
Southeast Asian archipelagos for centuries, making piracy there a way of life that has been
established for generations, often on a clan or family basis.”113
Piracy does not exist if there are no ships to plunder. Therefore, the shipping
routes are just as significant. The Mediterranean is another area where the trading routes
have a long history. At the same time, new shipping routes create new opportunities for
piracy. The development of the petroleum industry and the shipment of oil is a major part
of the global economy. Oil shipments now cross the globe. West Africa has a significant
role in the shipment of oil, so while the trading routes from West Africa may not have the
same continuous long history as other routes, they create an environment ready for
contemporary piracy. Some aspects of contemporary piracy are different. The mercantile
companies of old that essentially had their own navies are gone. As well, many of the
national merchant fleets have been eroded; the majority of merchant shipping now sails
under flags of convenience where the licensing costs are lower. Additionally, as maritime
112
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technology advanced, the size of the ships increased while the size of the crews decreased.
Today these large ships may have a crew of only a dozen or so merchant mariners, which
reduces their ability to fend off a pirate attack. These factors make these ships particularly
vulnerable to attack.
Meanwhile, modern-day pirates are also able to take advantage of technological
advances.114 Many have high performance boats with radios, radar, and satellite
navigation. Weapons technology has also advanced and so modern-day pirates may be
armed with automatic weapons. These factors also increase ship vulnerability and the risk
of piracy.
These aspects are exasperated by the transnational threats which characterize the
21st century; competing demands for scarce security resources, global proliferation of
arms, and areas of ineffective governance. Maritime piracy is a global phenomenon. It
occurs as a means of subsistence all the way up to sophisticated organized crime.115 No
portion of the oceans is without the risk of piracy. However, incidences of piracy are not
equally distributed across the globe. Both Asia, particularly the waters of Southeast Asia,
and Africa have far more pirate attacks then other regions, and therefore deserve a detailed
discussion.

A recent Seatrade Maritime News article by Vincent Wee reported “Pirates used AIS tracking app to
identify ship to hijack.” September 21, 2017. Accessed September 22, 2017, http://www.seatrademaritime.com/news/asia/pirates-used-ais-tracking-app-to-identify-ship-tohijack.html?utm_content=Pirates%20used%20AIS%20tracking%20app%20to%20identify%20ship%20to%
20hijack&utm_source=Email&utm_medium=Seatrade%20Maritime%20News&utm_contact=23761008&utm
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Contemporary Piracy in Asia
Contemporary piracy in Asia continues to make Asian waters risky for Mariners.
This activity reached a peak of 353 cases of piracy in the year 2000.116 Most of the piracy
occurring in Southeast Asia happens where there are concentrations of ships, especially in
areas where the geography and congestion of ships require the vessels to slow their transit.
There are plenty of coastlines which might harbor pirates. Stefan Eklöf describes the
Southeast Asia coastline as the equivalent of several times the length of the equator.117
Here the incidents are primarily opportunistic and are conducted by fisherman and other
mariners looking to supplement their meager incomes.118 Piracy in the Philippines is an
exception to this. There the incidents are primarily in the waters off the island of Mindanao
and are largely attributed to the inability of the Philippine government to maintain control
in an area that is in conflict with Muslim separatists.119 Piracy in the South and East China
Seas is more complex, involving multiple countries and various local criminal syndicates.120
The highest levels of reported Asian piracy incidents occur in Indonesia. If, as
Murphy said; “Southeast Asia is the ideal environment for piracy,” Indonesia is the most
ideal given its geography as an archipelagic nation. Indonesia consists of over 17,500
islands (only about 6,000 of which are inhabited) and about 34,000 miles of coastline.121
Although Indonesia is concerned about maritime security, their assets are limited and
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piracy is not necessarily their primary maritime security concern.122 In some areas their
control is tenuous at best. Added to these issues is the problem of government corruption,
“a common problem amongst agencies in the region charged with maritime law
enforcement…”123 Most of the reported incidents which occur in Indonesian anchorages
and territorial waters are low-level opportunistic robberies. However, the increasing rate
of these incidents is reason for concern and the IMB has been working with the Indonesian
Marine Police to improve maritime security in these high-risk areas.124 Since many
incidents occur to vessels at anchor, the Indonesian Marine Police have designated certain
anchorages where they will perform increased patrols; these are listed on the ICC
website.125 Other anchorages may have a higher risk for piracy.
The geographies of the Philippines and Malaysia are similar to Indonesia although
neither of them is as vast in scope.126 Murphy suggests that piracy in the Philippines is
likely as big or bigger of a problem but most of the incidents are unreported.127
Throughout the Philippine-Indonesia-Malaysia “tri-border” region, casual killing of
fishermen and local traders unfortunately seems to be a regular occurrence. Protection
fees are common. Piracy does not stop at the shorelines and coastal settlements have also
been raided and forced to pay protection fees. This form of piracy likely has connections
back to the historical regional piracy that typically does not garner international attention.
Murphy, 1983, 73. Murphy lists smuggling of people and goods and the degradation of the maritime
environment through over fishing as higher concerns.
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Adding complexity to this region is the Philippine Mindanao and Malaysian Sabah region
which is effectively linked by the Sulu island chain. Eklöf believes this probably is “the
most dangerous maritime area in the world.”128 Here the tradition of piracy was never
suppressed by the Spanish, and what control the American occupation imposed, vanished
with Philippine independence. Anthony Davis has suggested that there are six individual
groups of armed pirates who operate in this region, some of them with links to the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG).129
The piracy situation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is a very different issue.
Here freedom of navigation and safe passage is of vital interest to many nations. John S.
Burnett describes the five-hundred-mile passage of the Malacca Straits as “the commercial
umbilical connecting Europe, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent to Asia and the
Pacific.”130 Roughly a third of global commerce travels through these straits.131 While
piracy incidents in the straits are lower than their historic peak because of coordinated
international efforts to control piracy, these passages are not risk free; incidents still occur
and Burnett refers to them as “Dangerous Waters.” The number of pirate attacks was so
alarming in the early 2000’s that the straits were declared a war zone in 2005 by the Joint
War Committee.132 This required ships making the passage to carry extra marine
insurance. Through focused efforts, the situation improved and the straits were removed
from the list in August 2006. The IMB has continued to provide a warning about these
waters. Their 2016 annual report says; “The number of attacks continue to drop due to the
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patrols by the littoral states authorized since July 2005.”133 In both areas, Malacca and
Singapore Straits, ships are warned to maintain anti-piracy/robbery watches and be
vigilant.134
Reported incidents in the South China Sea have dropped significantly. Between
1993 and 1995 piracy in this region was second highest, only behind Indonesian
incidents.135 The region of greatest concern is formed by a triangle from Hong Kong and
Macau to Luzon Island in the northern Philippines and to Hainan Island, the southernmost
province of China. This area is called the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan (HLH) triangle. Many
of the incidents here involved organized criminal activity and even more noteworthy,
official Chinese patrol craft were often involved.136 One explanation for why this activity
significantly decreased in 1995 is that the Chinese government reigned in the local
administrations, because these piracy incidents were harming China’s international
reputation and were a challenge to Chinese authority.137 Yet in 2003, Burnett described the
South China Sea as “a lawless, disputed no-man’s-land where ships are frequently hijacked
by pirates in the employ of organized crime syndicates for the precious cargoes they
carry.”138 Some of these waters still remain risky and the ICC website warns mariners to
remain vigilant “in the vicinity off Tioman / off Pulau Aur / off Anambas / Natuna /
Mangkai islands / Subi Besar / Merundung areas.”139
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Certainly, one of the most important developments to come about because of piracy
in Asia was the establishment of the ICC IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. Alarmed by the increasing incidences of piracy, the IMB established the
PRC in 1992 as a free service to mariners.140 The Centre allows attacks to be reported and
acted upon more quickly. While not specifically stated, another factor may have been the
increasing probability that unchecked piracy operations could lead to an environmental
disaster with far reaching consequences to those who depend on the sea for their
livelihood. Murphy discusses two pirate events that could have resulted in a disaster. The
first was in 1991 when, following a pirate attack, the Eastern Power, a fully loaded Very
Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), steamed out of control in the Phillips Channel south of
Singapore for 15-20 minutes.141 The second incident occurred in 1992. A pirate attack left
the Valiant Carrier on fire, steaming out of control, and close to the shore of Sumatra with a
full load of furnace oil.142 Aware of the incredible environment destruction caused by the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989, it is hard to imagine that the
IMB did not at least think about the potential for piracy to cause an environmental disaster
when the PRC was created.
The Piracy Reporting Centre is a 24-hour operation. It functions as a nongovernmental organization and is capable of being the first point of contact for mariner
reports of pirate or armed robbery activity, not only in Asian waters, but globally. In
October 1992, the IMB began to issue daily situation reports to improve situational
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awareness of ships at sea.143 These reports allow mariners to make better informed
decisions about their sailing routes. They have not eliminated the problem; in fact, it has
generally continued to grow in magnitude. Perhaps more troubling is a parallel trend of
“growing sophistication and increasing violence” in these pirate attacks.144
Between 1990 and 1994 there was an average of less than 100 incidents of piracy a
year.145 From 1994 to 1999, the annual average increased to 209.146 In 1999 there were
285 piracy incidents; attacks on ships at sea, at anchor or in port.147 There were 2,463
actual or attempted acts of piracy reported between 2000 and 2006, this increased the
annual average to 352.148 Analysis of the data for more recent years is provided in
Chapter 5.
All of this clearly implies an increasing trend in the number of global piracy
incidents, although some of it may also be attributed to better or more consistent incident
reporting. When I spoke with Noel Chang, the Director of the PRC, in 2015 about how he
measures the effectiveness of the Centre, his reply was the amount of cooperation between
the ships and between governments.149 The number of reported incidents is less important
because there is no way to know what percentage of incidents are being reported. But
increased communication, sharing of information, and cooperation leading to counterpiracy actions are critical to success.
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Another cooperative international organization which has developed to deal with
the threat of piracy in Asia is The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).150 Unlike the ICC’s IMB Piracy
Reporting Centre, ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government agreement to
promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. The
agreement to form ReCAAP was finalized on 11 November 2004, and the organization
entered into force on 4 September 2006. There are currently 20 nations who are
Contracting Parties.151 ReCAAP’s Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established 29
November 2006 and has since been recognized as an International Organization. The ISC,
located in Singapore, uses a secure web-based information network system to exchange
information between the contracting parties. This network allows ReCAAP “Focal Points”
(each contracting party designates a focal point) to be linked to the ISC and each other
around the clock. They are able to exchange information about piracy incidents, support
anti-piracy capacity building efforts and negotiate cooperative arrangements. However, it
is worth noting that neither Malaysia nor Indonesia are member states (although they may
become at some future date), and it is difficult for ReCAAP to operate efficiently without
these two critical states’ full participation.
In the event of a piracy incident, the ISC is able to facilitate appropriate responses:
“The agency receiving the incident report will manage the incident in accordance to its
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national policies and response procedures, and provide assistance to the victim ship where
possible. The agency will in turn, inform their ReCAAP Focal Point which will submit an
incident report to the ReCAAP ISC and its neighboring Focal Points.”152 The ISC attempts to
validate and maintain accurate information on piracy incidents. They provide greater
detail of the incident than the IMB and try to follow up on each incident to monitor law
enforcement response.153 The centre is also responsible for analyzing the statistics of
piracy and armed robbery incidents to develop a better understanding of the situation in
Asia. Lastly, they cooperate with other organizations and parties via information sharing,
joint exercises, and other forms of cooperation, as appropriate, and agreed by the
Contracting Parties.154 This includes hosting workshops and participating in conferences
to share lessons learned, including best management practices for anti-piracy efforts. They
have formal cooperation agreements with the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as well as other like-minded
organizations.155 ReCAAP provides a strong example of why international cooperation is
important on an issue as complex as piracy and provides a model for cooperation in other
regions.
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A third organization is the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) hosted by the Republic
of Singapore Navy. The IFC is a regional Maritime Security information-sharing center
which was opened in April 2009. As a military organization, the IFC is more operationally
focused than the other organizations. The Centre hosts liaison officers from 15 partner
nations and has linkages to another 20 countries and 65 agencies.156 Staffed 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, the goal of the IFC is to enhance the collective understanding of the
maritime domain for collaborative strengthening of maritime security. In addition to
providing real-time updates of actionable information, the IFC conducts capacity-building
workshops and exercises.
The three organizations; the PRC, ReCAAP, and the IFC, demonstrate the wide
variety of stakeholders with interest in the issue of maritime piracy. The PRC, while funded
purely by donations, represents the commercial interests of the IMB. The Centre focuses
on increasing awareness of piracy and protecting the lives of mariners. ReCAAP is an intergovernmental organization whose objective is to enhance cooperation and increase
capacity to for counter-piracy efforts. The IFC is a military organization with the mission of
sharing operational information. The need for all of these organizations speaks to the
complex challenges to fighting piracy.
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Contemporary Piracy in Africa
Forty years ago, West Africa had the highest rates of piracy anywhere in the world.
In 1981, the IMO declared the Nigerian coastline to be the most dangerous worldwide.157
By the 1990’s attention shifted to Asia where there was concern that piracy rates in the
Straits of Malacca would spin out of control.158 As the new millennium arrived, the piracy
rates in Somalia began to take center stage. By 2009, Somali piracy composed more than
50% of worldwide reported pirate incidents. In 2011, it peaked at nearly 54% of
worldwide reported pirate activity. That year the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre received a
total of 237 incident reports attributed to Somali pirates.159 Over 700 hostages and 32
vessels were being held by Somali pirates, with huge ransoms demanded for their
release.160
Up until 2013, Somali pirate incidents outnumbered the total incidents in all the rest
of Africa. While it is difficult to determine the exact origin of these attacks, they began in
the early 1990’s following the political disorder that resulted from the ouster of
Muhammad Siad Barre, the socialist dictator who was overthrown by clan-based warlords.
Early on, Somali pirate attacks were a focus of concern because of the heavy weapons (e.g.
mortars and grenades) which were used against ships transiting the coast as well as those
in port.161 These may have been supplied by the civil war which was ravaging the country,
resulting in a near total breakdown of a functioning government. The pirates sometimes
presented themselves as Somali Coast Guard officials. It is possible that they actually were
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corrupt law enforcement officials.162 Given the breakdown of Somali governance, past
government officials needed an alternate means of supporting themselves. The semilegitimate organizations such as the Somali Coastal Defense Force, the Somali Marines and
the National Volunteer Guard were all implicated in piracy operations, conducted under the
appearance of legitimacy.163
However, law enforcement officers were not the only ones who needed to find ways
to support themselves. Without a functioning government, conditions in Somalia were
bleak for many. Desperate fishermen turned to piracy. Initially, they targeted foreign
fishing boats. They would keep the catch and ransom the crews. When the fishing vessels
hired local warlords to provide protection, the pirates adapted and began to target
commercial vessels.164
Attacks by Somali pirates began in coastal waters and gradually increased in range
as the pirate tactics evolved. This is the warning in the IMB annual report for 2000:
Somalian waters continue to be a risk prone area for hijackings. Ships should
keep at least 50 nm and if possible 100 nm from the Somali coast. Ships not
specifically calling at Somali ports should avoid approaching the Somali coast.
Armed pirates in speedboats and gunboats open fire on ships / yachts and rob or
hijack them. Some crew had been injured or killed in the past. Communications
including the VHF in these waters should be kept to a minimum.165
In 2005, there was a significant increase in Somali pirate attacks. The IMB warnings
reported that Somali pirate attacks had been reported as far away from the shore as 400
nautical miles. The pirates were using larger vessels, which they had obtained or were
holding hostage, to function as “mother ships.” This tactic significantly increased the range
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of the pirates. Ships not calling on any Somali ports were advised to maintain their track at
least 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast.166 Murphy credits this increase of Somali
piracy to the inability to affect the economic factors which were driving it. As he says,
“Shadowy home-grown leaders with a clear understanding of supply and demand
transformed what was a small-scale nuisance before 2005 into a disciplined and effective
machine…”167 Failure to address the initial problem allowed it to expand into a much
larger problem.
As a result of this surge in piracy incidents in the waters off Somalia, the European
Union Naval Force launched Operation Atalanta in December 2008 to “deter, prevent and
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.”168 Their specific tasks set
by the EU Council are:
1. Protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable
shipping;
2. Deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea;
3. Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia;
4. Support other EU mission and international organizations working to strengthen
maritime security and capacity in the region.169
As part of these efforts, The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA)
was set up as a 24-hour manned watch center at the Northwood Headquarters in
Hertfordshire, England. MSC-HOA monitors shipping traffic transiting the Gulf of Aden.
The Centre maintains an interactive website with the latest anti-piracy guidance. Shipping
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companies and ship operators are “encouraged to register their movements with MSC-HOA
to improve their security and reduce the risk of attacks or capture.”170
By January 2009, Somali pirate activity increased enough to capture global
attention. It was a maritime issue which had been festering within the shipping and
maritime insurance communities. Now it became headline news and international action
was demanded. The incidences of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden had reached unprecedented levels for modern times. Equally unprecedented was the
global response. The UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created and
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 was established with a “specific piracy mission-based
mandate” under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)
1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1897.171 In addition to the member nations who formally
comprise the CTF, other nations have contributed naval assets to the anti-piracy mission to
create a level of international naval cooperation never before seen. CTF 151 operated in
conjunction with the EU Naval Force’s Operation Atalanta.
On February 1, 2009, MSC-HOA established an Internationally Recommended
Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. This allowed for military assets, both ships and
planes, to be strategically deployed along the route of the corridor and better protect
transiting merchant ships. Ships could register the details of their intended transit. The
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ships were also encouraged to make the transit in groups based on their transit speed.172
In August 2009, the IMO officially endorsed the establishment of the IRTC and encouraged
member governments to make ship owners, operators and crews aware of the guidance.173
Also in February, the first version of the Best Management Practices (BMP) to avoid
and respond to a pirate attack were published. The BMP was developed by organizations
who represented the interests of ship owner, mariners, and marine insurance companies.
The New York Declaration was signed in May and September by ten countries committing
them to promulgate the BMP to vessels on their ship registries and to ensure the ship’s
security plans required by the ISPS code included these practices.174
In August 2009, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield also began naval operations in
support of the Combined Maritime Forces’ anti-piracy efforts. NATO’s ships focused on
protecting the ships of Operation Allied Provider which were transporting relief supplies as
part of the World Food Programme’s mission in the region and capacity building of regional
maritime security forces to assist in counter-piracy operations. Eventually, there would be
multiple ongoing efforts operating in the Gulf of Aden; the three organized missions (EU,
CTF 151, NATO) and a wide variety of independent ships from other navies, notably China,
India, Russia, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea. Without a centralized command
structure, they were voluntarily collaborating to secure the maritime region impacted by
Somali piracy. As Donna Hopkins, the coordinator for counter-piracy and maritime
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security in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs stated, that was a
“remarkable phenomenon.”175
Despite all these efforts, incidences of piracy attributed to the Somali pirates
continued to increase. In 2010, the pirates continued to employ “mother ships” and their
range of attacks were attributed to an “extended geographical area from the southern part
of the Red Sea in the west to 72° East longitude and beyond in the east. Incidents have also
been reported off the coast of Oman/Arabian Sea in the north extending southward to 22°
South.”176 In 2011, the warning range was extended even further to 76° East longitude.177
This year was the peak of activity with 237 incidents, making up more than half of the total
439 incidents reported for that year. The good news was that the number of successful
ship hijackings decreased from 49 in 2010 to 28 in 2011.178 The following year there was
another significant decrease. Attacks in 2012 attributed to the Somali pirates accounted
for less than 25 percent of world incidents; 75 of 297 reported attacks of which just 14
were hijackings.179
Finally, all of the efforts and resources which were being directed at the piracy
problem were having an effect. The ships carrying the WFP relief supplies and
humanitarian aid materiel were able to safely deliver their cargos with the escort of the EU
and NATO ships. International maritime security forces’ aggressive interdiction efforts
reduced the number of successful pirate attacks. The implementation of the Best

Maritime TV panel discussion, “Donna Hopkins, U.S. State Department Coordinator Discussed Counter
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Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy180 by the maritime
industry significantly decreased ship vulnerability – no ships with armed guards were
successfully hijacked.181 And at least some progress was being made on the issue of how to
legally deal with detained pirates.182 What remained to be seen was if this improved
situation was sustainable.
While acts of piracy were decreasing in the Gulf of Aden, they were on the increase
in the Gulf of Guinea. The ICC IMB annual report for 2012 reported the following trend: “As
for West Africa, piracy is rising in the Gulf of Guinea, with 58 incidents recorded in 2012,
including ten hijackings, and 207 crew members taken hostage. Pirates in this area are
particularly violent with guns reported in at least 37 of the attacks.”183 An article published
by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies attributed this increase to the region’s rapid
economic growth, the limited maritime security presence, and the increasing use of the
area by traffickers of narcotics from South America.184 As the Somali pirate attacks
continued to decline, this region became the area with the highest level of pirate attacks in
2013. The predominant perpetrators are Nigerian pirates, operating out of Lagos, although
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there have also been spikes of activity from Benin and Togo, and there are occasional
incidents in the waters of other Gulf of Guinea nations.185 The trends observed in the Gulf
of Guinea do not bode well; the percentage of the incidents occurring in international
waters has significantly increased, as has the severity of the attacks.186 Both of these point
to an increased level of organization and sophistication of piracy in this region. Thus, I end
this discussion of contemporary African piracy where I began, off the coast of Nigeria,
emphasizing the cyclical character of maritime piracy.

Current Status
Contemporary piracy continues to be a very real and present danger for the
maritime industry. Much of the time piracy is a crime of opportunity. In other instances,
piracy is a highly organized criminal activity. Either way, maritime piracy continues to be a
very clear risk across the globe. Its prevalence varies based on complex considerations. A
globally connected world depends on maritime shipping to transport vast amounts of
materials and goods. Increased shipping transits means increased opportunities for piracy.
The latest annual report from the ICC IMB reported the lowest worldwide total of
attacks since 1998. The total number of pirate attacks for 2016 was 191 incidents.
However, the number of mariners kidnapped was the highest in the last 10 years; 62 crew
were kidnapped from their vessels and another 151 were held hostage. The numbers
break down as follows: 150 vessels were boarded, 7 vessels were hijacked, 12 vessels were
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fired on and there were 22 attempted attacks.187 There was a noticeable drop in
Indonesian incidents and incidents were also down in Vietnam and Bangladesh.
Conversely, there is an emerging threat of kidnapping in the Sulu Seas, which escalated in
quantity and scope during the last quarter of the year. The Gulf of Guinea remains a highrisk area for kidnapping and there has been a noticeable increase in incidents off Nigeria,
some almost 100 nautical miles from shore. There were two attempted attacks off Somalia,
after there being none in 2015. Finally, there were 11 incidents recorded for Peru
compared to zero in 2015.188
Despite encouraging trends in some regions, the trends in other regions continue to
highlight the need for constant vigilance. And even in the Gulf of Aden, where the most
significant improvements have been made, that progress is very fragile. Although there
were no successful attacks on large merchant ships in 2015 or 2016189 the pirate activity
off the coast of Somalia had “increasingly shifted to the hijacking for ransom of dhows and
foreign fishing vessels.”190 CTF 151 continues to operate; there are currently 32 nations
participating in the coalition.191 Additionally, the European Council has extended
Operation Atalanta until the end of 2018.192 This decision was based on the fact that Somali
pirates still have the capacity and intent to engage in maritime piracy, as was demonstrated
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by six armed men 330 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia on October 22, 2016. 193
Meanwhile, there are plenty of competing demands for maritime security assets. NATO
made the decision to end Operation Ocean Shield as of December 15, 2016.194 This
decision was based on the changing political environment and the need to reallocate
resources to deal with the refugee crisis and human smuggling occurring in the
Mediterranean.195
The significant gains made to improve the security of the maritime domain will be
fleeting if they are not matched by gains on the shore. The UN Secretary General’s October
2016 Report called the progress on building a federal state in Somalia significant, but
fragile and reversible.196 The root causes of piracy continue to be “a fragile economy, a lack
of alternative livelihood, insecurity and weak governance structures.”197 The report
further observed that “It is particularly important to direct collective international efforts
at tackling the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia, in particular in the coastal
areas.”198 Sadly, recent drought conditions in Western Africa have brought famine
conditions back to Somalia. A CNN World Report on March 8, 2017 summed up the critical
situation with the headline “Somalia: ‘People are dying of hunger… there’s no water.’”199 It
was a mere two days later that pirates successfully hijacked the first commercial ship in
Maritime Executive, November 28, 2016. Details of the attack on CPO Korea are available in ICC IMB 2016
Annual Report, 57. This was one of the two attempted attacks for 2016.
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five years.200 Following that event, there were two additional hijackings of dhows and five
commercial vessels have been fired upon. While it may be difficult to definitively prove a
direct cause and effect, the already poor conditions in Somalia appear to be worsening.
Before concluding this chapter, I want to take a short detour to an area which I have
not addressed. South and Central America and the Caribbean Waters make up another
region that the ICC IMB groups together. Typically, there are no significant events to
warrant attention. Between 2011 and 2015, the only place that earned a mention in the
section of the report for warning of areas prone to attacks, has been Guayaquil, Ecuador; in
2016, Callao Peru was added to the warnings. All the attacks listed for this region have
been robberies conducted on ships in the port or at anchorage. These are the type of low
level events which regularly occur without garnering wider attention. I want to mention a
place that has not been singled out since 2010.

Venezuela – an Illustrative Side Note
The economic situation in Venezuela has deteriorated to the point that most of the
population is in economic crisis. A July 2017 article in The Economist reported “An
astonishing 93% of them say they cannot afford the food they need, and three-quarters
have lost weight in the past year.”201 If the situation continues through the rest of this year,
inflation will have exceeded 1,000% and the economic collapse which started in 2012 will
have become the steepest in modern Latin American history. The average individual

The details of the hijacking are available on the ISS IMB’s Live Piracy Map and Live Piracy Report.
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income has fallen to what it was in the 1950s. Price controls and government take-overs of
private firms have led to shortages of critical supplies like food and medicine.
Weakened oil prices have certainly contributed to the situation; however, Venezuela
has extensive oil resources which could still allow for the country to flourish. Instead, a
corrupt government, the most corrupt in Latin America, has led the country backwards.
Government officials have embezzled billions and the common people suffer. President
Maduro “spends public money lavishly, especially on his supporters.” When he cannot pay
the bills, he prints more money.”202 There have been protests in the streets, but heavyhanded government tactics have led to over 100 deaths and hundreds more have been
imprisoned for political reasons. Venezuelans are infuriated by the current situation which
has become explosive.
This sort of environment, where social dissatisfaction is high and people are unable
to improve their situation by normal means, provides incentives for illegal activity. In fact,
the same article in The Economist reported that “Venezuela has become a favored route for
drug-trafficking and is awash with arms.”203 Given that Venezuela has a long coastline, my
hypothesis would be that this is also an environment where maritime piracy would be
emerging. The data on piracy incidents, reported to the IMB, for the last 10 years is
provided in table 3-1. The numbers show an increasing trend since 2013, but a higher
number of incidents occurred in 2010. For the most part, these are non-violent low-level
events that occur in territorial waters. At this point, there is nothing alarming about the
data. The question to consider is: if the conditions in Venezuela continue to deteriorate
will we see a higher number of attacks?
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Table 2-1. Actual and Attempted Piracy and Armed Robbery Attacks Against Ships 204

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Venezuela
1
3
5
7
4
0
0
1
1
5

A December 2016 article on the website “Inside Crime” did in fact claim that the
economic crisis in Venezuela is fueling piracy on the Caribbean coast.205 The article
focused on the coastal community of Sucre where there was once a thriving fishing
industry. “People can’t make a living fishing anymore, so they’re using their boats for the
options that remain: smuggling gas, running drugs and piracy.”206 Not all the fishermen are
involved, but some are also victims of the crimes with their boats or boat motors being
stolen, often with violence; dozens of fishermen have been killed during the robberies. The
following analysis of the situation was provided:
Acts of piracy against cargo vessels or private yachts off Venezuela’s
Caribbean coast have been reported for a number of years now, and Sucre’s waters
were already considered highly risky as far back as 2010, according to a report by a
Venezuelan non-governmental organization working on maritime security. But the
country’s dire economic situation appears to be contributing to an increase in piracy
targeting large and small commercial interests alike.207
In addition to the problem in Sucre, four anchored cargo ships were boarded in
2016 close to Puerto da la Cruz in Anzoátegui state (west of Sucre).208 Additionally, an LPG
tanker was boarded on 15 January 2017.209 While it is difficult to draw a direct correlation
between these incidents and the economic and political situation in Venezuela it is
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reasonable to assume some sort of relationship. This may be an interesting area to keep an
eye on.

Summarizing the Current Status
Maritime Piracy is here to stay. Despite increased international cooperation and
some very real progress with anti-piracy efforts, there is still plenty of piracy to go around.
Murphy has called it “a fluid crime of a fluid medium.” 210 It is a fluid crime due to its
varying motivations and characteristics depending on where it occurs. Legal actions taken
to combat piracy must take the origin of the victims into account as well as the location of
the crime. It occurs in fluid medium, meaning that environment where it occurs, on the
high seas, causes the problem to be unbounded by the jurisdiction or control of a single
state and therefore it becomes “the subject of political interplay between states with
competing interests.”211 The earlier discussion of both the evolution of maritime law and
the definition of piracy reflect this as well. Furthermore, while piracy is executed at sea, it
is planned and supported on land. The complexity of the problem requires a multiapproach solution.
Naval cooperation, whether it is an effort of neighboring littoral states, as in
Southeast Asia, or a truly international effort such as off the east coast of Africa, has a role
to play. Organizations such as the IMB’s PRC and ReCAAP allow for the effective sharing of
information in a timely manner. Operational watch centers like MSC-HOA and Singapore’s
IFC are critical to ensuring timely responses to vessels in distress. While the efforts of
these organizations are important, they are often reactive – after the incident. As Peter
210
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Chalk has said, “More attention needs to be devoted to ameliorating the underlying political
and socio-economic drivers.”212 Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) is a relatively new
organization. It is a project of the One Earth Future Foundation and describes itself as
“developing a stake-holder driven approach to addressing maritime piracy.”213 The goals
of the organization are to mobilize the stake-holders in the maritime industry, to form
public-private partnerships which promote long term solutions, and to create sustainable
deterrence based on the rule of law.214 OBP and other non-governmental organizations
have a vital role to play in improving the economic conditions and enhancing the security
capability ashore.
As already discussed, piracy at sea is as much a result of the conditions on land as it
is of the opportunities presented at sea. Piracy cannot flourish without land-based support.
In addition to the need for safe harbors, there is a need for a labor pool which is willing to
take the risks associated with pirating. An integrated approach which works to provide
security at sea while minimizing the driving forces of piracy ashore is required for
continued success. A better understanding of how the socio-economic and socio-political
variables impact piracy is essential for make the right cost-effective decisions on how to
employ limited resources.
The next chapter will provide an overview of the existing models of maritime piracy.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELS OF MARITIME PIRACY

This chapter explores the various piracy risk models that currently exist. These
models vary from very sophisticated models funded by the U.S. Navy to more simplistic
models. Most of the models focus on the piracy issue off the coast of Somalia and in the
Gulf of Aden, which had a peak in pirate activity in 2010. This exceptional peak in piracy
provided the motivation for many of these models. Yet because to the narrow focus on this
specific region, most of the models have limited utility for the broader range of piracy.
After a brief over-view of these models, the chapter concludes with a discussion of what is
missing from these models and highlights for the need for a new model.

MARITIME PIRACY MODELS
Only recently have there been serious efforts to model pirate activity. This was
primarily prompted by the huge surge in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and in the
Gulf of Aden. The anarchical status of Somalia resulted in a lawless region which
encouraged piracy. The frequency of these pirate attacks grew at such a rate that an
unprecedented international response was demanded by this activity. The European Union
launched Operation Atalanta (Task Force 465) in December 2008 with a counter-piracy
mission. A month later, the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, a multinational coalition of
naval forces, formed Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) with a counter-piracy mandate
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based on five United Nations Security Council Resolutions.1 Maritime piracy was
frequently breaking news and counter-piracy operations were in the limelight. In this
environment, an interest in models of maritime piracy emerged. The result has been a
variety of different models, with various focus and goals. Each of these are briefly
discussed to provide an understand of how these models contributed to our understanding
of maritime piracy.

Naval Research Laboratory Models
Following the first pirate hijacking of an American flagged ship, MV Maersk
Alabama,2 the US Naval Oceanographic Office developed a model that used forecasted
weather conditions and historical pirate incident data to predict the locations that would
be conducive to pirate activity in the Somali Basin Region and the Gulf of Aden. Using
multi-source intelligence and operational tactics employed by the pirates to inform the
Oceanographic Office’s model, the result was a fairly sophisticated model that allowed
CTF 151 to better employ naval assets.
The resultant Piracy Performance Surface (PPS) model was developed within two
weeks of receiving the task by Dr. Jim Hansen, a physical scientist, at Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) in Monterey, CA. The model used simulation to provide a forecast of the
probability of pirate activity in a specific location over time. The Monte Carlo method was

Combined Maritime Forces website “Combined Task Force 151” https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf151-counter-piracy/ accessed May 25, 2017. The UNSCRs are 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1897. Combined
Maritime Forces had already been operating CTF-150 with a general security and counter-terrorism focus in
the region since September 2001.
2 United States MV Maersk Alabama was in route to Mombasa, Kenya from Djibouti on April 8, 2009 when
pirates attacked, boarded the vessel and took Captain Richard Phillips hostage in a ship’s lifeboat.
The ship was able to continue to Mombasa. Phillips was rescued by a coordinated effort of the US Navy on
April 12, 2009.
1
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used as the probabilistic forecasting tool. The inputs to the model were the environmental
conditions or meteorological data, data about how the pirates operate and actual
intelligence reports on pirate activity. These inputs were weighted such that suitable
weather conditions comprised ninety percent of the forecast and historic pirate activity the
remaining ten percent.
The PPS model was updated with user feedback and additional refinement to the
pirate operating concepts. In March 2011, the Next Generation PPS (PPSN) model was
released (it was later renamed Pirate Attack Risk Surface (PARS) model). The updated
model factored in Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) which are groups of pirate dhows operating
with the support of a “mother ship” off the coast. This operating concept significantly
extends the range of pirate activity. The model output is the probability forecast of pirate
presence as a function of latitude, longitude and time. Each forecast covers a 72-hour
period in 0.2-hour time-steps and is generated by the model in 12-hour time steps. Recent
pirate activity is weighed more strongly than historical attacks with a high risk in the
vicinity of a recent attack for the next 48 hours and then dissipating over the next seven
days.
Hansen describes the PARS approach as a “dynamic coupling of environmental and
intelligence information.”3 The approach requires an extensive amount of meteorological
data as well current intelligence on pirate activity. In a May 2013 power point presentation
on the validation of PARS, Hansen says the next steps for PARS is to improve the
probability code which would allow for the model to run faster and provide better
algorithms for predicting future ship locations based on past behavior of ships with similar
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attributes.4 Leslie A. Slootmaker completed research to refine the input variables of PARS
to achieve maximum model performance.5 In her Master’s thesis she argues that the
variables must be set to a realistic level to balance the model’s efficiency and effectiveness.
Both PPS and PARS focus on just one region where piracy is an issue. Given
adequate data and intelligence support, other regions could be modeled in a similar
manner; however, a model at this level of detail would only be applicable for a specific
region and not transferable to another region where the conditions and pirate tactics vary.
Slootmaker’s argument for a realistic balance between model efficiency and effectiveness
would need to be considered in a model for any other region as well. Pirate operational
patterns vary by region, thus the portion of the model’s computer code for pirate behavior
would need to be adjusted. With the decrease of pirate activity in the region, the modeling
efforts of NRL have shifted to other topics. This reinforces the thought that this type of
model had limited applicability. Not only were the models specific to a particular
geographic region, but the level of detail in the modeling of the pirate operational tactics, as
well as the need for current intelligence input, made them practical only when the rate of
piracy incidents was very high.

Czech Technical University ATC Models
The Agent Technology Center (ATC) at the Czech Technical University in Prague,
funded by a grant from the (US) Office of Naval Research, conducted research on agentbased modeling of maritime pirate activity.6 The center’s AgentC software “models sea
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piracy and provides alternative routing for commercial vessels in waters off the Horn of
Africa.”7 The ATC’s website8 describes three individual modeling efforts: “Maritime
Simulation Platform,” “Maritime Transit Simulation,” and “Vessel Behavior Models.” The
Maritime Simulation Platform is a modular agent-base model of the platforms and forms
the base for the Maritime Transit Simulation. The Vessel Behavior Models use real world
data to provide a highly detailed agent-base model for each vessel class. The Maritime
Transit Simulation combines the Maritime Simulation Platform with the Vessel Behavior
Models to produce detailed simulation of maritime traffic. This simulation can provide an
estimation of the piracy risk under various transit routes with various naval patrol
strategies employed.
The Maritime Transit Simulation was demonstrated in the spring of 2011 at the 10th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.9 At the
conference the following year, an update on the research was provided.10 While the
Maritime Transit Simulation can simulate maritime traffic on a global basis, the Agent
Technology Center focused their suite of computational tools and techniques on the piracy
issue in the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden. They were able to assess the efficiency of a
“range of piracy counter-measures, including the recommended transit corridors, escorted
convoys, group transit schemes, route randomization and navy patrol deployments.”11
They were also able to assess the best trade-off between cost and security by using
decision-theoretic and game-theoretic optimization techniques.12 When they published the
Smalley.
ATC website. Accessed September 30, 2014, http://agents.cz/projects/AgentC.
9 Jakob et al., 2011.
10 Jakob et al., 2012.
11 Jakob et al., 2012, 37.
12 Jakob et al., 2012, 37.
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results of their research, the researchers at the Agent Technology Center believed “AgentC
is the only agent-based, micro-level simulation of global maritime traffic designed for nonmilitary purposes.”13
The software used to develop AgentC is proprietary to the ATC and requires a
significant knowledge of JAVA and computer programming to use. While the marine transit
model considered global shipping traffic and transits routes, the more detailed model with
vessel traits was focused on the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. With the completion of the
grant funded project, the ATC has shifted their modeling efforts to other issues. The work
they have completed could form the basis for a model of other regions, but this would
require significant programming efforts.
The modeling efforts of both NRL and ATC resulted in highly detailed models
focused on the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden. Given that incidences of piracy in this
region have significantly decreased, and there are plenty of other regions where piracy
provides a significant risk, there is a need for a model that is less geographically dependent.

Risk Terrain Model
Criminology researchers at Rutgers University have taken a different approach to
modeling the risk of piracy using Geographic Information System spatial modeling tools.14
They use Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM), which is an approach to risk assessment used to
evaluate the occurrence of crime within a geographic area. RTM “standardizes risk factors
to common geographic units over a continuous surface,”15 They argue that while favorable
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geographic factors and the presence of a potential target vessel are necessary for piracy to
occur, these factors are not sufficient. They identify three risk factors for piracy: state
status (using the 2008 Failed States Index), shipping routes, and chokepoints. Using these
factors, they created risk map layers which they then overlay to identify the regions of
greatest risk. Once they compiled this global piracy RTM using 2008 data, they overlaid the
2009 reported incidents of piracy and found their RTM predicted the location of these
incidents with more than 60% accuracy. As they reported: “This is quite a feat considering
that pirate attacks were located in approximately 1.3 percent of all the cells, globally.”16
While the factors considered for creating the piracy RTM could be revised or weighted
differently in the creation of the map layers, what was unique about this model is that it did
not use the occurrence of prior pirate attacks to predict future attacks. Since the
researchers used ArcGIS software to create the RTM of piracy, their effort could be
duplicated given the data they used or similar models could be created using different data.

Spatial Approach
A spatial model of where piracy risk exists has utility as input into a more
comprehensive model, but as a stand-alone model it does not provide any risk
differentiation for any of the other factors involved in pirate attacks. In fact, the zones for
increased piracy risk are identified by maritime insurance underwriters on an ongoing
basis without the benefit of a spatial model. Mariners are aware of areas where there is a
high risk for piracy. Mariners need a model that will allow them to better determine their
individual risk. This type of model should allow evaluation of risk mitigation options. The
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model should also provide insight into how the other parts of the “system” may impact the
vessel’s voyage.
Two researchers from the Department of Security and Crime Science at the
University College London, Elio Marchione and Shane Johnson, conducted research to
examine patterns in the location and timing of maritime piracy incidents. They applied
theories developed to explain spatial and space-time patterns in urban crime to maritime
piracy. Their work drew on previously developed criminology theories such as crime
pattern theory17 and disease contagion models which look at time-space patterns for risk
clusters.18 They cited the RTM work of Caplan, Moreto, and Kennedy, discussed above, as a
promising approach for identifying areas of risk for maritime piracy; however, limited
security assets cannot constantly patrol all of these areas.19 Thus Marchione and Johnson
set out to identify “regularities concerned with when attacks might occur as well as where
they are most likely.”20
Marchione and Johnson examined spatial patterns to determine where pirate
incidences tended to cluster and then looked at times-series data to determine how the
patterns varied reflecting the local condition differences.21 Their data consisted of 5,715
recorded events of piracy from the NGIS Anti-Shipping Activity Messages database. Once
they created a kernel density map of these events, they used Moran’s “I” statistic to
determine the statistical significance of the spatial clustering.22 They next evaluated their
data in times-series with a Poisson model. This revealed some seasonal trends, but the
Marchione and Johnson, 506.
Marchione and Johnson, 507.
19 Marchione and Johnson, 509.
20 Marchione and Johnson, 509.
21 Marchione and Johnson, 510.
22 See Marchione and Johnson, 510-512 for more details on how they evaluated the density map with Moran’s
I statistic.
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trends varied by sub-regions.23 Four geographic areas stood out as a result of their
analysis: near the coast of Sri Lanka, near the coast of Malaysia, near the coast of Somalia
and in the Gulf of Guinea. These four locations accounted for more than 70 percent of the
events in their data base.24
The final portion of their data analysis was to detect time-space clustering of the
incidents of piracy. They used both the Mantel test and the Knox test to determine this.
Separate analyses were completed for each sub-region to preserve local seasonal trends.25
The results of the analysis using the Mantel test revealed statistically significantly
worldwide clustering of piracy incidents from 1997 onward.26 Since the Mantel test is only
suited for summarizing general patterns, they then applied the Knox test for more precise
information about the clustering. The results made it “clear that more events occur close to
each other in space and time than would be expected if the timing and location of attacks
were independent.”27 This work provided the basis for their development of a spatial
model of maritime piracy.
Marchione and Johnson, along with Alan Wilson, developed an Agent-Based Model
(ABM) to simulate the dynamic patterns of pirate, vessel and naval forces behaviors and
interactions. Their paper “Modeling Maritime Piracy: A Spatial Approach,” provides a video
visualization of the NGIA dataset that Marchione and Johnson did their earlier analysis of.
They cite a noticeable burst of pirate activity around the Gulf of Aden in 2010 and focus

See Marchione and Johnson, 512-514 for more details on Poisson model time-series evaluation of their
data.
24 Marchione and Johnson, 510. 4,062 of 5,715 events were accounted by these four locations.
25 See Marchione and Johnson, 514-518 for more details on how they applied the Mantel and Knox tests.
26 Marchione and Johnson, 516.
27 Marchione and Johnson, 517-518.
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their modeling efforts on this geographic area.28 Their subset of data included 56 incidents
of piracy that occurred in that area in 2010.29 Data from the Suez Canal Traffic Statistics
was used to simulate the proper volume of shipping traffic passing through the canal as
well as the type and flag of the vessels.30 This information was supplemented with
information obtained from Surface Synoptic Observation reports concerning the position of
vessels in the area of interest and the weather conditions at the time of their reports.31
Lastly, they based the number of naval units on the work of Peter Chalk who cited 14
international naval units operating in the Gulf during the time of the model’s case study –
15 November to 31 December 2010.32
Their model consists of a grid representing the area of interest.33 The model’s agent
behavior condition action rules generate a dynamic maritime piracy risk map and allow the
testing of hypotheses about pirate activity.34 The model outputs were tested using
separate data of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from earlier in 2010.35 They conclude,
that despite the simplicity of the model, it appears to “approximate the observed spatial
distribution of pirate attacks rather well.”36 Thus, they argue that their model provides the
basis for developing and testing “more accurate and realistic agent behavior, and the
simulated impact of specific types of policy intervention.”37

Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 2.1.
Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 2.2.
30 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6.
31 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 2.3.
32 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 2.4. Also see Chalk, 2010, 89-108.
33 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 3.1.
34 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 3.1. See Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraphs 3.2 -3.17 for
detailed information on their model design.
35 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 5.1.
36 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 5.1.
37 Marchione, Elio and Johnson, paragraph 5.6.
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Marchione, Johnson and Wilson’s spatial model is definitely a step in the right
direction for portraying maritime piracy with an ABM since this allowed them to observe
patterns of piracy which were not necessarily obvious before their efforts. Previously,
most of the models had been developed to try and predict future occurrences of piracy or
to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-piracy efforts. By choosing to use an ABM, they
allowed for new insight concerning the relationship between the piracy events. However,
just like most of the earlier efforts, they too focused on a subset of global maritime piracy
because of the enormous scope of the issue and the differences in the characteristics of the
problem between sub-regions. They centered their attention on the Gulf of Aden where a
significant increase of piracy incidents in 2009 occurred as a result of socio-political and
socio-economic variables. Their resulting model did not model the influences of these
variables. As with other models of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, significant changes to the
code portraying the pirates’ concept of operations would need to be made for the model to
be applied to another geographic sub-region.

Models Aimed at Improving Detection of Pirate Activity
There have also been efforts to allow earlier detection of potential pirate vessels by
“focusing on the detection of anomalous shipping patterns.”38 Using data from the
Automatic Identification System (AIS),39 Richard O. Lane, David Nevell, Steve Hayward, and
T. W. Beaney, used Bayesian network analysis to calculate the probability that a ship’s

Khondaker, Rahman and Khan, 203.
AIS is an automatic tracking system on ships used by vessel traffic services to provide each ship with a
unique identification. It allows for the tracking of individual ship position, course and speed.
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behavior is an anomaly from normal ship behavior.40 The five behaviors they identified as
anomalous are: deviation from standard route;41 unexpected AIS activity;42 unexpected
port arrival;43 close approach;44 and zone entry.45 Their work developed algorithms for
calculating the probability of one of these anomalies in simulated AIS data. The next step
would be to “determine the numerical connection between specific behaviors and threats”
and then apply the model to real data.46 Maria Andersson and Ronnie Johansson write of a
similar effort for early detection of pirate activity using a fusion of information from AIS
and other sensors such as radar systems and optical sensors.47 Sensor fusion can improve
the overall situational awareness by reducing uncertainty.48 They used a Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) to develop an algorithm for abnormal behavior detection focused on piracy
operations.49 For best results the parameters used in the HMM to develop the algorithm
need to be sea-area specific.50 Because of the complexity of the anomaly detection in the
maritime environment, they conclude: “it is likely that a combination of several technical
and also organizational, measures will be required to improve situational awareness.”51
These efforts, as well as other similar work,52 to detect abnormal maritime behavior can
better inform piracy modeling efforts. However, as with the models described above, these

Lane et al.
Lane et al., 1-3.
42 Lane et al., 3-4.
43 Lane et al., 4-5.
44 Lane et al., 5.
45 Lane et al., 5-6.
46 Lane et al., 8.
47 Andersson and Johansson.
48 Andersson and Johansson, 2.
49 Andersson and Johansson, 4-6.
50 Andersson and Johansson, 6.
51 Andersson and Johansson, 6.
52 Andersson and Johansson devote section II of their paper to an overview of related work.
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efforts are focused only on what is happening in the marine environment, not the root
cause of the problem.

More Recent Modeling Efforts
There have been two newer modeling efforts. The first was a hybrid model
developed by Turkish Naval Officers to evaluate maritime security operations with respect
to counter-piracy operations.53 The second was the work of South African scholars in
which they proposed a generative model of maritime vessel behavior to develop and
evaluate counter-piracy methods and algorithms.54
A. Emre Varol and Murat M. Gunal, developed a hybrid model utilizing an agentbased model with discrete event scheduling. The objective of this model was to provide a
better understanding of the relationship between deployment of naval forces and piracy
prevention.55 Their model combined three separate systems. The backbone and data
structures that support the model are contained in a computer-code class library they call
Maritime Security Operations Library (MSOLib). They used the SharpSim Discrete Event
Simulation (DES) engine to create the hybrid DES/ABM model. Finally, they used GMap.net
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) package to interface their model with a map of the
region of interest.56
The purpose of their model is to aid decision makers in understanding the
relationship between pirate behavior and naval force planning. Therefore, the focus of the
simulation efforts was on variations of maritime security patrols. Three separate maritime
Varol and Gunal.
Dabrowski and de Villiers, 116-130.
55 Varol and Gunal, 2038.
56 Varol and Gunal, 2038.
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54
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security efforts in the Gulf of Aden are cited: Operation Atalanta,57 Combined Maritime
Forces (CMF)58 and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS)59. These security efforts were discussed
in greater detail in Chapter 2; however, it is important to note here, that unlike the efforts
of Marchione, Johnson and Wilson, Varol and Gunal include greater detail of the naval
security forces in their model. Specifically, they model three separate types of naval
security forces: Naval Patrol Ships an embarked Naval Patrol Helicopter;60 Maritime Patrol
Reconnaissance Aircraft; and Naval Convoy Ships operating with a Naval Convoy
Helicopter. This increased fidelity of the maritime security forces allowed evaluation of
various operational employments of these assets. This is important to decision makers
who must make resource allocation decisions. For example, their model determined that
the Naval Patrol Ships did not require a helicopter if they were operating in cooperation
with the Naval Convoy Ship and its associated helicopter. The model confirmed a “strong
positive relationship” between the resource allocation and the success of the operation.61
The model also allows for decisions which could increase the efficiency of these operations.
The savings gained by eliminating the requirement for a Naval Patrol Ship to have a
dedicated helicopter could be applied elsewhere. While the level of detail provided in their

Operation Atalanta is the European Union’s NAVFOR Somalia counter-piracy operation. Stood up in
December 2008, the mission is on-going. Accessed August 10, 2017, http://eunavfor.eu/.
58 Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is a multinational naval partnership which operates Combined Task
Force (CTF) 151, a counter-piracy task force authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. CTF
151 has been operating in the Gulf of Aden since January 2009. Accessed August 10, 2017,
https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/.
59 Operation Ocean Shield was NATO’s contribution to counter-piracy operations. It began in August 2009
and concluded in December 2016. NATO Shipping Centre – Allied Maritime Command website. “NATO
Operation Shield Closing,” December 15, 2016. Accessed September 22, 2017,
http://www.shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/news/2016/nato-operation-ocean-shield-closing.aspx.
60 See Varol and Gunal, 2041-2044 for a discussion of details on how these units were modeled. Space
limitations of the journal article prevented similar details for the other units. An online supplement to the
paper is available at http://www.simulationmodel.com/gunal/PirateSim/ where a link allows download of
the complete model.
61 Voral and Gunal, 2048.
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model is adequate to support strategic decision making, additional details would be needed
for operational use such as the inclusion of weather conditions.62
While Voral and Gunal’s model significantly contributes to understanding how to
improve the efficiency of naval force deployments aimed at preventing piracy, it does not
focus on the root causes of the piracy nor does it provide enough fidelity of the merchant
vessels for individual merchant ships to make risk analysis decisions.
Joel Janek Dabrowski and Johan Pieter de Villiers propose a multi-agent generative
model of maritime piracy. They describe their model as “a novel variant of a dynamic
Bayesian network (DBN) that extends the switching linear dynamic system (SLDS).”63 The
structure of the DBN is informed by prior knowledge of the maritime piracy and uses both
discrete and continuous variables. They used the model to generate a synthetic dataset of
pirate attack locations and then compared the dataset to real world data with encouraging
results. The variables included in the model account for the class of vessel (private,
commercial or fishing), the journey parameters, the external parameters (date, time,
season, ocean and weather conditions), the state parameters (vessel activity or behavior)
and an ocean current/weather variable which influences vessel motion simulation.64 The
purpose of their work was to provide an information system that can be used to test
“maritime pirate behavior detection algorithms.”65 As with some of the other models
already discussed, the more detailed the input to this model becomes, the more
cumbersome it is to configure. And again, the focus of the model is on the maritime domain
alone.
Voral and Gunal, 2048.
Dabrowski and Villiers, 116.
64 Dabrowski and Villiers, 118-120.
65 Dabrowski and Villiers, 117.
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With the decline in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, so too has there been a
decline in the efforts to model the phenomena. As stated above, the efforts of the Naval
Research Lab and the Czech Technical University have shifted to other issues. Security
protocols, such as BMP-4, developed because of the significant scope of piracy off the
Somali coast, continue to be employed by merchant vessels transiting the area. These
protocols are being adapted for use in other portions of the globe. There continues to be a
significant international naval presence providing maritime security along the
International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) although it has been somewhat
reduced with the conclusion of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield in December 2016. While
Somali piracy incidents had essentially been eliminated, 2017 has seen a renewal of piracy
activity in the region. Within a week of news of the severity of the current famine in
Somalia,66 the first successful pirate attack since 2012 occurred on 14 March 2017. 67 While
it is difficult to make a direct cause and effect case, especially considering the decreased
maritime security forces, there continues to be a need to better understand the dynamics
involved in maritime piracy with emphasis on the socio-economic motivations, not just the
interaction of vessel traffic and maritime anti-piracy operations.

See the following as representative media coverage: Amanda Erickson, “In Somalia, a drought killed 110
people in just 48 hours,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2017. Accessed May 26, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/04/in-somalia-a-drought-killed-110people-in-just-48-hours/?utm_term=.1b653ead1f28. Hussein Mohamed and Sewell Chan, “U.N. Chief, Visiting
Somalia, Pleads for Aid to Avert Famine,” The New York Times, March 7, 2017. Accessed May 26, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/africa/united-nations-famine-somalia.html. David MeKenzie
and Brent Swials, “Somalia: ‘People are dying of hunger…there’s no water’” CNN World Website, March
8,2017. Accessed May 26, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/africa/somalia-famine-unitednations/index.html.
67 Luke Graham, “Somali pirates hijack first commercial ship in 5 years,” CNBS Crime website, 14 March 2017.
Accessed May 26, 2017, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/14/somali-pirates-hijack-first-commercial-ship-in5-years.html.
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This concludes the discussion of some of the existing models of maritime piracy. It
is possible that other models have been created or are currently being developed; however,
this sampling of models illustrates that there is a need for a model with a different focus.

WHY A NEW MODEL IS NEEDED
Maritime piracy is a global issue. While we have data that indicates this, the data is
relatively scarce and therefore inadequate for purposes of statistical modeling. Multiple
other approaches have been taken to modeling maritime piracy. However, most of the
models discussed above were designed for a particular geographic area, primarily the Gulf
of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia. They focus only on the water side of the
problem. Because of the differences in the tactics employed by pirates from one region to
another, a significant amount of change would be needed to apply these models to another
geographic region and none of them address the land-sea interface of the issue. The
exception to this is the RTM model designed by Caplan, Moreto and Kennedy. Despite the
RTM model, there is a need for a model that is less geographically dependent. The goal is
not a macro level model of the world, but rather a more parsimonious model that has utility
across multiple regions.
The ATC at the Czech Technical University initially developed a model of the world
shipping routes. While this model was global in scope it did not specifically model piracy,
rather it was informed by piracy reports as to where the main hubs of piracy are. This
global model was used to inform their later development of a region-specific model for the
Gulf of Aden. The Maritime Traffic Simulation model replicated “the key static and dynamic
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features of maritime transit” for thousands of vessels consisting of several categories.68 It
was based on real-world shipping information, shipping routes and recommended transit
corridors. While this global model was not limited to a specific geographic region, its global
scope makes it very large and complex. In the terminology used by Robert Axelrod, the
ATC’s model was very heavy, requiring massive amounts of information.69 A light model
which can allow us to concentrate on what is occurring in a limited amount of sea-space in
a more generic manner would be of value to various regions and therefore would provide
greater utility.
While the ATC models were designed for non-military purposes they were used to
evaluate the best route for the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor and the
optimum patrol patterns of Naval Security Forces. Both of the other agent-based models
were designed to improve the operational tactics of naval security forces. What is needed
is a model which will allow mariners to better determine their individual risk depending on
the environment they are planning to operate in and support policy makers who need to
determine where to apply limited resources.
Maritime piracy is complex and it lends itself to the complicated models that have
already been developed. However, because of this complexity it is difficult to design a
model which applies to all piracy. A model can account for the specific characteristics of
piracy in a region by limiting its geographic scope. Heavy models with details of specific
piracy tactics or features unique to regional geography then become limited in their
application. Alternatively, it can ignore those details and simulate global piracy at a macro-
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level. There is a third option; the model can present a simplified representation of the
phenomena of interest.
The objective of this work is to distill maritime piracy down to a form simple
enough to portray generic phenomena regardless of geographic location, yet robust enough
to provide insight into the associated issues, especially the sociological variables which
have been lacking in the other models. An agent-based model is suited to this purpose
because the emergent behavior of the agents can provide new understanding of how the
variables interact. By simplifying the issue down to its essential elements, the model will
not be tied to a specific geographic area. By focusing on the generic, the model will not
attempt to portray reality but rather an abstraction of the issue and this will allow for a
better understand the interaction of the variables. The intent of my modeling effort is to
provide a tool which will provide new insights into the relationship between the socioeconomic and political variables and piracy.
This model is the first step toward developing a more complex model which would
provide a risk assessment based on the socio-economic variables in the vicinity of shipping
lanes, the maritime security readiness of the merchant vessel, and the presence or lack of
maritime security forces. Ideally, the model should also provide insight into how the other
parts of the “system” may impact the vessel’s voyage. Only by understanding the whole
picture, to include what motivates the pirates, can policy makers make the best resource
decisions. Additionally, with the right enhancements, this type of model would allow
merchant vessels to assess their individual piracy risk. However, this foundational step has
great value on its own. Moreover, it has potential for being the basis for modeling efforts in
other applications where decisions are also made based on available opportunities.
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To summarize; a new model is needed because there is inadequate data available to
do statistical modeling. The complexity of piracy makes this scarcity of data even more
problematic. Most of the models which have already been created are geographically
specific. More specifically, they all focused on the water side of the problem without
considering what the root causes might be and how the variables ashore impact the
problem at sea. A model with broader application is needed. While there are a few global
level models, these models provide a macro level view of the issue. Thus, the need exists
for a light, parsimonious model which provides utility across regional domains but still
allows focus on the core interaction of the socio-economic and political variables and
piracy. Lastly, while the other models were primarily created to help predict where pirate
attacks would occur or to evaluate the effectiveness of various counter-piracy efforts, the
purpose for my model is to enrich our understanding of the core dynamics which drive the
piracy problem.
In the next chapter, I take an in-depth look at the concept of risk and risk analysis,
with particular emphasis on maritime risk. Then, Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of the
data available to analyze the issue of modern piracy and provide some basic analysis of the
most recent piracy data. With this additional information, all the components needed to
begin building the model, developed in Chapter 6, will have been discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
RISK AND MARITIME SECURITY

This chapter begins with the topic of risk. Most of the models discussed in Chapter 3
attempted to predict the risk of maritime piracy in one way or another. Risk is a term that
we frequently encounter in our everyday lives, but that has not always been the case. To
understand how the perception of risk has evolved, the concept of risk is explored from its
historic origins to its current day applications in what is sometimes referred to as the “Risk
Society.” How the concept relates to the field of security studies is discussed. Next the
systems approach to risk analysis is reviewed. The chapter then shifts to the more specific
topic of maritime risk. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the maritime
environment.

LIFE IS RISKY
Risk in its simplest terms is the possibility that something bad will happen. In his
book Risk, Jakob Arnoldi states “Risks are not actual but rather potential dangers.”1 Risk
can be a consideration in our simplest day-to-day decisions. When we decide to do this or
that, we weigh what the possible outcomes of our actions might be, taking potential
dangers into consideration. We value positive outcomes and hope to avoid negative
outcomes. If we perceive that there is a high probability of a negative outcome we may
decide not to take the risk. Such simple informal risk calculations may occur many times in
our daily life either consciously or subconsciously. More formal calculations of risk can be
1

Arnoldi, 8.
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made using probability theory. To understand how the concept of risk evolved from
informal calculations to a more structured discipline, a partial review of mankind’s
mathematical journey through history is needed.
In his book Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, Peter L. Bernstein states
that the development of the Hindu-Arabic numbering system was essential to the modern
understanding of risk. This numbering system introduced the concept of zero and is the
basis for current day mathematics, without which there would be no way to calculate odds
and probabilities. Bernstein claims that “The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary
between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is
more than a whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature.”2
Arnoldi agrees that there is a link between risk and modernity but cautions that the
boundary is not as vivid as some might portray it.3 Modernity is characterized by
deliberate individual and collective actions “to shape the future to human will.”4 This
necessitates a scientific understanding of risk in order to understand and engineer future
outcomes. For this, mathematical probability theory, which of course has roots in the
development of mathematics, is essential to the modern understanding of risk. However,
“all cultures at all times have had (varying) conceptions of risk and various ways of
managing and sharing risks.”5
The ancient Greeks did not have a numbering system with which they could
calculate. They used columns of pebbles to count quantities. From the Greek word abax,
which means sand-tray and the Greek word calculus which means pebble we get the word
Bernstein, 1.
Arnoldi, 22.
4 Arnoldi, 23.
5 Arnoldi, 23; (citing Bollig, 2006).
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abacus. For centuries, the abacus would be the primary means for doing arithmetic – until
a new numbering system was spread by the Arabs.
Under the urging of the Prophet Mohammed, an Arab empire was created to spread
the Islamic religion. This empire stretched as far east as India. As a result of their invasion
of India, the Arabs became familiar with the Hindu numbering system. This allowed them
to “incorporate eastern intellectual advances into their own scholarship, scientific research
and experimentation.”6 With the use of the Hindu numbering system into their culture,
Arabs transformed mathematics and measurement and therefore commerce as well as
astronomy and navigation.7
At the time the Arabs were expanding their empire, Christians were also exploring
the globe and establishing colonies. While these two different cultures would share
knowledge, they would also clash magnificently with the resultant Crusades. The first
Crusade was authorized by Pope Urban in 1095. These religiously inspired battles would
rage off and on for hundreds of years, and as discussed in Chapter 2, the Crusades would be
justification for much of the piracy which occurred on the high seas.
Despite being exposed to Arab mathematical advancements, “Arabic numbers were
not enough to induce Europeans to explore the radical concept of replacing randomness
with systematic probability and its implicit suggestion that the future might be predictable
and even controllable to some degree.”8 Religion played a significant role since Christianity
and western culture strongly believed the future was determined by God. However, the
power of the Catholic Church was weakened by the Protestant Reformation, allowing the
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ideas of the Renaissance to have greater impact. This allowed western culture to
reevaluate the relationship of God and man. If the future is not totally determined by God,
then man must take responsibility for the consequences of his decisions. No single event
can be credited with allowing the shift. Instead there was a gradual shift from the belief
that the future is controlled by the gods, or God, to an understanding that individual agency
and responsibility for one’s actions can impact the future.9
As Bernstein writes: “With this opening up of choices and decisions, people
gradually recognized that the future offered opportunity as well as danger, that it was
open-ended and full of promise… The new sense of opportunity led to a dramatic
acceleration in the growth of trade and commerce, which served as a powerful stimulus to
change and exploration.”10 Trade involves both resources and markets and getting goods
and materials from one market to another is risky business. The gradual shift from the
belief that the future is determined by God, to a world where individuals are believed to
play a significant role in their own fate, brought with it the desire to better understand the
risks involved with individual decisions. This was the shift which was necessary for
western cultures to really embrace mathematics and the numerous advances that followed.
The 1600’s were a time of great mathematical advancements.11 In 1637, René
Descartes published his book which outlined his philosophical views; A Discourse on the
Method of rightly controlling the Reason and seeking Truth in the Sciences. The last appendix
of the book concerned the study of geometry. Here he developed a coordinate system
which allowed for geometric shapes to be described using algebraic equations. At about
Arnoldi, 27.
Bernstein, 21.
11 Alfred Hooper’s Makers of Mathematics offers a great history of mathematics and the individuals who made
the advancements.
9
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the same time that Descartes was developing his theories of analytic geometry, Pierre de
Fermat was also thinking about how the theory of numbers could be applied to lines and
curves. His work in this area anticipated Newton’s development of calculus. But more
importantly, for the study of risk, is Fermat’s work with Blaise Pascal which is credited
with laying the foundations of the theory of probability. As described in Makers of
Mathematics, it all began when the Chevalier de Méré sent Pascal a gambling problem.
Pascal worked out his solution and sent it to Fermat. Both agreed on the solution but gave
different proofs. The idea of mathematical probability emerged from their discussions of
the issue. Thus, from a gambling problem, came an important advancement in
mathematics which is essential to all branches of mathematical statistics, including
actuarial and insurance work. At last, not only had the Arab numbering system been fully
embraced, but significant advancements in mathematics were occurring which would allow
for other advancements. Bernstein claims that it was the growth of trade which
transformed the principles of gambling into the creation of wealth. This ultimately lead to
capitalism which he calls the “the epitome of risk-taking.”12 Regardless, it was with the
shift from subjective probabilities to more calculated objective probabilities that the field
of statistics emerged and with it the study of risk.

MODERN CONCEPT OF RISK
While there was a time when the concept of risk was not formally recognized, today
we have been said to live in a “Risk Society.” German sociologist Ulrich Beck proposed this
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concept in his well-known book Risk Society.13 In the book, he asserts that we have
transitioned from the industrial age to the risk society. The risk society is a result of the
technological advances of modern society which, while intended to solve problems, have
introduced a new set of unintended side-effects. In Beck’s own words: “This concept
describes a phase of development of modern society in which the social, political, ecological
and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control
and protective institution of industrial society.”14 Beck draws a distinction between
dangers, which he defines as caused by nature, and risks, which he says are caused by
people. Statistical analysis allows for us to study risks.
Within the study of risk, there are three related processes: risk analysis, risk
assessment and risk management. “Risk analysis involves identifying the most probable
threats to an organization and analyzing the related vulnerabilities of the organization to
these threats.”15 This concept is at the core of security studies. “Risk assessment involves
evaluating existing security and controls and assessing their adequacy relative to the
potential threats to the organization.”16 Risk assessment goes beyond risk analysis. Once
the risks have been identified, risk assessment looks at what actions have been taken or are
planned in the event of an incident and assesses their adequacy for addressing the
individually identified risks. Risk assessment is a concept that ship operators are very
familiar with. Portions of security studies also deal with risk assessment, although the
process is apt to be turned around and focused on the threat. The third process, risk
management, “is the systematic application of management policies, procedures and
Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Sukrkamp, 1986.
Beck, 1999, 72.
15 Search Security.
16 Search Security.
13
14

97
practices to the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating,
monitoring and communicating risk.”17 Risk management is primarily a tool for project
managers and engineers, yet there is great potential for security studies when security
threats are assessed in a more systematic fashion. To apply risk management to a specific
issue, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved in the issue.
For maritime piracy, this means that we must understand what is motivating the activity in
addition to when and how it occurs at sea. For these reasons, a model of maritime piracy
that begins with the situation ashore is important. To date, the modeling efforts have
focused on the water side of the issue, looking at ways to calculate the risk of a pirate attack
or best ways to employ counter-piracy efforts. In all the models discussed in Chapter 3, the
motivation for piracy is not considered. The existing models take a straight forward look at
the risk of piracy at sea. We need a more holistic approach to understanding the piracy
risk.
Let us return to the sociological study of risk. In his later book, World Risk Society,
Beck expands his thoughts and says, “Risk society, fully thought through, means world risk
society.”18 Dangers produced by modern civilizations “cannot be socially delimited in
either space or time.”19 This thought certainly pertains to the transnational security
challenges we face today.
Beck draws a distinction between the first modernity and what he calls the second
modernity. The first modernity consisted of a world “based on nation-state societies,
where social relations, networks and communities are essentially understood in a
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territorial sense.”20 He characterizes this time as one with collective patterns of life, full
employment, progress and controllability, and the exploitation of nature. While the
industrial age produced plenty of risks, many of the risks produced by progress were
viewed as controllable. Additionally, modernity was thought to reduce many of the threats
of pre-modernity such as famine and epidemics; infant mortality was reduced while life
expectancy was increased; and technological advances improved quality of life and work
place safety.21

First Modernity
The term modernity refers to the modern era. It refers to the timeframe when
western civilization began to question and reject tradition. There is a link between the
development of risk and modernity. This was when the view of the future shifted from
being in the hands of God to the outcome of deliberate human activity aimed at shaping it.
During this era, western civilization moved from being primarily agrarian toward
urbanization and industrialization. The concept of capitalism was developed and the
market economy was expanded.
It was also during this time frame that the theory of probability developed into a
“serious instrument for forecasting.”22 In order for this to occur, the quality of the
information that forms the basis for probability estimates had to be known. How to
determine this was a central question of the eighteenth century. Jacob Bernoulli was the
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first to ponder this issue seriously in the late seventeenth century.23 After working on the
subject for twenty years, he completed his work shortly before his death in 1705. His work,
Ars Conjectandi (The Art of Conjecture), was published, by his nephew Niklaus Bernoulli, in
1713.
Bernstein describe this as an effort to demonstrate where “the art of thinking –
objective analysis – ends and the art of conjecture begins.”24 In Ars Conjectandi, Bernoulli
purposed that it is possible to determine the likelihood of an event by calculating the exact
number of possible cases and determining the relative likelihood of each case. Up until this
time, the theory of probability was primarily use in games of chance, but Bernoulli
envisioned wider applications. He drew “a crucial distinction between reality and
abstraction in applying the laws of probability.”25 To apply the theory of probability to real
life problems, relevant information is required. The difficulty is that we seldom have
complete information. We can work with sample data and make assumptions about how
well it represents all the possible data, but that is not the same as having complete data. To
fill this gap, Bernoulli suggested that we assume “under similar conditions, the occurrence
(or non-occurrence) of an event in the future will follow the same pattern as was observed
in the past.”26 Bernoulli’s theorem mathematically expresses how the size of a sample is
related to the accuracy of assertions about the total population, as Arnoldi describes it, the
“degree of truth value of statements regarding the causal laws of nature.”27
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The next enabling mathematical advancement belongs to Abraham de Moivre.
Based on the way randomly drawn samples disperse themselves around the average value,
De Moivre determined that distribution formed a curve around the average. Today we call
this a normal curve or a bell curve because of its shape. De Moivre used this normal
distribution to calculate a statistical measure, which is now known as standard deviation.
Given a normal distribution, approximately 68 percent of the sample will fall within one
standard deviation and 95 percent within two standard deviations. This concept is
“critically important in judging whether a set of observations comprises a sufficiently
representative sample of the universe of which they are a part.”28 Put another way, this
concept allows us to “evaluate the probability that a given number of observations will fall
within some specified bound around a true ratio.”29
The logical question that follows this is, how do we update our predictions as we
acquire new information about the situation? For this we turn to the work of Thomas
Bayes, a Presbyterian minister who was known as a philosopher and statistician. He
formulated a theorem to deal with situations when we have “sound intuitive judgements
about the probability of some event and want to understand how to alter those judgements
as actual events unfold.”30 The theorem, which has become known as Bayes’ theorem, was
described in “An Essay toward solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances,” and was
presented to the Royal Society in 1763 by Richard Price after Bayes death.
Here is now Bernstein recounts Bayes’ problem statement: “Given that the number
of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance that the
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probability of it happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two degrees of
probability that can be named.”31 The theorem allows us to revise inferences based on old
information with new information, and this provides us with a means of dealing with
uncertainty.
The ability to deal with uncertainty, or unknown probabilities, enabled many of the
technical and social advances of the modern age. By quantifying risk, and then developing
a way to deal with the risk, unintended consequences could be minimized and managed. At
the heart of these efforts was the belief that, to a certain extent, risk can be controlled. Risk
management improved safety and system performance. But the first step of this process is
identifying the system. Today’s systems are “more sophisticated and complex than ever
before.”32 This leads us to a discussion of the second modernity.

Second Modernity and Complexity
In contrast to the first modernity, the second modernity is characterized by five
interlinked processes that undermine the first modernity: globalization, individualization,
gender revolution, underemployment and global risks such as climate change and the
financial market crash.33 These issues may all be considered as unintended consequences
of the successes of the first modernity. While Beck describes the first modernity as “simple,
linear, industrialization based on the nation state,”34 he describes the second modernity as
“radicalized modernization” with a “new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new

Bernstein, 131. Referencing Bayes 1763.
Pinto and Garvey, 2.
33 Beck, 1999, 2.
34 Beck, 1999, 2.
31
32

102
kind of global order, a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life.”35 This second
modernity undermines the foundations of the first modernity resulting in the need for a
paradigm-shift for our social frame of reference.
The second modernity is defined in terms of globalization and transnational
interdependence. Changes are occurring with increasing speed, intensity and significance.
Risks can no longer be addressed individually, but rather need to be addressed
simultaneously. Modernity was typically defined by Western society, which also defined
other non-Western societies as traditional or pre-modern; not with their own terms, and
more importantly not even understanding those terms. The nature of the second
modernity requires us to understand the pluralization of modernity and that there are
“divergent trajectories of modernities in different parts of the world.”36
Despite the complexity of the current world with its latent threats, it is important to
quantify these threats as best we can. The difficulty is that the complexity is not simply a
result of an expansion of what we consider when we think about risk. It is not merely an
added layer or even layers of additional consideration. Rather it is the interconnectedness
of all parts of the whole. Globalization is manifested in the interlinking of economic,
political and cultural processes. This process is fusing our world together into a more
unified entity.37 At the same time that globalization is unifying, it also highlights the
differences between portions of our world. We continue to live in an industrial society that
is organized by nation-states, but those nation-states are increasingly impacted by the
effects of globalization in ways they cannot control. This is magnified by individualization,
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where individuals, and even more dramatically, groups of them, are able to impact the
social agenda. Beck cites the theme of “an endangered world” as an example of this.38 As
evidence of this, he points out: “the themes of the future… have not originated from the
farsightedness of the rulers or from the struggles in parliament – and certainly not from the
cathedrals of power in business, science and the state.”39 Beck’s other three
characterizations of the second modernity: gender revolution, underemployment and
global threats, put added stress on a system that is already struggling to find a new balance.
The result of all this is that our world has become a place of increasingly rapid
change, characterized by new levels of uncertainty about the future. Gabe Mythen says,
“We are living in a ‘runway world’ stippled by ominous dangers, military conflicts and
environmental hazards.”40 Risk is omnipresent in the instability in which we exist. Far
from becoming more stable at the end of the Cold War, the world has been catapulted to a
new level of instability, which was accentuated by the events of September 11, 2001.
Mythen credits 9/11 as having been “a high voltage shock to the capitalist system,” which
changed the way “we perceive the concepts of safety and danger.”41
It is just as important today to define the system, to determine the risk. But many
systems are no longer stand-alone systems. We must look beyond the system to how it
interacts with other systems. As Beck says: “The calculus of risk connects the physical, the
engineering and the social sciences. It can be applied to completely disparate phenomena…
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it permits a type of technological moralization which no longer need employ moral and
ethical imperatives directly.”42
A good example of this, is the depletion of fisheries in Somali waters, caused by
illegal fishing by non-Somali vessels. Modern technology allowed these vessels to fish
further from their home waters and to preserve the fish, either by refrigerating or freezing,
until they get it to market. This caused many Somalian fishermen to be unable to support
their families in their traditional way. Some then turned to piracy, initially targeting those
who were stealing their fish. This is perhaps a simplistic description of an issue which was
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, but it illustrates how an unintended consequence can
result from technological advancements. Add to the issue, that some of the “pirates” were
operating as Somali “Coast Guard,” and the issue also illustrates that not all cultures view
an issue through the same prism. The complexity of our modern world requires us to
explore the historic and cultural aspects of an issue to fully understand it.
The next section will delve into how the field of security studies approaches the
concept of risk.

SECURITY STUDIES APPROACH TO RISK
Security Studies is a subset of the field of International Relations. It is an evolving
field which has expanded from its roots as Strategic Studies, focused primarily on the State
as an actor, to include Human Security which is more concerned with individual security.
Human Security includes issues of Human Rights and Human Development with emphasis
on how these topics impact the individual, rather than just considering them from the
Beck, 1999, 51. Beck provides an example of this with mortality rates that consider certain conditions of
air pollution.
42
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broader policy aspect of traditional Strategic Studies. The expansion of Security Studies is
important because it recognizes that security is an issue that impacts all levels of society.
The decisions made by states determine how they relate and interact with other states, but
they also impact the people who make up the states.
While it is important to think about how the actions of the state may affect the
individuals of the state and elsewhere, it is even more important to consider how the
actions of the individuals may affect the state. Specific to this work, the policies of the
states set the conditions for the geo-political environment. Within a particular state, when
the conditions are not favorable for individual success, an individual may choose to act in
ways the state does not sanction – illegally. Such is the case for piracy, which is universally
considered to be illegal. An individual who is presented with limited, or no good, options
may see piracy as their best option.
The definition of security is somewhat subjective. What a state considers to be
security may vary from state to state and what an individual person values for security will
also vary depending on their individual values. Yet within the field of International
Relations, most scholars “work with a definition of security that involves the alleviation of
threats to cherished values.”43 Alternatively, in describing the shift in Strategic Studies to
Security Studies, John Baylis and James Wirtz say security is “defined in terms of freedom
from threats to core values.”44 In simpler and broader terms, Security is the condition of
being protected or free from harm. Security Studies typically focus on threats which are
essentially “things that can go wrong” and therefore by definition - risk. Yet the concept of

43
44

Williams, 1.
Baylis, et al., 12.

106
risk is seldom directly addressed in traditional International Relations, so the connection
between the fields must be made.
The concepts of risk and security are inversely related. The greater the risks, the
less secure the situation is likely to be. The greater the security, the less risk exists.
Security Studies, with its focus on threats, aims at its core to understand and reduce risks.
While the concept of risk might not be directly addressed in traditional international
relations study, it is a topic which is frequently the focus of policy makers.
In February of 2005 The Heritage Foundation published Making the Sea Safer: A
National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism. This report summarizes a oneyear project to examine the criticality of “protecting maritime commerce from attack or
exploitation by terrorists.”45 The Project specifically focused on the foreign policy,
economic and defense implications of this issue. The number one proposal for the
Administration was to create a Maritime Security Strategy.
In September 2005, the United States published the National Strategy for Maritime
Security (NSMS). This document was a joint effort between the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security. The goal of the NSMS is to integrate and blend the
public and private maritime security activities to address all maritime threats.46 To achieve
this goal, the Departments developed eight supporting plans:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
45
46

National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness
Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan
Interim Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan
International Outreach and Coordination Strategy
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan
Maritime Transportation System Security Plan
Maritime Commerce Security Plan

Carafano and Kochems, 1.
National Strategy for Maritime Security, ii.
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8. Domestic Outreach Plan
The introduction to the strategy concludes: “Together, the National Strategy for
Maritime Security and its eight supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to
promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while preventing hostile
or illegal acts within the maritime domain.”47 These efforts recognize both the importance
of maritime activity to the wellbeing of the economy and the complexity of providing
maritime security.
The directed strategies and plans are intended to be updated as required to reflect
changes to the maritime environment and the threats to it. The plan and most of the
supporting plans can be located on the Department of Homeland Security’s website.48 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked to assess the effectiveness of these
efforts and this is an on-going effort. To provide guidance to the various agency decision
makers, the GAO developed a risk management framework.49 Figure 4-1 provides an
illustration of this framework.
This risk assessment model is very goal/objective oriented as opposed to some
models which start by identifying potential hazards. It begins with an objective to be
achieved and then considers the possible constraints to achieving that goal. The risk
assessment portion may be multi-faceted if there are multiple potential constraints (risks).
However, for each risk the process is the same: evaluate alternatives, management
selection of an action to eliminate or mitigate the risk, and then the actual implementation
and monitoring phase which is then followed by repeating the entire cycle.
National Strategy for Maritime Security, ii.
Homeland Security Digital Library. Access July 26, 2017, https://www.hsdl.org/?collection&id=4.
49 Caldwell, 50.
47
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Figure 4-1. GAO risk management framework

One of the areas where these concepts of risk and security are regularly applied is in
contingency planning. Military contingency plans are the ones most closely related to
Strategic Studies, but contingency planning may occur across all elements of government
and in private industry, as well as for personal reasons. A contingency plan is made when
there is a possibility that the planned outcome may not occur. It can be thought of as a
“what if” plan; what if “this” happens instead of the “that” which we expected to happen?
Or in other words, what if something goes wrong with our plans? An example of this is a
ship’s voyage plan to get from point A to point B and the considerations given to what
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might go wrong during the voyage. The possibility of encountering pirates during the
voyage is one of these considerations.
The likelihood of something going wrong is determined by a risk analysis. When the
risk is significant enough to raise concern, a plan is developed to address the actions which
should be taken in the event the risk is realized. These plans could be business continuity
plans, disaster recovery plans or simply risk management plans. Returning to the example
above, when the risk of piracy is great enough, a counter-piracy contingency plan is
warranted.
The need for a plan may be triggered by a risk which is considered likely to occur or
by an unlikely risk that would have catastrophic consequences should it occur. In this
regard, it is useful to think of categories of risk. All risks can be subjectively evaluated to
fall into one of four categories. They may be plotted onto a four-quadrant matrix which
categorizes them in term of probability of occurrence and impact of occurrence. Figure 4-2
below depicts these categories.
In a world without resource constraints, it would be good to address and plan for
each of these categories of risk. In reality, resources are always constrained. The risks that
fall into the “high probability, high impact” quadrant obviously need to be planned for.
These are risks which are likely to occur and when they do they will have a significant
impact. It is equally important to plan for “low probability, high impact.” While the
likelihood of these events occurring may be very slight, their potential catastrophic impact
requires these risks to be addressed. A pirate attack on a merchant ship is an example of a
low probability event that could have a high impact associated with it. Although the media
sometimes elevates awareness of these events, taken in the context of how many ship
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transits occur, this is truly a low probability event. Lower probability and lower impact
risks should be addressed as resources allow with the “low probability, low impact”
category receiving the least priority.

Risk Quadrants
High

High Probability
Low Impact

High Probability
High Impact

Probability
of Occurrence
Low Probability
Low Impact

Low Probability
High Impact

Low
Light

Severe
Impact of Occurrence

Figure 4-2. Risk quadrants

Early in the development of the study of risk, the occurrence of a particular risk was
documented and the statistical consequences considered. This allowed for the refinement
of insurance as the risk was then “personalized and shifted onto individuals.”50 Having an
insurance policy, is to a certain extent, a form of a contingency plan. If the event occurs, the
policy will pay out and this allows future recovery actions. In this manner, an individual is
better prepared for an event but likely has a very limited, if any, way to impact the
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situation. When risks are considered as systemic events, they are “de-individualized.”51
This shift in how we view risk allows us to better deal with the unforeseeable future. By
looking at an issue more holistically, we can focus more on prevention rather than reaction.
As a means of operationalizing this concept us let turn to the field of system engineering.

RISK ANALYSIS AND ENGINEERING RISK MANAGEMENT
As already stated: “Risk analysis involves identifying the most probable threats to an
organization and analyzing the related vulnerabilities of the organization to these
threats.”52 As just discussed, the risk quadrants can be a useful tool for categorizing risks.
Rather than thinking in terms of a plan, engineers think in terms of systems. Instead of
asking what could go wrong with my plan, an engineer will ask “What can go wrong with
my system or any of its parts?”53 Despite the differences in terminology, it is easy to see the
parallels between these two processes.
There are many specific fields within the engineering domain and they each think in
terms of a system; mechanical engineers think in terms of the mechanical system; electrical
engineers are concerned with the electrical system, etcetera. However, systems engineers
specifically consider the interactions between the component systems. It is the principal
discipline that addresses the “depth and breadth of sociotechnical challenges.”54 These
challenges include how the system affects society as well as how society affects the
system.55 Even more comprehensive, enterprise engineering is concerned with very large
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complex “enterprise-wide” systems and is about shaping the environment of those systems.
It “coordinates, harmonizes and integrates the efforts of organizations and individuals
through processes informed or inspired by natural evolution and economic markets.”56
International shipping can be thought of in terms of an unbounded system or a
system of systems also knows as an enterprise system. A system is defined as “an
interacting mix of elements forming an intended whole greater than the sum of its parts.”57
Enterprise systems cannot be centrally controlled and they require continual and
evolutionary development.58 They are a “mix of interdependency and unpredictability.”59

Figure 4-3. An enterprise system within another enterprise system

In a broader sense, international shipping can be viewed as a subsystem of the global
supply chain and in this respect, as an enterprise system within another enterprise system.
Pinto and Garvey, 24.
Pinto and Garvey, 15.
58 Pinto and Garvey, 23.
59 Pinto and Garvey, 22.
56
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Figure 4–3 represents this concept of an enterprise system within another enterprise
system.
Advanced Risk Analysis in Engineering Enterprise Systems provides a look at the
emerging discipline of engineering enterprise systems. This discipline provides a
structured approach for analyzing and managing risk in a complex system. It requires
engineers and managers to develop a “holistic understanding of the social, political, and
economic environments within which an enterprise system operates.”60 Since maritime
piracy cannot be understood without considering it in the context of the larger complex
system within which it exists, the engineering enterprise systems discipline provides a
structured method for analyzing this problem.
Pinto and Garvey use Keating, Sousa-Poza and Kovacic’s description of a complex
system as “a bounded set of richly interrelated elements for which the system performance
emerges over time and through interaction between the elements and the environment…
and the appearance of new and unforeseen system properties which cannot be known
before the system operates, regardless of how thoroughly they are designed.”61 They
provide seven properties which characterize a complex system:
- Large number of richly interrelated elements
- Dynamically emerging behavior and structure that can dramatically change over
time
- Uncertainty in outcomes
- Incomplete understanding of the system
- Multiple, and possibly divergent, system stakeholder perspectives
- Constrained resources and shifting requirements/expectations
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- Urgency for immediate responses with dire, potentially catastrophic consequence
for “getting it wrong”62
These characteristics of a complex system have obvious parallels to the description
Beck provided for the second modernity. This reinforces the idea that it is useful to think
about complex problems as a complex system.
Risk is often expressed in terms of probability; the probability that a potential event
or action will occur. When factors involving the social, political and economic environment
of the enterprise system are considered, objectively derived measures for the probability of
certain event occurrences are not possible. Therefore, risk management in these
situations must rely on probabilities that stem from expert judgment. These “subjective
probabilities” are also called “measures of belief.”63 To determine these values, an expert
must use all available evidence including experiences of similar events.
Since maritime piracy events fit into a category of data scarcity, an agent-base model
is a good tool to assist the “expert” with plausible and consistent probabilities. I will return
to this concept in the next chapter when we discuss contemporary maritime piracy in
terms of the international shipping system and the environment it operates in.
While a systems engineering approach encourages us to look at our area of interest
in a more holistic manner, it is still necessary for us to have an in-depth appreciation for
our particular area of interest. Therefore, I will now turn to a discussion of maritime risk.
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MARITIME RISK
The risks involved in moving cargo by sea have always existed. The seaworthiness
of the vessel is critical. The ship must be able to make the voyage. Even the most
seaworthy vessel can become a casualty of extreme weather, and changes in the weather
may come with little or no warning. But, more to the point, there has long been the risk
that human intervention will prevent the cargo from reaching its destination. Interceptions
and/or destruction of cargo ships have been a risk for as long as ships have sailed. When
not viewed as a target of warfare, this risk was labeled as piracy by the ancient Romans.
The risk of maritime piracy continues to be a big concern for mariners today and will be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Maritime risk assessment is a very broad topic that covers risks within the maritime
domain, as well as threats from the shore to the maritime domain, and from the maritime
domain to the shore. The topic includes the design, production and operation of maritime
assets such as ships and off-shore platforms. In some cases, the port infrastructure is also
considered in this topic.
A general literature review of maritime risk assessment determined the primary
focus is safety at sea. This encompasses both the safety of the ship as well as the safety of
the environment from the hazards of ship operation; primarily pollution. Much of the
literature is concerned with applying the lessons learned from past maritime accidents and
incidents to future ship design to improve the overall ship safety. The concepts employed
in some of these efforts may have application to the operational aspects of shipping.
Therefore, a selected number of them are discussed below.
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For example, in a 2006 issue of Quality & Reliability Engineering International, W. Jin
wrote an article to introduce a series of articles promoting research and development of
maritime risk modeling and decision making. The article discussed how the maritime
industry is moving from a largely prescriptive safety regime to a risk-based goal-setting
regime. This shift recognizes that all safety issues cannot be cost effectively eliminated;
however, they can be reduced to “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).64 The same
can be said for maritime security risks. These risks cannot be totally eliminated; the cost to
even attempt that goal would make marine transport prohibitively expensive. An ALARP
standard also makes sense for maritime security threats.
Historically risk assessment has been used to improve ship design and operations to
make shipping safer. J. Wang, et. al. discuss the use of risk assessment in ship design
feasibility in “Use of Advances in Technology for Maritime Risk Assessment.” The article
begins with a brief review of the then current status of marine risk assessment. It
describes both reliability analysis and safety analysis, allowing that there is considerable
overlap between the two types of analysis. Specifically, it defines reliability analysis as the
study of system’s characteristics “expressed by the probability that it will perform a
required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time.”65 A safety analysis
extends beyond the reliability analysis “to include the study of the consequences of the
failures of the item in terms of possible damage to property, injury/death of people, and/or
the degradation of the environment.”66 The article then equates a safety analysis to a risk
assessment.
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A general process is described for risk assessment. The five steps of this process
are:67
1. Hazard identification
2. Risk estimation
3. Risk-based design/operation strategy selection
4. Risk-based design/operation optimization
5. Risk-based operations/maintenance
The hazard identification step may either be a top-down or bottom up process. The
top-down process is used if adequate failure data is available. When the data is not
available or the reliability of the data is questionable a bottom-up process which looks at
system as a series of subsystems and considers each component individually can be used.
The hazards identified feed into the next step: risk estimation and so forth.
The article concludes by recommending a holistic framework that incorporates aspects
from multiple techniques be employed for maritime risk assessment and “where
appropriate risk modeling and decision-making tools [can] be selected for use at different
stages of the design process and operations.”68
Although the article is primarily focused on a method for safety engineers to
incorporate lessons learned from prior accidents and incidents into future ship safety
design, the techniques and process described may be applied to any large engineering
system. Consequently, when the maritime shipping industry is thought of in term of an
enterprise system the concepts and ideas of this article are useful. It is useful to note the
parallel between the general process described above for risk assessment and the risk
67
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management framework provided by the GAO in the reports discussed in the Security
Studies Approach section. While the two processes are very similar, the general process for
risk assessment begins by focusing on the hazards of whatever is being analyzed. The risk
management framework focuses first on the objective or goal and then evaluates the risk.
While this is a subtle difference, it is an important difference. The risk management
framework is focused on achieving a specific goal by managing risks. The risk assessment
process is focused on improving design and operation to make the system safer.
Identification of strategic goals, objectives and constraints is the problem identification
portion of the process and may be equated to the hazard identification step of the risk
assessment. The constraints to achieving a goal or an objective create a risk that the goal
will not be achieved. Risk assessment is equal to risk estimation except when there is a
lack of specific data to make the estimation. Then a more subjective assessment is
appropriate. The step to evaluate alternatives parallels the step where the risk based
design and operation strategy selection occurs. Management selection refers to
management desire to optimize outcomes and thus nicely equates to risk-based design
operation optimization. Finally, implementation and monitoring is the same as the last
step in the risk assessment where the risk based operations are conducted and maintained.
In 2006, Wang provided an update on the subject with his article “Maritime Risk
Assessment and its Current Status.” He states that the maritime industry’s interest in a
risk-based ‘goal setting’ regime dates back to the 1990s. Safety engineers have applied a
variety of risk-modeling and decision-making techniques to the process of Maritime Risk
Assessment. They have increasingly used Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). These
methods are used for “verification purposes in design and operational processes of marine
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and offshore engineering systems” and “for making decisions from the early stages.”69
Safety improvement efforts for large engineering systems increasingly use risk analysis
methods both inside industry and from a regulatory standpoint. Both quantitative and
qualitative analysis methods are used depending on the information available. As
engineering systems become more complex and the public becomes more safety conscious
there is a need for the development and application of safety assessment procedures.
Wang’s article briefly reviews four noteworthy offshore accidents, (offshore
accidents occur on platforms) followed by four maritime accidents (maritime accidents
occur on ships). These accident reviews are provided as a basis for the current status of
the safety assessment process. While Wang’s article is particular to the UK system of
regulations and assessment techniques, general lessons can still be drawn from them.
Wang describes the reason for the IMO’s role as a maritime regulatory organization: “The
international safety-related marine regulations have been driven by the serious marine
accidents. Lessons were first learnt from serious accidents. Then regulations and rules
were produced to prevent similar occurrences.”70
Wang is primarily focused on design and operation of ships and platforms but he
does provide a discussion on Port Safety as well. He provides a list of potential benefits of
formal safety assessments and goes on to discuss the “Formal Ship Safety Assessment”
(FSA):
FSA is a new approach to marine safety that involves using the techniques of
risk and cost–benefit assessment to assist in the decision-making process. It
should be noted that there is a significant difference between the safety case
approach and FSA. A safety case approach is applied to a particular ship,
whereas FSA is mainly designed to evaluate existing and new safety
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regulation although it may also be applied to safety issues common to a ship
type (such as high-speed passenger vessel) or to a particular hazard (such as
fire). It is noted that the purpose of FSA is not to take account of any specific
systems or their arrangements, operations, etc., nor is the process design to
look at the risks facing a particular stakeholder associated with a ship.
…whilst features specific to a particular ship cannot be taken into account in
a generic application, the commonalities and common factors that influence
risk and its reduction can be identified and reflected in the generic approach
for all ships of that type.71
The article provides a discussion of each of the FSA steps (note the similarities to
the risk assessment steps discussed in Wang’s earlier article):72
1. Identification of Hazard
2. Assessment of Risk
3. Risk control options
4. Cost-Benefit Assessment
5. Decision Making
Earliest possible risk estimation is important, however early risk estimates likely
involve more uncertainty so risks should be ranked relatively rather than with absolute
values. As a design proceeds the risk assessment must continue. At a certain point a
“mathematical model consisting of safety, cost and other objectives can be formulated and
thereafter formal decision-making techniques can be used to process the model in order to
optimize the design.”73
Similar to the earlier article, this article is primarily focused on safety engineering.
However, this article proposes that these methods have value for regulators and the
development of more effective regulations. It is also conceivable that the recommended
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processes, FSA in particular, have application for the broader enterprise system of
international shipping beyond just the regulatory aspect.
The article concludes with a list of recent research activities in maritime risk
modeling and decision making and the following list of “novel risk-assessment tools being
developed:74
1. Expert judgement and approximate reasoning approach for dealing with
problems associated with a high level of uncertainty. This includes subjective safetybased decision-making method, evidential reasoning technique, fuzzy set modelling
method and Dempster–Shafer method for risk modelling and decision making.
2. Safety-based design/operation optimization approach.
3. Application of methods developed in other disciplines, such as artificial
neural network approach and Bayesian networks for risk estimation and decision
making.
4. Methods for modelling of human and organizational factors in the design of
offshore structures.
Some of the most interesting work occurring in the field of maritime risk
assessment deals with the use of fuzzy logic to define an individual ship risk factor. Two
articles describe the development of the MAritime RISk Assessment (MARISA) tool. Both
articles were written by Jean-Francois Balmatt, Frederic Lafont, Robert Maifret and
Nathalie Pessel and were published in Ocean Engineering. “MAritime RISk Assessment
(MARISA), fuzzy approach to define an individual ship risk factor,” presents what was then
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(2009) a new approach to maritime risk assessment.75 The article presents the MARISA
system as a tool to determine individual ship risk factors based on multiple inputs using
fuzzy logic to create a single factor. The risk factor is comprised of both static and dynamic
factors. The static factor provides for the ship’s characteristics and is comprised of the
ship’s age, flag, gross tonnage, number of companies, duration of detention and type. The
dynamic factor is comprised of input on the sea state, wind speed and visibility. The
primary focus for MARISA is safety at sea with emphasis on environmental concerns and
pollution.
The article provides the background for the fuzzy logic approach, followed by an
assessment of works using fuzzy logic in the maritime domain. The data for MARISA is
discussed as well as the MARISA system architecture. Lastly, the results of simulations
using MARISA are provided.
The 2011 article “A decision-making system to maritime risk assessment,” is an
extension of the work.76 In this article, MARISA has been updated to incorporate the ship’s
speed and its position relative to maritime shipping lanes. The MARISA architecture is
hierarchical and modular; therefore, the additional factors simply build upon the earlier
model. The next step would be to expand MARISA even further by incorporating
information about maritime traffic density and/or maritime risk zones. While the intended
focus of MARISA is environmental safety at sea, it is easy to think about a similar
architecture focused on maritime security.
Psarros, Skjong, and Eide have done some interesting work specific to maritime
security risk. In their 2009 article “The acceptability of maritime security risk,” they look at
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the general issue of how to define acceptable risk.77 Since resources are limited, industry is
interested in maximizing the benefits of investments in maritime security. They propose
that maritime security use the same criterion used for maritime safety which is based on
averting fatalities. Their article proposes the decision criterion be the value of $6 million.
In another article, they look at the incidents of maritime piracy. The article “On the success
rates of maritime piracy attacks,” analyzes available statistical data from the IMO’s monthly
piracy reports from 2000 to 2009.78 Using trend analysis, they determine the attack rates
on specific vessel voyage segments for each geographic area of pirate activity and find that
each trend is unique by region. They use this information to estimate the probability of a
pirate attack using logistical regression. The conclusion from their modeling is that the
pirate attack success rates decrease with vessel size, but increase with pirate capability.
The results of this sort of data analysis could be utilized in an expanded version of MARISA,
specifically to help identify maritime risk zones and to identify the extent of the risk.
Marine insurance is another method shippers and mariners use to deal with risk.
Maritime insurance can be traced back to Greek Antiquity when “sea voyages would be
‘insured’ by high-interest maritime loans that were repayable only if the ship and cargo
made it safely to their destination.”79 A lender making these high interest loans was able to
off-set the losses from unsuccessful voyages with their large gains on the successful
voyages. They were even able to develop a certain level of sophistication for this primitive
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insurance by varying the ‘interest rates’ depending on the season; “according to the
probability of storms and rough weather.”80
As maritime commerce prospered and the trade routes lengthened, maritime
insurance became more institutionalized. In the early years, the insurance was provided
by individual underwriters. These underwriters might be acting alone or in organized
groups. One of the first insurance markets to provide maritime insurance as a specialist
insurance business was Lloyd’s of London.81
Today, huge amounts of capital are invested in ships and their cargoes. Marine
insurance continues to play a role in safeguarding these major investments. Hundreds of
insurance companies around the world provide marine insurance and it is a complex
process consisting of individual policies to cover the hull of the ship, the cargo, and the
owners’ and operators’ liability, as well as other specialized policies packaged together as
needed. Specialized polices might include items such as “Kidnap and Ransom” or “War
Risks.”
There is no specific policy to directly protect against the risks of maritime piracy
and terrorism; rather these risks are incorporated into the various policies as appropriate.
Just as improvements in ship construction allow for the rates on hull insurance to be lower,
security enhancements which reduce the ships vulnerability to pirate attacks can reduce
some insurance costs.
As in all forms of insurance, there are clauses which clarify the coverage, as well as
when it applies and does not apply. There are also different classes of insurance which
cover the various aspects being insured – hull insurance for the actual ship; cargo
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insurance for what the ship is carrying; liability insurance to protect the owners; and
specialized policies for more specific risks. The risk of piracy is not specifically addressed,
as it crosses into many of these types of insurance that a ship will have. Yet, when the risk
of pirate attacks increases, the cost for insurance also increases.
Some regions of the oceans require higher risk insurance. Specifically, a normal
insurance contract can be voided if the ship transits a designated war zone. The Joint War
Committee (JWC), which is comprised of underwriting representatives from Lloyd’s and
the International Underwriters Association, determines and publishes a list of the areas
which are considered war zones. The transit of these areas requires a special “war risks”
policy. In 2005, the JWC in conjunction with the Joint Hull Committee (JHC) produced
wording which allowed underwriters to put the piracy peril into the war policy. Areas with
significant pirate activity are now listed on the Joint War Listed Areas (JWLA). The current
areas of “perceived enhanced risk” are listed in JWLA022.82 Additionally, ships that sail
these waters may carry kidnap and ransom insurance (K&R). K&R insurance protects
individuals in high-risk areas around the globe from kidnapping, extortion, wrongful
detention and hijacking. It is often purchased for situations on land, but it can also apply at
sea. Paradoxically, K&R insurance could make mariners better targets for the illegal
activity of holding them for ransom payments.
Maritime insurance is one way to deal with certain maritime risks; however, the
institution of insurance has also likely played a role in the escalation of piracy in certain
regions. Ships that have insurance are more likely to sail through risky waters. Ships that
have insurance make profitable targets. As Terry McKnight said in his book Pirate Alley
Lloyd’s Market Association website: Accessed July 26, 2017, http://www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.
The list was published 10 December 2015. It was reviewed with no changes made in June 2017.
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when describing the escalation of Somali piracy, specially referring to the increase in
ransom demands by the pirates: “…while piracy is making millions for the pirates, it’s
actually making a lot more for several legitimate international businesses.”83 In the time
frame that pirates collected an average of $160 million in ransom payments, maritime
insurance companies collected five time that amount in increased premiums and service
fees.84 In situations like that, where is the incentive for change? It must come from those
who are being targeted, the mariners and the nations who support them. Therefore, let us
dive a little deeper into the issues of maritime safety and security.

MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY
The safety and security of international shipping has historically been an important
issue. Shipping enables international trade, and shippers and investors want their cargos
to arrive safely. It is a topic which begins with the design and construction of each and
every vessel. It continues with how the ship is manned and operated, as well as how it
interacts with other vessels at sea. Since man first put to sea, constant improvements have
been made to make going to sea safer.
Today, those practices have evolved into the more structured practice of maritime
risk assessment. Maritime risks are multi-faceted. They can be divided into two major
categories of events; maritime safety accidents and maritime security incidents. Maritime
safety accidents are unintentional events which may occur because of natural causes, an
action of the crew or a third party. These include events such as fire, explosions or
collisions. Safety accidents may also be navigational in nature, caused by either weather or
83
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geography. However, maritime security incidents are intentional actions. These are
comprised of unlawful acts of piracy and terrorism. When reducing the risks from this
category, the concern is how to enhance ship security without jeopardizing the ship’s
organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Although this work is primarily concerned with
Maritime Security issues, there are valuable lessons to be learned from looking at how the
maritime community has dealt with safety issues. Additionally, while the two types of
events are distinct in nature, a maritime safety issue may result in an increased
vulnerability to maritime security risks. Or as in the case of the June 2017 collision
between the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the Philippine flagged container vessel, ACX
Crystal, what appears to have been a navigational incident, could perhaps have been an
intentional act and consequently a maritime security incident rather than a maritime safety
accident.85 The line between these two categories is not always clear. For these reasons, a
brief discussion of maritime safety is provided before shifting to the issue of maritime
security.

Maritime Safety
The international maritime community has long been concerned with improving
safety at sea. Following the sinking of RMS Titanic, the first version of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was negotiated and agreed upon in 1914.
This treaty has been revised and updated to continually improve safety at sea issues. The
fifth and current version of SOLAS was adopted in 1974 and entered into force in 1980.
ACX Crystal plowed into the starboard side of the USS Fitzgerald around 0220 on Saturday, 17 June 2017,
approximately 56 miles south of Yokosuka, Japan. The resulting damage to the Fitzgerald was significant
enough that the ship would have sunk without the heroic damage control actions of the ship’s crew. There is
an on-going investigation of this incident, at this time there has been no indication of terrorism.
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The current version has been updated and amended as needed and is referred to as
“SOLAS, 1974, as amended.” The Convention specifies “minimum standards for the
construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety.”86 Flag States
are responsible for the ships that sail under their flag and must ensure they comply with
current SOLAS requirements. Port States are authorized to inspect the ships entering their
ports to verify that they comply with all requirements.
The first SOLAS convention prescribed the number of required lifeboats and other
emergency equipment, including radio communications equipment, and safety procedures.
These types of equipment directly impact life safety in the event of an emergency. Newer
versions of the convention were adopted in 1929 and 1948. With the establishment of the
International Maritime Organization in 1948,87 the SOLAS convention came under the
IMO’s purview. The 1960 SOLAS convention, the first update that the IMO was responsible
for, represented a major advance in updating shipping regulations to reflect new
technology and maritime procedures. Many of the SOLAS requirements deal with ship
construction standards which are intended to make the ship more survivable in the event
of extreme weather or collision. Modern day environmental concerns are included in the
current convention, such that, in addition to the original aims of ensuring safety by
preventing injury or loss of life, avoidance of damage to the environment is now
addressed.88
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The 1974 version of the convention included a clause which allowed for
amendments to the convention to be made by tactic agreement, whereby the amendments
enter into force on a stated date unless objections to the amendment are received by a
specified number of convention parties.89 Since then the SOLAS convention has been
amended numerous times and in addition to safety issues, maritime security issues are also
addressed.90 Specifically, in 2002, Chapter XI-2 “Special measures to enhance maritime
security,” was adopted and entered into force on 1 July 2004.91 This chapter was added to
clarify the requirements of authorized organizations to carry out inspections and surveys,
including the operational responsibilities of the port State.92 The chapter is organized into
two sections; the first section provides a general introduction to the new requirements
while the second section provides the details of the new regulations. Most significantly,
this chapter introduces the International Shipboard Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS
Code). Part A of the code is mandatory and Part B provides guidance on how to best
comply with the mandatory code.93 The safer we can make ships and the ports they sail to
and from, the less vulnerable the ships will be. This provides a good transition to the topic
of maritime security. More details of these developments as well as maritime security
policy will be discussed in the next section.
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Maritime Security
Unlike safety accidents, maritime security incidents are intentional actions caused
by someone or some group of actors. The major distinction which makes these issues
different from maritime safety issues is the unlawfulness of the acts. The incidents can be
divided into two major groups; terrorism and piracy. Acts of terrorism at sea are a
relatively recent consideration, while piracy is as old as seafaring. Maritime piracy was
discussed in Chapter 2. Here we will take a brief look at maritime terrorism.
Martin N. Murphy credits the distinction between maritime piracy and maritime
terrorism as a result of the hijacking of the Santa Maria in 1961. Because this act of piracy
was politically motivated, “Modern legal thinking was reluctant to label the act one of
piracy and therefore, retrospectively, it was labeled terrorism.”94 Murphy contends that
many commentators do not agree with this categorization of these acts. Specifically, he
states; “In the view of James Cable, the noted diplomat and naval historian, the difference
between piracy and terrorism is artificial, one that is not recognizable in practice.”95
Despite this somewhat artificial distinction between maritime piracy and maritime
terrorism, the risks for mariners are very real and can be extremely costly.
The hijacking of the MS Achille Lauro in October 1985 brought renewed attention to
the issue of maritime terrorism. The following month, the IMO assembly developed
“Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of
their passengers and crew.”96 The next year, the Maritime Safety Committee issued a
Circular entitled “Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews onboard
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ships.”97 These efforts lead to the “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation,” commonly referred to as the SUA convention, which
was adopted by member nations on March 10, 1988 and entered into force on March 1,
1992.98
Article 3 of the convention states that “Any person commits an offence if that person
unlawfully and intentionally:
1. seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any
other form of intimidation; or
2. performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
3. destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
4. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device
or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship
or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
that ship; or
5. destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of a ship; or
6. communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
7. injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a)
to (f).”99 [of the SUA Convention]
The suicide bombing of the USS Cole (DDG-67) in 2000 and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in 2001 brought even greater focus to the issue of maritime security. The
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) was established in December
2002 as an amendment to SOLAS. The measures in the Code entered into force in July
2004. The Code, which has two parts, one mandatory and one recommendatory, is a
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comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities.100
Essentially, the Code equates to doing a risk assessment and implementing risk
management practices.
The IMO website summarizes:
In essence, the Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships
and port facilities is a risk management activity and that, to determine what
security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made
in each particular case. The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardised,
consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling Governments to offset
changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities
through determination of appropriate security levels and corresponding
security measures.101
Also following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the SUA Convention was amended by the
Protocol of 2005. This protocol acknowledged “terrorist acts threaten international peace
and security” and requested new measures “in order to prevent and suppress terrorism
against ships and to improve security aboard and ashore, and thereby to reduce the risk to
passengers, crews and port personnel on board ships and in port areas and to vessels and
their cargoes.”102 Specifically, the protocol spells out in detail the threat of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and goes into detail on state responsibility for bringing
perpetrators to justice.
In 2006, the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy published a study
of the risk and liability associated with maritime terrorism. Even though only two percent
of all international terrorism incidents over the last 30 years involved seaborne strikes,
policy makers had become increasingly concerned by the possibilities of maritime
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terrorism. Maritime terrorism, like maritime piracy is a low probability, high impact event.
However, it is likely a lower probability, but possibly higher impact event than piracy. A
maritime terrorist attack has the potential to cause mass casualties, severe property
damage and perhaps significant disruptions to commerce.103 Add, the fact that many
maritime assets are particularly vulnerable and the issue simply cannot be ignored.
The RAND study only looked at a limited number of attack scenarios involving
passenger and container shipping.104 However, their findings are germane to the topic in
general. They looked at the issue in terms of vulnerability, capability and intent. For the
most part, terrorist groups have not been geographically located in coastal areas or have
not had the necessary skill set needed to operate in the marine environment. Similar to
pirates, to operate at sea terrorists must have “mariner skills, access to appropriate assault
and transport vehicles, the ability to mount and sustain operations from a non-land-based
environment, and familiarity with certain specialist capabilities.”105 Despite this, the study
lists several groups that have clearly integrated waterborne capabilities into their skill
set.106 While maritime targets are often out of sight and therefore “relatively speaking also
out of mind,”107 modern media abilities could allow for them to be more visible, particularly
in the case of cruise ships.
The study found that on-board explosive attacks were most probable for cruise
ships and ferries. Such an attack could cause high casualty rates, particularly on a ferry
where passengers are concentrated and the vessels are especially vulnerable. While an
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attack on a cargo ship is less likely to cause high profile casualties, these vessels are
susceptible to being used as a concealed-weapon platform. The greatest risk in this
category would be radiological or nuclear detonation, but even a conventional explosion
could cause significant economic impact on a port facility.108 These sorts of findings are
very useful for prioritizing limited resources that are required for detection, prevention
and interdiction efforts.109

Maritime Security Environment
The oceans are large, and while shipping lanes and ports determine where the
majority of merchant ships will travel, the areas to be protected remain vast. The high seas
cover more than 130 million square miles of the earth’s surface.110 These waters are by
definition beyond the sole jurisdiction of any one state.
In early times, protection of merchant shipping was provided by a combination of
great empire power and the power of mercantilism. The ability of the large mercantile
companies to have what were essentially their own private navies disappeared as the
mercantile companies either ceased to be commercial entities or were transformed into
modern corporations.111 For a while, state sponsored privateers were employed as an
adjunct to more proper naval power, however by 1856 international agreements began to
outlaw privateers under international maritime law.112 By the turn of the century, states
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had banished privateers to the annals of history.113 Thus, the ability to legally employ
violence on the high seas was relegated solely to state powers.
Safe transit of maritime vessels continues to be a primary motivation for naval
power in modern times. During the era of Pax Britannica, the British Empire functioned as
a global hegemonic power and essentially provided a global police force. The British
controlled most of the key maritime routes and the British navy was for the most part
unchallenged upon the seas. The First World War put an end to that world order and by
the end of the Second World War a new world order was emerging. The bi-polar security
arrangement which emerged divided the world between American and Soviet spheres of
influence. During the Cold War, the American and Soviet Navies vied for control of the seas.
Between them they patrolled and controlled much of the seas while maintaining relative
order on the high seas. Both nations significantly reduced their presence in the relative
peace that followed the end of the Cold War. However, with the end of the bi-polar global
security environment, the world has, in some ways, become a far more complex place.
Increasing rates of piracy at sea, as well as the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States,
have brought a renewed focus to maritime security issues and a need to fill the void left by
the decrease in US-USSR naval activity.
Currently the security of the seas is provided for in a variety of ways. The efforts
vary by region, depending on the needs for security. Within territorial waters, security is
the responsibility of the state and may be provided for by marine police and coast guard
forces. Alternatively, when the state does not have the resources to defend its waters,
other states may be invited to assist. In international waters, security is the responsibility
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of all nations. These efforts are primarily provided by multi-national cooperative efforts.
How willing these forces are to get involved in piracy depends on a multitude of factors.
Even though states nearly unanimously agree that piracy is illegal, willingness to get
involved in enforcing the international laws which prohibit piracy depends on complex
considerations to include what to do with pirates who are apprehended. However, when
pirate activity increases enough to capture global attention, international action is called
for. Such was the situation in January 2009 when incidences of pirate attacks off the coast
of Somalia and in the Gulf Aden reached extraordinary levels for modern times. The
response was an unprecedented international maritime cooperative effort to combat
piracy in that region.
As maritime trade continues to expand, and the availability of naval assets shrinks,
providing security on the seas becomes increasing challenging. Since maritime security
forces cannot be everywhere at all times, mariners debate how much self-protection they
should sail with. Key among the factors considered is the risk level of piracy. As John S.
Burnett so well, states: “Indeed, there is not a shipping lane, a navigable strait, an important
canal, that is safe from those determined to take over a ship.” 114 The question is, how great
is the risk for such an event? An even more important question is, whether we can have a
greater impact on this risk by concentrating on the motivators ashore, than on our
interdiction and counter-piracy efforts at sea?
Despite continual efforts to increase security at sea, it is important to take a more
holistic view of the issue, to include what motivates piracy in the first place. If we have a
better understanding of what motivates piracy, we should be able to put policies in place
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that help prevent piracy by eliminating or minimizing the conditions which encourage it.
This kind of prevention may be more effective than the reactive efforts to interdict piracy
operations at sea or taking actions after a pirate attack.

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE OTHER PIRATE RISK
When we think about pirate risk, we are normally thinking about the risk to a ship
or yacht in the event of a pirate attack. Indeed, the previous section of this chapter
described the marine environment and the efforts to make it safe from piracy. When we
think about maritime piracy in terms of a system, we understand the pirates are an
essential part of the problem. Without pirates, there is no piracy. To understand the risk of
a pirate attack, we must understand the pirates and their motivations – this includes the
pirate’s risk. What risks are pirates considering when they decide to engage in piracy?
First there are the normal risks associated with going to sea on a boat. These risks
vary depending on the seaworthiness of the boat, including the dependability of the engine;
the seamanship skills of the pirate operating the boat; and the weather and sea conditions
or operating environment. At the top of this list, is the risk of drowning since there is no
guarantee that a boat that goes to sea will return to land. We can assume that able
mariners would take all these risks in stride just as they would if they went to sea to fish or
trade. There are days when the risks are high enough that they do not go to sea. This could
be problem with the boat, perhaps the engine is not operating properly. Stormy weather
could also prevent someone from going out in a boat. This is reflected in the seasonal
cycles of piracy in certain areas. The PPS and PARS models developed by the Naval
Research Laboratory used meteorological data to account for this. Richard Phillips
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discussed this in his book, A Captain’s Duty. He says, “Piracy has seasons, just like the
weather.”115 During the monsoon season, the ocean is dangerous for small boats, so piracy
ebbs. For example, piracy season in the Indian Ocean runs from October to May. This trend
is also reflected in the IMB piracy reports, when the number of attacks by region are
analyzed by what time of year they occurred.
The maritime security environment presents another set of obvious risks. These are
the risks associated specifically with the act of piracy. Some of these risks are related to the
target ships. What kind of ship is it? How much freeboard is there – meaning how difficult
will it be to board. What kind of counter-piracy measures has the ship employed? Some
ships have fire hoses rigged to repel boarders. Others may have barbed wire obstacles.
Many ships have taken to sailing with armed guards when they transit dangerous waters.
These are just a few of the best management practices merchant mariners employ to
discourage pirates. All these efforts factor into how risky a particular target is for pirates.
Then there is the security environment itself. Are there maritime security units operating
in the area; naval vessels or coast guard, etc.? What is the risk of being interdicted by these
security forces and what is the punishment?
During the early days of CTF 151, the unwritten policy for the U.S. Navy was to
“catch and release” the pirates. 116 This was because the legal ramification of taking them
into custody was far too complicated. The point here, is that if the pirate knows there is no
penalty for being caught in the act of piracy, he will view the risk of engaging in piracy
totally different from when the risk is incarceration or possible death. Thus, even the
reputation of the state’s legal system can factor into the pirate’s calculation of risk. The
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total risk of engaging in piracy is the sum of all the individual risks. All of these risks are
likely subjectively calculated based on the pirate’s experience.
For the pirate, the risks are half of the calculation. What is the potential reward? If
the reward is high enough, the pirate will be willing to take bigger risks. Many of the
contemporary incidents of piracy involve hijacking the vessel and holding the crew for
ransom. In 2012, the average ransom was $4 million per incident and as much as $12
million. The total ransom paid out in 2011 was $135 million.117 Some people would be
willing to take quite a bit of risk for this kind of payment. It should be noted that the
pirates who are demanding these high ransoms are not the disorganized ad-hoc type of
simple opportunistic piracy we often think about. These incidents are the piracy engaged
in by a “highly developed transnational criminal enterprise.”118
For a more accurate calculation for the risk to reward ratio, the risk calculation
should include a factor for the probability of success. This is where effective counter-piracy
efforts of the vessels and counter-piracy operations by maritime security forces can have a
big impact. But these are costly efforts to employ, so we return to the question asked
earlier; is it possible to have a bigger impact on reducing the risk of maritime piracy by
concentrating on reducing the motivators ashore?
The next chapter returns to the issue of contemporary maritime piracy. It will
provide some initial analysis as well as a discussion of the available data.
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CHAPTER 5
PIRACY DATA AND ANALYSIS

This chapter begins with a discussion of the data available on maritime piracy. It
provides some basic analysis of the data to establish what the risk of a pirate attack is for
merchant shipping as well as how successful pirate attacks tend to be. A spectrum of
piracy operations is proposed which illuminates the need to consider the motivation for
piracy. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of data on socio-economic and
socio-political factors.

MARITIME PIRACY DATA
Data on current pirate attacks is only as good as the reports of these attacks allow.
There are a few comprehensive sources of this data. The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) maintains a “Live Piracy Map” of incidents of piracy at sea for the current
year.1 A Map of the previous year is also available. The data is gathered by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. They get the information directly from the ships or owners of the ships who
make reports to the Centre. The ICC also produces quarterly and annual reports of “Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships,” and these reports are available from the Centre.
The IMO maintains statistical data on reported incidences of piracy and armed
robbery dating back to 1982.2 The data comes from the Global Integrated Shipping

1
2

ICC, Live Piracy Map.
IMO, Knowledge Centre.
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Information System (GISIS). The UK Defence Intelligence Staff, International Terrorism and
Organized Crime Group (ITOC), Maritime Branch issues a “Worldwide Threats to Shipping
Report” monthly. Both the IMO and ITOC draw most of their data from IMB PRC.
The US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provides piracy analysis and weekly
warnings of the world-wide threat to shipping. Two separate documents are produced by
ONI; “Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly” and “World Wide Threat to Shipping.” ONI
draws on multiple sources to include the data from the IMB, IMO and ReCAAP to make this
information available.
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a regional government-to-government agreement. The
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) is located in Singapore.3 The Centre is focused
on piracy in Asia. It provides a network for the sharing of timely and accurate information
about incidents of piracy, issues warning and alerts to the shipping industry, and produces
periodical reports of maritime piracy.4 The agreement entered into force on September 4,
2006, so they also recently published a 10th anniversary report Commemorating a Decade
of Regional Cooperation 2006-2016.5
Lastly, Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) is a program that was launched in 2010 by the
One Earth Future Foundation, a privately funded, independent, non-profit organization.
Their goal is to develop public-private partnerships which promote long-term solutions

ReCAAP “Home.”
ReCAAP “About ReCAAP ISC.”
5 ReCAAP, 2006-2016,
3
4
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both ashore and at sea to combat the issue of maritime piracy. They produce an annual
report on the State of Maritime Piracy. The 2016 report is their seventh annual report.6
Efforts to collect reports of piracy and disseminate warnings have steadily
improved. Greater details, when available, of the incidents allow for better analysis of past
events. This analysis provides feedback so that reporting requirements may be adjusted.
Conversely, we do not know what we do not know. The estimates for what percentages of
incidents are reported widely vary. More optimistic estimates believe that up to fifty
percent of incidents are reported, while others predict as little as ten percent.7 No matter
the precise percentage, many incidents are not reported and therefore are not captured in
any of the data bases.
The best incentive to report incidences of piracy is to provide better warnings for
other mariners. In fact, the IMB annual report clearly emphasizes this. In the section about
the IMB Maritime Security Hotline, the report says “All information received will be treated
in strict confidence and will passed on to relevant Authorities for further action. Maritime
crime and security concerns us all and with your help, we can try to minimize the risk and
help save lives and property.”8 The section ends with “REMEMBER: Your information may
save lives. All information will be treated in strict confidence.”9
Unfortunately, there are many disincentives for reporting. Peter Chalk reports that
most ship owners are reluctant to alert authorities about attacks on their vessels, primarily

The report is available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/state-maritime-piracy-2016
Accessed August 28, 2017.
7 Murphy, 1983, 67-68.
8 ICC IMB 2016 report, 19.
9 ICC IMB 2016 report, 19.
6
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because of the resultant delays and costs associated with the investigations.10 Ships might
also be reluctant to report out of concern for how the incident could impact their
reputation.11 Operational costs would be increased if crew members demanded additional
pay to sail through “pirate-prone areas.”12 There is also a concern that reporting incidents
will lead to higher insurance rates.13
The worst reason that some incidents do not get reported is that, as they say; “dead
men tell no tales,” and therefore some victims of piracy are unable to make reports. Finally,
pirates seldom, if ever, self-report. This is especially important as we lack data on precisely
what motivates piracy. Since the data is gathered by incident, we do not know much about
the population of pirates. Is there a large population of which each is only involved in a few
attacks, or a smaller number involved in more attacks? This might not matter to the
victims; however, it can make a significant difference in terms of pirate tactics and
capability – pirates learn.
With any kind of data, the details matter. The annual reports produced by the ICC
IMB compile a year’s worth of data on “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.” As
discussed in Chapter 2, the distinction between a pirate attack and an armed robbery is
where the incidence occurs. When the incidence occurs on the internal waters of a state or
within the territorial waters of a state it is considered to be armed robbery, whereas those

Chalk, 2008, 7. Chalk credits IMB officials in Kuala Lumpur with this information and cites: “According to
analysts in Malaysia, the losses incurred by delays to onward journeys (known as demurrage costs) hurt ship
owners the most. These losses, which can reach $20,000-30,000 per day, are especially severe in countries
where police authorities lack efficiency or professionalism, both of which can result in investigations that
take weeks, or even months to complete.” (Author interview with maritime analysts and IMB official, Kuala
Lumpur, August 26, 2006).
11 Murphy, 1983, 68. The ship might be blamed for taking insufficient precautions to prevent the attack.
12 Murphy, 1983, 68.
13 Chalk, 2008, 7.
10
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that occur on the high seas are acts of piracy.14 The report also lists actual attacks and
attempted attacks; therefore when looking at the summary of all attacks in the first table of
the report the number of events include the combined totals of pirate attacks and
attempted attacks as well as the same for armed robbery events. In 2016, there were a total
of 191 events across the globe reported by 49 specific regional areas.15 This total
continued the general downward trend of the last few years following record highs of 445
events in 2010 and 439 in 2011 (see figure 5-1).16
Each annual report provides five years’ worth of data for comparison. The overall
summary of actual and attempted attacks includes all incidences of reported piracy and
armed robbery. The actual attacks consist of vessel boardings (events when pirates enter
the vessel and then depart), and hijackings (events when pirates enter the vessel and take
control of it). Attempted attacks are divided into two categories as well; simple attempts
and attempts in which the vessel was fired upon. Each of these categories is later broken
down into more detail. In addition to where the events occurred, the data also provides
greater details as to what kind of ship was attacked, what kind of weapons were used, what
sort of violence occurred, and what the status of the ship was at the time of the attack;
berthed (pier side in a port), anchored or steaming.

The IMO uses the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) definition of piracy
and the IMO definition of armed robbery.
15 ICC IMB 2014 report, 5.
16 ICC IMB 2016 report, 5. There were 297 events in 2012, 264 in 2013, 245 in 2014 and 246 in 2015.
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Figure 5-1. Actual and Attempted Attacks 2007-201617

Each category of ship status at the time of incident has different security
implications that depend, to some extent, on the level of onboard readiness to deal with any
incident, no matter where it occurs. However, they also are each unique because the
security environment in each situation is dependent on different variables. In a port,
jurisdiction belongs to the state in which the port is located and may fall to local security
forces. Anchorages are located within the territorial waters of specific nations who then
have a sovereign responsibility to provide security. Some anchorages are known to be

17

ICC IMB Annual Reports 2007 through 2016.
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more prone to incidents of “armed robbery”18 and ICC offers warnings about these areas.19
The level of security provided in a port or around an anchorage falls to the host nation and
varies directly with that nation’s capabilities and willingness to provide security.
When a ship is operating in a steaming condition it may be in territorial waters or
on the high seas. In territorial waters, security continues to remain the responsibility of the
host nation. These events, as well as the ones that occur in the port or at anchorage, would
technically be classified as armed robbery and be under the auspicies of local authorities.
However, on the high seas the responsibility for ship security rests solely with the vessel
and others operating in the vicinity. There is no permanent international maritime security
force. However, as demonstrated off the coast of Somalia, a coalition or coordinated effort
by multiple navies can play a significant role in reducing the threat of piracy.
The majority of the reported incidents occur when the ship is berthed or at
anchorage, and for many locations listed in the report, there are no incidents for ships in a
steaming status. This means that very few of the events occur on the high seas. These
factors lead to the conclusion that the data on pirate attacks on the high seas is relatively
scarce. This makes it difficult to create a model based on existing data. Instead a model can
be created making certain assumptions and then be used to help us understand the
dynamics which are in play.

By definition, pirate attacks that occur at an anchorage are incidents of armed robbery because they occur
in territorial waters.
19 See ICC IMB 2014 report, page 20 for warnings about anchorages in Bangladesh and Indonesia.
Additionally, Table 3 of the report lists the ports and anchorages which had three or more incidents in 2014.
18
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SOME SELECTED PIRACY DATA
Globally there are plenty of relatively small incidents which occur as opportunities
present themselves. The data on these events is probably highly under-reported. Payne
cites the estimated 3000 annual attacks on yacht and small boats as an example of this.20
These are the sort of piracy and armed robbery events that require relatively no
equipment, can happen quickly and then the transgressors can be on their way again. Few
of them make it into the IMB PRC’s data base.21 Larger attacks may still be relatively simple.
The common thread is often a lack of proper governance, as on open waters, in places like
Somalia, or when complaisant authorities either look the other way or are themselves
involved.
To the individual merchant ship, a pirate attack would likely be considered a low
probability, high impact event. Although when conditions are right, such as off the coast of
Somalia from 2008-2010, the occurrence of piracy incidents can significantly increase.
Even with such an increase, it would be difficult to classify the risk as anything other than
low probability. Let us look at some of the specific numbers for some of the busiest
shipping lanes from available data. Two separate regions will be considered, East Africa
and Southeast Asia.
In generic terms, we know that about 90 percent of the global trade is transported
by the international shipping industry. This industry consists of over 50,000 merchant
ships sailing under the flags of over 150 nations.22 The world merchant fleet consists of

Payne, 191.
Payne, 191.
22 International Chamber of Shipping website “Shipping and World Trade,” (2017). Accessed August 27,
2017, http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade.
20
21
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many different types of vessels, figure 5-2 shows the composition of the merchant fleet by
type of vessel.

World Merchant Fleet
51,405 ships as of 1 January 2016
1,770

4,316

16,892

5,204

Bulk Carriers
General Cargo Ships

5,239

Crude Oil Tankers
Container Ships
Chemical Tankers

7,065
10,919

Ro-Ro/Passenger
Ships
Liquefied Natural
Gas Tankers

Figure 5-2. World Merchant Fleet as of 1 January 201623

Using data from table 5-1 of the total attacks worldwide for the years 2009-2016 we
would get an annual average of just under 320 actual and attempted attacks. Since we
know that the higher than normal rate of piracy off the coast of Somalia skews the data, we
can consider just five years from 2012 to 2016. This would lower the annual average to

Compiled from data on the Statista website, “Number of ships in the world merchant fleet as of January 1,
2016, by type.” Accessed September 2, 2017, https://www.statista.com/statistics/264024/number-ofmerchant-ships-worldwide-by-type/.
23
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just under 250 attacks. While 250 still sounds like a lot of attacks, taken in perspective of
how many ships there are, the risk of an attack is very small. If we want to consider the
piracy that occurred on the high seas we can just look at incidents that occurred for ships
listed as steaming. For 2016, a little more than 25 percent (52 of the 191 total) of the
pirate attacks/ attempted attacks occurred on ships in a steaming status. These events
occurred in just 11 of the 49 regional areas defined in the annual report. However, even
this percentage is likely high because some of the ships were likely steaming in territorial
waters.24 To get to this level of detail, the geographic location of each incident would need
to be compared with a map delineating territorial waters. Even without making that
distinction, it’s reasonable to consider the attacks on the high seas to be rare events,
especially in comparison to the size of the merchant fleet, the number of fishing boats
which are likely to be operating as well as the number of yachts that make up the potential
target pool.
Looking specifically at the Somali piracy issue during the timeframes 2009 to 2011
and 2012-2016 allows for analysis of two very different amounts of piracy. Using an annual
shipping rate of 17,88525 for 2009 to 2011 we find a piracy a rate of 1.24 percent.26
Specifically, for the year 2011, when the rate peaked, the piracy rate was 1.32 percent.27
We get a very different result when we consider the last three years. From 2014 to 2016

To determine where the ship was specifically steaming (in territorial waters or on the high seas), the
location data of each individual incident would need to be analyzed. Since there is a scarcity of piracy data to
start with this was not done for this work.
25 This is based on the max capacity of the Suez Canal being 49 ships per day for an annual total of 17,855
(49 x 365).
26 (222/17,885) x 100 = 1.24.
27 (236/17,885) x 100 = 1.32.
24
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the annual average number of attacks due to Somali pirates dropped to 4.3, which would
indicate a piracy rate of 0.024 percent.28

Table 5-1. Actual and Attempted Attacks for Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia29

Region
Horn of Africa

Location

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gulf of Aden

117

53

37

13

6

4

0

1

Red Sea

15

25

39

13

2

4

0

0

Somalia

80

139

160

49

7

3

0

1

Sub-total

212

217

236

75

15

11

0

2

Indonesia

15

40

46

81

106

100

108

49

Malacca Straits

2

2

1

2

1

1

5

0

Malaysia

16

18

16

12

9

24

13

7

Singapore

9

3

11

6

9

8

9

2

42

63

74

101

125

133

135

58

156

165

129

121

124

101

111

131

410

445

439

297

264

245

246

191

SE Asia

Straits
Sub-total
Rest of the
Globe
TOTAL

For this specific geographic area, we see that amount of piracy occurring, which was
attributed to the Somali pirates during the first timeframe, was more than ten times the

28
29

(4.3/17,885) x 100 = 0.024.
This data was compiled from the IMB Annual reports for 2013 and 2016.
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rate of the next riskiest area of the globe. During the second timeframe, the rate decreased
by a factor of about 50.
In the case of Southeast Asian piracy, looking at the data in terms of two separate
timeframes allows for an increased amount of shipping to be accounted for. The amount of
shipping passing through the Straits of Malacca was estimated to be 70,000 ships per year
in 2010.30 Following a trend of increasing shipping volume, an all-time high of 79,344
ships was reported in 2014.31 Using these two pieces of information we can make some
estimates for piracy risk in this region. Using the annual piracy data from 2009 to 2011 we
find there to have been an average of 60 attacks per year. Combining that with the
shipping rate of 70,000 ships per year we estimate a piracy attack risk of less than 0.1
percent.32 Assuming that the increasing trend in shipping volume continued, it is
reasonable to use 80,000 ships per year for the years 2014 to 2016. During this timeframe,
there was an average of 109 pirate attacks each year. Those assumption lead to an
increased piracy risk of 0.136 percent.33 It is clear that along with the increase in shipping
volume the number of pirate attacks was also increasing.
Given that the reported shipping rate for the Malacca Straits increased by 10,000
transits from the earlier timeframe to the later one, the rate of piracy increased at an even
higher rate. Therefore, there was an increase in the percentage of reported piracy

30Rachmat,

Budiman, Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Security the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore: Lessons Learned,” Brief at the Asia-Europe Meeting Seminar on Piracy at Sea, Brussels, 4-5 May
2010. Accessed September 26, 2017,
http://www.asem8.be/sites/1226.fedimbo.belgium.be/files/presentation_budiman.pdf.
31 Marcus Hand, “Malacca Strait traffic hits an all time high in 2104, VLCCs and dry bulk lead growth,”
Seatrade Maritime News (London: Seatrade UBM (UK) Ltd., 27 February 2015). Accessed July 24, 2017,
http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/malacca-strait-traffic-hits-an-all-time-high-in-2014-vlccsand-dry-bulk-lead-growth.html.
32 (60/70,000) x 100 = 0.0857 or 0.1.
33 (109/80,000) x 100 = 0.136.
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incidents. However, if these two rates are rounded, they could both be considered to be
approximately 0.1 percent. Looking at just the peak year of 2015 we find a slightly higher a
piracy risk of 0.169.34
As I said at the beginning of this section, the risk of a pirate attack would be
considered a low probability, high impact event for a merchant ship. Since there are some
parts of the oceans where the risk of a pirate attack is nearly zero, we can globally bind this
risk as zero up to a high of 1.32 percent at the peak of the Somali pirate crisis. In the next
chapter, this range of risk will be considered during the development of the model.
The numbers used to do this rough analysis of the probability of a piracy event
occurring does not consider if the incident was an actual attack or just an attempt. The
data provided by the IMB breaks the numbers down into “actual attacks,” which consider
the number of boardings and hijackings, and “attempted attacks,” further divided to
indicate which vessels were fired upon versus a non-violent attempt. Using just the
broader categories which indicate if an attack was successful or not from table 5-2 we can
calculate the percentage of times an attack is successful. During that ten-year time span the
percentage varied from a low of 50 percent in 2011 (this was at the peak of the Somali
pirate crisis when the incentive to report any pirate activity was likely increased) to a high
of 89 percent in 2015. If we consider all of the annual percentages we get an average 70
percent success rate.

34

(135/80,000) x 100 = 0.169.
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Table 5-2. Actual and Attempted Pirate Attacks 2007-201635

ACTUAL ATTACKS
ATTEMPTED ATTACKS
TOTAL ATTACKS
Percent successful

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
187 200 202 249 221 201 214 204 218 157
76

93

204

196

218

95

50

41

28

34

263

293

406

445

439

296

264

245

246

191

71

68

50

56

50

68

81

83

89

82

A SPECTRUM OF PIRACY
Not all piracy is created equal. There are different levels of piracy in both
sophistication and motivation. Phillip Gosse claims; “In all the seas of the world and in all
times piracy has passed through certain well-defined cycles.”36 He describes the cycle as
beginning with only a few individuals of poor coastal areas banding together to attack the
weakest merchant ships. As the pirate activity becomes more organized, bigger pirate
gangs emerge. The smaller groups either join up or get driven out of business. The
greatest of pirate organizations pose a threat to all shipping, and no ship is safe from pirate
attack.
While each incidence of piracy may not fit neatly into a category, it is useful to at
least consider what I propose as a spectrum of piracy operations. This is an expansion of
the piracy cycle that Grosse describes. On one end of the spectrum is simple piracy. This is
low-level activity, that occurs independently when an opportunity presents itself. It can be
thought of as “come as you are” piracy since it utilizes the boat available with the tools on
hand. This is perhaps what Dian Murray refers to as “petty piracy” as referenced in

35
36

This data was compiled from the IMB Annual Reports from 2007-2016.
Gosse, 1.
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Chapter 2. It might be seasonal, engaged in when fishing is not productive. As we move
along the spectrum, piracy becomes more sophisticated, either in the
planning/coordination of the activity or the platform and tools/weapons employed.
Cooperative piracy would involve more than one pirate boat working together. This could
be a small group or a large network, sharing information and targets. It would still be
relatively low-level piracy, occurring from the shore – so with a limited range of operations.
Advanced cooperative piracy would involve more sophisticated tactics, perhaps the
employment of mother-ships to extend the range of operations; more sophisticated
coordination, such that larger targets are lucrative because the network includes a means
for dealing with the complexity presented by these targets, including connections to illicit
markets for trading the captured cargo.

Figure 5-3. Spectrum of Piracy Operations

On the other end of the spectrum are the far more complex forms of piracy. State
sanctioned piracy would be piracy that occurs with the knowledge of the state, or at least
some corrupt state officials. Here I put “privateers,” but with a lower case “p” as
historically this would have been the privateers that operated with a wide range of
freedom. The political goals of this form of piracy are less well defined. Today these pirates
are obviously not called privateers and the international community considers this to be
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piracy. The primary aim is to make a profit. Organized crime piracy is the most complex in
terms of a network. It can consist of a large multinational organization with a sophisticated
ability to leverage illicit markets. These organizations are involved with the cartels that
smuggle drugs, weapons and people. Last on my spectrum is state sponsored piracy. Here
I label “Privateers” with a capital “P” as historically these would have been the privateers
who engaged in naval warfare. This piracy was engaged in for political purposes –
although that is not to say that there was no monetary motivation. Today, this piracy is at
the nexus of terrorism.
Certainly, this spectrum greatly simplifies a complicated issue. It is not perfect, and
in fact the first criticisms come from myself as I struggled, especially with the right side of
the spectrum. Did I place organized crime in the right position or should that perhaps be
on the far-right side, since its multinational character and extended range of operations
makes it the most sophisticated? But I decided to put state sponsored piracy on the far
right because it is the nexus with terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 4, the division
between piracy and terrorism is not always clear, particularly because it is the motivation
for the action which makes the distinction between the two and often insight into the that
motivation is lacking. However, I did try to add a bit more nuance into the issue with the
division between what I call state sanctioned and state sponsored piracy.
To my way of thinking, state sanctioned piracy includes the piracy engaged in by
naval personal. Here the very people who are tasked to police the piracy are themselves
implicit in the activity. The state does not, in fact may not be able, to provide these
mariners a living wage and so they supplement their income with piracy. This sort of
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activity has been most notable in places like Indonesia, China, Iran and Nigeria.37 The
activity could also involve port security and customs officials, although then the activity is
more likely to occur in the port and be more broadly defined as corruption.
As already mentioned, some piracy does not fit neatly into a specific category.
Where do we place the Somali piracy which was occurring in the dysfunctional
environment left by civil war? Some of this piracy perhaps began on the lower end of the
spectrum and then advanced to the right as it grew in scope and sophistication. At its
height, when it was highly organized and controlled by warlords, perhaps we would place
it between the state sanctioned (although the presence of a functional state was lacking)
and organized crime piracy. As well there were those who expressed concern that perhaps
this piracy was actually on the other side between organized crime and state sponsored
piracy; that perhaps some of the money was being funneled to terrorist groups. So, while
the proposed spectrum is not without fault, it does provide a tool for discussing the range
of activity which we label as piracy.
It is also important to remember that there are connections between the different
levels of piracy. Murphy says there are links between the lowest level of piracy, what he
calls “common piracy,” and the highest level, what he calls “organized piracy;” and links
between “attacks on local fishermen and local boats and attacks on international traffic.”38
Despite not knowing what motivates these linkages and how they are maintained, it is
important to recognize their existence. Left unchecked, even common piracy can grow in
scope. Murphy quotes Samuel Menefee: “attacks on fishing boats, if not checked, lead in

37
38

Murphy, 1983, 125.
Murphy, 1983, 127.
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time to attacks on supertankers.”39 Developing a model of piracy that takes various
sociological variables into consideration has the potential to help us understand these
connections. To do that, sociological data must be considered.

SOCIOLOGICAL DATA
It would be wonderful if an elementary data analysis could be conducted to
determine potential relationships between incidents of piracy and various socio-economic
and socio-political variables. However, because the piracy data is so limited this traditional
method for determining correlation between variables is not possible. Statistical analysis
will not tell us the reasons for maritime piracy.
Murphy states the reason for piracy is that “Piracy is a low-risk, criminal activity
that pays well.”40 He continues by saying “It occurs for one over-riding reason:
opportunity.”41 Yet that over-riding reason requires a maritime environment and therefore
the problem is geographically specific. Maritime piracy is not equally common in all
maritime environments so there must be more to the issue. John Burnett says that poverty
is the primary motivator for piracy.42 Murphy finds this explanation too simplistic, but he
does agree that economic dislocation contributes to the issue.43
Opportunity also requires a permissive legal environment with a lack of sufficient
security. When a society is formed there are norms for acceptable behavior. As the society
becomes more developed, these behavioral norms become codified into rules and laws.
Murphy, 1983, 128. Citing Samual Pyeatt Menefee, “Under-reporting of the Problems of Maritime Piracy
and Terrorism,” 157.
40 Murphy, 1983, 25.
41 Murphy, 1983, 25.
42 Burnett, 117.
43 Murphy, 1983, 25-26.
39
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Each society develops its own means for ensuring that these rules are followed. It may be
that justice is in the hands of tribal elders, or in more sophisticated society departments of
justice are created to enforce the laws and provide punishment for those who break the
laws. Thus, there are a few scenarios that allow for piracy. The first is a permissive legal
environment that turns a blind eye on the issue for cultural or other reasons. The other is
a state with an inadequate security infrastructure which cannot enforce the laws. It is also
possible for there to be a combination of these situations.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Risk Terrain Model that Caplan, Moreto and
Kennedy created used the Failed State Index to create one of the risk layers of their model.
A better understanding of this index is needed to appreciate what that layer in their model
represented. The Failed State Index was an annual report published in the United States by
the think tank Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. This index has been published
since 2005. In 2014, the name of index was changed to the Fragile State Index (FSI).
It is reasonable to think that fragile coastal states provide a more favorable
environment for maritime piracy to flourish. Fragile states are less able to provide for the
wellbeing of their citizens and are not able to impose the rule of law upon those who
engage in illegal activities. Both factors; lack of opportunity and lack of repercussion for
bad actors, encourage illegal activity. Given the right environment and the skills necessary
to go to sea, a pull toward piracy will develop. So, let’s look at what the Fragile State index
is specifically comprised of.
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The FSI ranks 178 sovereign states who are members of the United Nations “based
on their levels of stability and the pressures they face.”44 Each state is ranked from 0 to 120
with 0 indicating those which are most stable and 120 indicating the least stable. When the
scores are compared from year to year a lower score for an individual state indicates
improvement, while a higher score indicates worsening conditions. The scores are
assigned using the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) which is a proprietary
analytical platform based on “comprehensive social science methodology,”45 Each year
millions of documents are analyzed and data from three primary sources is triangulated to
determine the state scores, which are based on twelve key social, economic and political
indicators as well as greater than 100 sub-indicators. Before assigning the final scores, the
ratings are subjected to critical reviews. As the Fund for Peace states: “No framework,
methodology, or Index is perfect;”46 however, the index offers a standardized approach
which allows for comparison of annual results.
C.S.C. Sekhar writes that “A state is defined as “failed” or “fragile” when it is unable
to perform its core functions and displays vulnerability in the social, political and economic
domains.”47 The Fund for Peace defines a fragile state as having certain attributes which
manifest themselves in various ways. The most common state fragility attributes may
include:
Loss of physical control of its territory/monopoly on the legitimate use of force;
Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;
Messner, 3. This issue comprises data collected between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2015. This is
the eleventh edition of the annual Index.
45 Messner, 3.
46 FSI website, “Reviews and Studies of the CAST Methodology and Fragile State Index.” Accessed September
22, 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/reviews.
47 Sekhar, 263.
44
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Inability to provide reasonable public services;
Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international
community.48
Each of the twelve indicators has a value from 0-10. These values are then added to
get the fragile state index. States are then placed into four categories based on this score.
Those with a composite score equal to or greater than 90 are given a red status and placed
in the “Alert” category; the orange/”Warning” category is composed of states with scores
between 60-89; the yellow/”Moderate” category is for states with scores between 30-59;
and states with scores less than 30 are green/”Sustainable.” While the raw data that these
scores are based on are not available for review,49 the index does provide the individual
values for each of the twelve indicators.
Caplan, Moreto and Kennedy’s Risk Terrain Model demonstrated that there may be
a connection between coastal states with high Failed State Index values and rates of piracy.
However, the overall Fragile State Index score is too broad, covering too many categories,
to draw out specific causal relationships. Yet, the overall index scores are compiled by
adding up the individual indicator scores. This allows for the overall score to be
deconstructed and individual indicators to be looked at in more detail.
The twelve indicators are organized into three categories of indicators; social,
economic, and political. The Fragile State Index website provides details for each of the

“Fund of Peace Fragile State Index Frequently Asked Questions.” Accessed September 22, 2016,
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/faq-06-state-fragility.
49 “The content analysis component of the Fragile States Index draws upon raw data from over 40 million
news articles and reports every year. As this content is the property of the copyright holders and is not the
Fund for Peace's to share. Further, as a practical matter, the content analysis is not replicable without the
methodology and the software (including the algorithm and Boolean search terms) which is a proprietary
framework that we do not make publicly available.” Cited from: “Fund of Peace Fragile State Index Frequently
Asked Questions.” Accessed September 22, 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/faq-10-public-access.
48
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indicators. In brief, the four social indicators are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and
IDPs, Group Grievance and Human Flight and Brain Drain. There are just two economic
indicators: Uneven Economic Development and Poverty and Economic Decline. Lastly,
there are six political indicators: State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule
of Law, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites and External Intervention.
If available opportunities are truly critical to the decision to pirate or not pirate, the
indicator that would be most useful for understanding this issue would be Poverty and
Economic Decline (ECO). This is described as straining “the ability of the state to provide
for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves.”50 When this type of situation exists it
“can create friction between the haves and the have-nots.”51 The indicator consists of
measures of multiple items including unemployment and youth employment. These are
items that are directly applicable to individuals being able to provide for themselves and
their families.
Along with the ECO indicator, the Demographic Pressure Indicator (DP) would
provide greater insight to the environmental conditions on the land. This indicator takes
into account issues that make it hard for the government to protect its citizens or which
indicate a lack or capacity to take care of the citizens. The Issues considered by this
indicator are listed as: natural disasters, disease, environment, pollution, food scarcity,
malnutrition, water scarcity, population growth, youth bulge and mortality.52 Many of
these items could contribute to a situation where an individual is put into a desperate
situation, such as a loss of livelihood, and might encourage them to take the risk of piracy.

FSI Indicators website.
FSI Indicators website.
52 FSI Indicators website.
50
51
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In addition to looking at the economic opportunities and the environmental
conditions, it is important to consider the capabilities of the government. The two political
indicators which are most useful for this are State Legitimacy (SL) and Security Apparatus
(SEC). State Legitimacy is concerned with corruption and the lack of representation in the
government. Among the many issues this indicator considers are government
effectiveness, corruption, and illicit economy. All of these could contribute to enabling a
piracy problem. The Security Apparatus indicator considers to what effect the state has a
monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Included in the issues measured by this indicator
are items like internal conflict, small arms proliferation, rebel activity and militancy. These
sorts of conditions might contribute to some of the more violent forms of piracy.
While specific sociological data correlated to incidences of piracy would be
ideal, this is not feasible due to the lack of adequate piracy data, especially when
only the incidences occurring at sea are considered. Because the data available is
insufficient for statistical modelling, an ABM can be developed to provide us further
insight of the issue. By incorporating the indicators discussed above into an ABM,
the relationship between these issues and the problem of piracy can be explored.
An ABM is particularly suited to this purpose, as the emergent behavior of the
agents can provide new insight to the dynamic relationships between the variables.
By using the data from the Fragile State Index, a somewhat consistent mode
of consideration can be made for these factors across geographic regions. This
brings us full circle to the discussion of piracy models in Chapter 3, and more
specifically to what is lacking in all the models. Each of the modeling efforts
discussed focused on the water side of the problem without considering what the
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root causes might be and how the variables ashore impact the problem at sea. So,
let us return to the system diagram proposed in Chapter 1, figure 1-1, with four of
the FSI indicators acting on the land. Figure 5-4 show the same relationship of
system components without the verbiage.

Figure 5-4. System Diagram of High Seas Land interface

Despite being a simplified depiction of the high seas land interface, the
complexity of the issue is clear. There are multiple variables that not only act on the
land and through the land to the other nodes, but they also impact each other.
Before we can begin to model this issue, we need to simplify the system further until
we are left with only the elements essential to beginning our exploration of the
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issue. Figure 5-5 provides a simplified system diagram. Here the diagram has been
changed to only include the core elements necessary to create a model of the issue
that we want to understand better. The model will focus on the interface between
the land and water, represented by the high seas. The elements required for this are
the pirates and the ships they target, as well as the opportunity that drives their
decision to pirate or not. The ECO variable was chosen to represent the variables
that impact the land and therefore piracy.

Figure 5-5. Simple System Diagram of High Seas Land interface

The next chapter will discuss the development of an ABM for the interface of
the land variables with the waterborne piracy activity.
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CHAPTER 6
PIRACY OPPORTUNITY MODEL

This chapter focuses on the design, development, validation and to the extent
possible, the verification of the Piracy Opportunity Model. This model explores how
conditions on land impact maritime piracy. It incorporates a socio-economic variable into
a basic piracy risk model. After a brief introductory section, the ODD protocol1 is applied to
the model. The actual code for the latest version of the model is provided in Appendix A,
while Appendix B provides a commented version of the code that details its evolution from
earlier versions of the model. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of model
verification.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF WHY A NEW MODEL IS NEEDED
The biggest reason for a model of piracy which includes sociological variables is that
the data available on the issue is simply insufficient to for us to really understand the issue.
For this reason, an ABM is best suited to the problem. Agent-based models consider the
actions and interactions of autonomous agents who follow simple rules of behavior. The
models often result in emergent behaviors that develop as a result of the “agents”
interacting with each other and their environment. In this manner, an ABM can help us
find order in the apparent disorder of a complex system, or at least provide us new insights
into understanding that system.
The ODD protocol is a standardized protocol for describing agent-based models. ODD stands for Overview,
Design Concepts, and Details. The protocol was proposed by Volker Grimm et al in “A standard protocol for
describing individual-based and agent-based models,” Ecological Modeling 198 (2006) 115-126.
1
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We often model to be able to make predictions; however sometimes we model even
when the model might not provide useful predictions as a way to better understand an
issue. In his article “Why Model?” Joshua M. Epstein discusses many reasons to model
other than for prediction.2 Here I will discuss just a few of them. The first reason is to
explain. A model which explains how or why a phenomenon is happening can help us to
better understand an issue. Such a model can also guide future data collection. Since we do
not have adequate data to fully understand the dynamics occurring in maritime piracy this
is important for future work.
While maritime piracy is a global issue, there are regional differences in both the
operational tactics of the pirates and those who respond to piracy. Most of the models
discussed in Chapter 3 were designed for a particular geographic area, primarily the Gulf of
Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia. For the most part, these models used an
inductive approach to create a high-fidelity model, relying on lots of data about the
maritime environment and using the available data on past piracy events. With this level of
detail, they model specific geographic regions. Thus, there is a need for a model that is not
geographically limited. Additionally, most of the previously discussed models are very
heavy,3 requiring massive amounts of information. A light model, which allows us to
concentrate on what is occurring in a limited amount of land/sea-space, in a more generic
manner, would provide greater utility. The objective of this work is to distill maritime
piracy down to a form simple enough to portray generic phenomena regardless of
geographic location yet robust enough to provide insight into the associated issues,
especially the sociological variables which have been lacking in the other models. For this,
2
3

Epstein, 2008, 1.9.
See Axelrod.
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a more deductive approach is necessary. A highly abstract model allows generalization of
the variables outside the focus of the model. Additionally, as Epstein says, simple models
can be “illuminating abstractions,” which can be “invaluable without being ‘right’.”4
Such a model could also provide a foundation for a more fully developed model,
which would allow mariners to better determine their individual risk depending on the
environment they are planning to operate in. Therefore, this work begins with a simplified
prototype. Ultimately, the model could evolve to the extent that it will provide a risk
assessment based on the socio-economic and socio-political variables in the vicinity of the
merchant ship’s operating area, the maritime security readiness of the vessel, and the
presence or lack of maritime security forces. Ideally, the model would also provide insight
into how the other parts of the “system” may impact the vessel’s voyage. Only by
understanding the whole picture, to include what motivates the pirates, can piracy risk
truly be assessed. This information would be valuable to yacht owners, ships, shipping
companies, insurance companies, and maritime security providers as well as policy
makers.
This work takes the first steps toward exploring the value of such a model. As
already stated, to increase the utility of a model, it must be as simple as possible. Models
which are heavy with details become limited to the application of situations for which the
details pertain. The challenge is to build a parsimonious5 and simple model that
nevertheless captures the essence of piracy. For this reason, the initial NetLogo6 model
Epstein, 2008, 1.12.
A parsimonious model is a model that accomplishes a desired level of explanation or prediction with as few
predictor variables as possible.
6 NetLogo is a multi-agent programmable modeling environment for simulating natural and social
phenomena. It is open source code which was authored by Uri Wilensky and has been in continuous
development since 1999 at the Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling (CCL). NetLogo
4
5
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developed here can be thought of as a prototype. In this model, the issue is looked at in a
very parsimonious manner with focus on an overarching sociological variable that
represents opportunity and its effect on piracy. The ECO indicator from the FSI is used to
portray this variable. The range of the economic opportunity is defined by the ECO rating
of the state. Since everyone has a different experience of economic opportunity, assigning
random values to the land within that range, can represent the different experience of
every individual. The ECO rating for a particular state can be found in the FSI. This
information is available for the current report year as well as past years. While we do not
have data for specific individuals, conceptually we can still simulate the variation in
opportunity between individuals. By allowing the ECO value to be set on the model
interface across the full range of values found in the FSI, the model can also represent the
median economic opportunity available to a society or within a state.
Also in keeping with the need to start somewhere, this model focuses on the level of
piracy that is occurring on the left side of the piracy spectrum that I proposed in Chapter 5.
This is individual piracy which does not require coordination between multiple pirate
boats. Future work could provide extensions of the model which would represent other
forms of piracy on the spectrum.
Although this model is simple, it can provide insight into the type of interactive
dynamics that exists between the economic variation of the environment and the decision
to pirate. It can further illuminate the relationship of this changing environment to
changes in the value of pirating. The question is: Can the model reproduce patterns of
maritime piracy related to the socio-economic conditions on land which we observe with
Accessed January 8, 2016, https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. The Piracy Opportunity Model is written
in NetLogo version 5.3.1.
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the limited real-world data that is available? From this we can ask if it is more effective to
increase humanitarian efforts on land (improving the economic conditions) or to expend
the limited resources on added maritime security.
The focus of the model is a generic small area with adjustable variables to simulate
regional differences. The land and sea portions of the model interact in a dynamic manner,
providing for a constantly changing push and pull from one side to the other. When
economic opportunities on land are poor, there is a push toward piracy. However, the
potential risk and pay-off for pirating activity is constantly assessed; it continually changes
with pirating competition and the pirates’ successes and failures. When the risk is low and
the pay-off is high, there is a pull toward pirating. Conversely, when the risk increases
and/or the pay-off decreases the pull is reduced. The assumptions made to reach this basic
level of simplicity are described below.

MODEL OVERVIEW (THE “O” IN ODD)
Purpose
The purpose of this model is to provide insights into how the economic opportunity
on the land affects an individual’s decision to pirate or not. In particular, the model
examines the relationship between economic opportunities on land with changing reward
rates for maritime piracy. This model also serves as a prototype for a more complex model
which would include additional sociological variables.
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State Variables and Scales
The model comprises two interacting environments; the land and the sea. There are
three breeds of agents that exist within the model: People (or potential pirates), Pirates
(represented as pirate skiffs), and Ships (merchant ships).7 The agents’ world consists of a
generic coastal area that is 200 patches wide and 100 patches from top to bottom. The top
area, representing water, is further defined by shipping lanes and shallower coastal zones.
The bottom section represents land, including a single port area. There are no specific
dimensions to the area being modeled. Time is represented by model ticks and distance is
relative and only relevant on the water where agent speed is adjustable. Finally, the model
is not necessarily intended to represent a realistic amount of pirate attacks since those are
relatively rare events.8

Process Overview and Scheduling
The model proceeds in time steps (ticks) which have no specific equivalency but
rather allow for relative interactions. Within each time-step people assess their
opportunities and decide to pirate or not; ships transit the shipping lanes; and if present,
skiffs engage in piracy operations.
More specifically, people identify themselves as pirate or not-pirate. If they are not
a pirate, they roam on land by randomly moving and evaluating their economic

The initial concept for the model included a fourth breed called Units which represented security units. To
simplify the model these were deleted based on the assumption that the presence of security units would
increase pirate risk and decrease successful pirate attacks and the lack of them would decrease pirate risk
and increase their success but the basic decision process to pirate or not to pirate would remain the same.
8 As the purpose for the model is to explore the relationship between the variables in a generic setting
comparison to real-world quantities of piracy is problematic. Future evolutions of the model could move in
that direction by scaling the model parameters to represent specific distances. For a specific example of
model calibration see section 4 of Marchione, Johnson and Wilson.
7
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opportunity. They compare the utility of pirating to their economic opportunity and decide
to pirate or not. If they are a pirate, they move in the direction of the port, but continue to
evaluate their economic opportunities. If their economic opportunity exceeds the utility of
pirating they will change their mind and return to roaming. Once they reach the port,
pirates no longer assess their opportunities. Instead, they move about the port until an
adequate number of pirates are available to man a skiff. Once assigned to a skiff they pirate
until they return from an unsuccessful pirating run, at which time they return to roaming
on land as a not-pirate.
Ships transit the shipping lane at half of their maximum speed. They constantly
check for skiffs in their vicinity. If there is a skiff, they increase their speed to the max
allowed. If captured, they change their heading and speed to follow their captor. When a
ship reaches the edge of the model, or the port, they are replaced by another ship. Pirate
skiffs operate in one of seven operational modes; transit from the port to a patrol area,
transit back to port in a low fuel status, loiter in the patrol area, chase, return to port with
captured ship, return to port after an unsuccessful attack, and wait in the port to re-sail.

MODEL DESIGN CONCEPTS (THE FIRST “D” IN ODD)
Emergence
The pull and push of piracy emerges as the model simulation runs. A relatively high
expected reward will pull people toward piracy because the utility of pirating will more
often be greater than their economic opportunity on land. Since the number of target ships
is limited, when a lot of people decide to pirate there will be far more pirates than targets.
The probability of success will decrease and the expected reward will trend downward.
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This will push people back to roaming. The point during a model-run at which this
phenomenon tends to occur is dependent on the initial reward level and the economic
environment.

Adaptation
People adapt to poor economic opportunity by pirating. When unsuccessful at
pirating, they adapt by returning to roaming.

Fitness
Fitness seeking is modeled explicitly. People calculate their fitness for economic
opportunity by comparing what they have experienced on land with what they may find by
pirating.

Prediction
People predict their future economic opportunity by averaging the value of the most
recent ten moves. They predict the value of pirating by using a utility equation.

Sensing
People know what the expected reward of pirating is.

Interactions
People continuously interact with their environment to assess their economic
opportunity. The utility function that they use is updated based on the successes and
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failures of other people. However, the people do not directly interact with each other. For
people to actually pirate, they must join up with other pirates and man a skiff; at this point
the pirates on a skiff act as one entity, there is no interaction between pirates. Skiffs and
ships interact. Ships will speed up when a skiff in detected. When a skiff detects an
available target ship, it will chase the ship and attack.

Stochasticity
At initialization, economic opportunity values are randomly distributed across the
land based on the setting of the ECO range. The ship reward value of individual ships is
randomly assigned using a normal distribution around the model reward setting. Each
ship is randomly assigned to an east or west passage of the shipping lane. Each skiff is
randomly assigned a heading that will allow them to transit to the shipping lanes. When
people roam on land, their movement is random. Finally, the success of each skiff attack on
a ship is randomly determined based on a thirty percent chance that the ship will
deter/repel the attack. This value is based on the average 70 percent success rate of pirate
attacks as discussed in Chapter 5 (table 5-2).

Collectives
People are grouped into two categories, pirates or not-pirates.

Observations
For experimentation, we record people who decide to pirate, successful ship
transits, skiff sorties, captured ships, pirating utility, pirating success, total reward,
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expected reward, the average skiff run time and the probability of successful piracy. Time
plots of expected-reward, probability of capture (p-capture), p-capture times expectedreward, number of people pirating, and pirating utility are created while the model
simulation runs, as well as a histogram of pirate success rates.

MODEL DETAILS (THE SECOND “D” IN ODD)
Model Pseudo Code
Initialization:
Create 100 People and distribute on land
Endow each with a decision list
Seed list with 10 random opportunity values
Create 3 Ships and place them in the shipping lanes
Endow each with random reward value
Coin flip determines east or west heading
Execution:
Loop forever:
Each person
Randomly roams on land
Adds eco-op value to start of decision list
Drops oldest eco-op value from list
Assesses opportunity value
Compares opportunity to pirating utility
Decides to pirate or not
Each pirate:
Heads toward port
If opportunity exceeds pirating utility, returns to roaming
At the port - mills about until manning a skiff
Hides when assigned to a skiff
ship
Figure 6-1. PseudoEach
Code
for the Piracy Opportunity Model
Moves forward at half speed in the shipping lane
Moves at max speed when pirate skiff detected
If captured, follows pirate skiff back to port
Hides at the edge of world, replaced by new ship
Each skiff (created at port when adequate pirates to man)
Transits to shipping lanes at one third speed
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Input (environmental conditions)
Prior to model initialization the ECO value (1-10) and the amount of reward (01,000,000) may be selected with a slider on the model interface. A visual display of the
economic opportunity values of land can be turned on or off.

Initialization
During model initialization, the global values are set, the land and water patches are
established, the people and ships are set-up and the ticks are reset to zero. Table 6-1 lists
the global variables and their initial values.

Table 6-1. Piracy Opportunity Model Global Variables

Variable
Sorties
Victory-party
Successful-transits
Captured-ships
Total-rewards
Expected-reward
Minimum-manning
Number-of-pirates
P-capture
Total-p-capture
Current-p-capture
Total-SRT
Average-SRT

Initial Value
0
50
0
[]
Reward*1000
Reward
3
[]
0.1
0.1
0.1
170000
170

Comments
Time/ticks in-port for skiffs following a capture
Empty list
Artificial reward history
Seed value - set by user on model interface
Required skiff crew size
Empty list
Piracy-Probability
Sum of p-capture values for each tick
Total-p-capture divided by ticks
Artificial total (SRT seed value*1000)
Seed value determined by earlier model runs

The model world is 200x100 parches with the origin in the center. Patch size is 6.
Wrapping is turned off. The world is divided in half horizontally with water on top and
land below. Water is further delineated as shallow coastal, territorial and international
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shipping lanes. This is represented by graduated shades of blue. Land patches are set on
the bottom half of the model. A subset of the land is designated as the port around the
origin of the model. Each patch of the land environment is randomly assigned an economic
opportunity value during the set-up of the model. These values are determined by a slider
on the model interface where the user can adjust the ECO level. Possible ECO levels range
from one to ten and correspond to the Poverty and Economic Decline (ECO) economic
indicator of the FSI, thus the lower the ECO level the better the economic opportunity. The
ECO level set on the interface translates to individual values of opportunity on each of the
patches of land. This is done randomly during the model set-up using an “eco-op” variable
which is set with the following equation: eco-op = (100 – (ECO * random 10)). Thus, when
ECO is set to one, which would represent the best economic indicator from the FSI, the
economic opportunity values randomly assigned to the land patches will vary from 91 to
100. Conversely, when ECO is set to 10, the worst possible economic indicator, the
economic opportunity values randomly assigned to the land patches will vary from 10 to
100. These values may be visualized by turning on the “Economic-Opportunity” switch on
the model interface; this changes the color of the land patches from brown to variations of
brown depending on the eco-op value. Every time the model is set-up, these patch values
are randomly assigned. Lastly, the economic opportunity value for the port patches are all
reset to 100. People only use port economic opportunity values when they return from an
unsuccessful pirate run. This ensures the first few values added to their opportunity list
equal 100. It encourages them to continue to roam and prevents them from immediately
deciding to pirate again, simulating the relative optimism an individual might have about
the opportunity on land after not succeeding at piracy.
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One hundred people are created. This population level was arbitrarily chosen. Each
has a Boolean variable that determines if they are a pirate or not. It is initially set to false.
They have another Boolean variable that indicates if they are assigned to a pirate skiff, this
is only used when they are a pirate and is initially set to false. Their “pirate-success”
variable is a list initially set to zero. Finally, their decision list, which tracks the ten most
recent economic opportunities they encounter when roaming is artificially seeded with ten
values using the same equation that assigns the economic opportunity values to the land
patches.
Merchant shipping traffic is simply represented by a constant presence of ships
(pirate targets). Three ships are created during model initialization. (This quantity of
ships was arbitrarily determined and remains constant throughout the simulation and
represents shipping lanes with constant ship traffic.) Their maximum speed is set to 2
while their transit speed is set to half of maximum speed. They have two Boolean
variables. The first determines if they have completed a successful transit, this is set to
false. The other indicates if they have been captured by a pirate skiff, this is also set to
false. The variable “captor” is set to nobody. Their payoff variable is randomly assigned
using a normal distribution of the “Reward” set on the model interface.9 Each ship is
placed somewhat randomly in the shipping lanes with either an east or west heading.
The simulation begins with zero pirating. P-capture is set to 0.1, which is equivalent
to a 10 percent probability.10 This is the piracy probability, or the probability that a pirate

[payoff = random-normal Reward 30000] This assigns a random value using the normal distribution with a
mean of “Reward” (as selected on the model interface) and a standard deviation of 30000.
10 Lacking real world data to determine this value, it was derived during the model development. See
Chapter 7, The Issue of Model Initiation.
9
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skiff will be successful. Once a ship is captured this value becomes dynamic and adjusts
depending on the future success and failure of the skiffs.
Three ships are randomly placed in the shipping lane and 100 people are randomly
placed on the land. There are no pirate skiffs. Each ship has a reward value that reflects a
normal distribution of the reward value set on the model interface. The reward value on
the model interface is also used to provide a seed value to the variable “total-rewards.”
This is done by initially setting total-rewards to 1000 times the Reward value set. Each
time a person decides on the utility of pirating they use the value “expected reward” to
determine the current average value of a target ship. Initially, the expected-reward is equal
to the total-reward divided by 1000, or the value set on the interface. By creating an
artificial history of 1000 rewards, the calculation of expected rewards is less sensitive to
the addition of captured ship rewards. (Once a ship is actually captured the total reward is
increased by the actual reward value of the captured ship and expected-reward is
determined by dividing total-reward by the number of captured ships plus 1000. Expected
reward is continuously updated throughout the simulation, which makes the pirating
utility value dynamic after the first successful ship capture.)

SUBMODELS
To a certain extent, the model is two models in one. The lower half of the model
considers the opportunity available to people on land. This half of the model uses a
deductive approach that models the economic opportunity in a highly abstract manner.
The upper half represents water and models piracy operations in a shipping lane. This half
of the model uses a more inductive approach by using the work already done in some of the
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other piracy models, but in a simplified manner. Figure 6-2 shows a typical initial setup for
this two-part model.
Using a “two models in one” approach further distinguishes this model from other
existing piracy models. The decision to do this was arrived at because the water side of the
issue has already received a considerable amount of attention. As discussed in Chapter 3,
multiple water models of piracy have been developed. The piece that is lacking is the
dynamics occurring on land that either encourage or discourage maritime piracy.
Therefore, the land side offers a greater heuristic value by remaining as simple and
transparent as possible, yet is able to leverage the more developed models of maritime
piracy with a heavier model of what occurs on the water. The focus of this model is shifted
from the details of piracy at sea, to what motivates an individual to become a pirate.

Figure 6-2. Typical initial setup of the Piracy Opportunity Model
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The main loop of the model consists of five steps. First the people move. Next the
ships move. After that, the skiffs move. With all the movements completed, the piracy
probability is updated (p-capture related values). Finally, a time step or tick is taken.
Movement of people occurs in the land portion of the model while movement of ships and
skiffs primarily occur in the water portion. The calculation of intercept probability and
advancement of time apply to the entire model.

Land Model
The land portion of the model is similar to other agent-based models such as Uri
Wilensky’s Rebellion model11 or D. Scott Bennett’s Insurgency model.12 In these models,
agents randomly move around being exposed to their environment and make decisions
based on their interaction with that environment and the other agents in the environment.
This portion of the model is simple with light-agent13 formation. In this half of the model,
people assess their opportunities on land and compare them to the risk and potential payoff of pirating. To do this, the people randomly wander from patch to patch.
Each of the people is assigned a variable called opportunity. This assumes that
everyone has a different experience with economic opportunity. This variable consists of a
decision list with ten values. The decision-list is initially seeded with values using the same
equation that assigned eco-op values to the land patches. As a person randomly wanders,
the eco-op value from the patch they are on is added to the decision list and the oldest
value drops off. The average of these values is what the person uses when making the

Wilensky, 2004.
Bennett.
13 A light agent has relatively few traits and makes simple binary decisions.
11
12
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decision to pirate or not to pirate. This abstraction of how an individual might evaluate
their economic opportunity was conceptualized by thinking about how an individual
without steady employment might look for work. On some days, they find a really good
opportunity and on other days they do not. Here in the United States one might find a
group of migrant workers looking for employment outside of large home stores. These
workers may or not be approached with an offer to work and the specific opportunities will
vary. The odds of the opportunity being good are impacted by the overall economic
opportunity of their environment. As described above, the lower the ECO setting on the
model interface, the better the economic environment and therefore their odds of landing
on a patch with a higher economic opportunity value. Figures 6-3 and 6-4 show how the
environment looks with the Economic Opportunity display turned on. The lighter the color
of the land patch, the better the economic opportunity.

Figure 6-3. Typical initial setup with ECO = 1 and the Economic Opportunity display on;
ECO values vary between 91 and 100
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Figure 6-4. Typical initial setup with ECO = 10 and the Economic Opportunity display
on; ECO values vary between 10 and 100

Comparison of figure 6-3 and figure 6-4 shows that in addition to the median ECO
value increasing as the ECO setting approaches 1, the range of possible values the people
can encounter becomes narrower. In a strong economy, everyone is able to have good
economy opportunities. The weaker the economy the chance of this lessens. Some people
will still encounter the high values (91-100) but there are far fewer of these values and
many more lower values to encounter. Following each random move, a person assesses
their opportunity and decides to pirate or not. The people are assumed to be rational
actors and make this decision based on a utility function. The value of pirating is called
pirating-utility and is continually updated as the model simulation runs. Pirating-utility is a
function of the expected reward for pirating times the probability of a successful pirating
run, minus the lost opportunity cost which is equal to the individual’s opportunity times the
average amount of time a person would be engaged in pirating.
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Let us assume that the utility of pirating is Up, the expected reward for pirating is R,
the current-p-capture value is p; the person’s opportunity value is O; t is the average-SRT,
and m is the minimum manning value for a skiff.

𝑈𝑝 =

𝑅∗𝑝
𝑚

− (𝑂 ∗ 𝑡)

Minimum-manning refers to the number of pirates required to man a skiff, who would be
splitting the reward; average-SRT refers to the average Skiff Run Time or the number of
“ticks” that a skiff is operational for a pirate run. Minimum manning is set at three for this
model but it could be made into a slider on the model interface if other skiff manning levels
were desired. While all skiffs in this model have the same manning level a certain amount
of variation could easily be introduced. Average-SRT is initially seeded with historic data
from earlier model-runs and is dynamically updated as the simulation runs.
Once the decision is made to pirate, the agent begins to make its way to the port
area. As long as their relative situation does not improve during this transit they will arrive
at the port. (If their opportunity exceeds the pirating-utility, they will change their mind
and return to roaming.) Once at the port, the pirate is added to the list of port pirates.
When an adequate number of people wanting to pirate congregate (minimum-manning), a
skiff is created and the agents transition to the water half of the model in a skiff; this is
discussed in the water model portion.
At this point the people hide. They will remain hidden and associated with a specific
skiff so long as the skiff is successful at pirating. When a skiff returns from an unsuccessful
pirate run, the people are disassociated from the skiff, their Boolean for pirate is reset to
false, and they return to roaming on land.
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People are green when they are first created. If they decide to pirate they turn red
as they head to the port. When they reach the port as a pirate, they turn black. If they
change their mind about pirating before they reach the port, they turn yellow and return to
roaming. When they return to roaming after pirating they are purple. These color codes
help the user recognize behavior changes during model-runs.

Water Model
The water half of the model is less abstract but still represents pirating activity in a
simplistic form. Certain assumptions were made about the generic water area modeled.
First assumption: the area is part of an established shipping lane, which means merchant
ships are apt to transit the area. Second assumption: the area is near the littorals, but
outside territorial waters, and therefore considered to be international waters or on the
high seas. This assumption is important since most pirates operate from land. Territorial
waters extend up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline and within this area the state has
jurisdiction. The orientation for such an area of water would vary depending upon the
coastline. For simplification purposes, the model area is depicted with the landward area
to the south (bottom) and the shipping lane oriented horizontally. The patches are colored
to indicate shallower water to the south, outside the shipping lane.
Before ships move, three checks are done. First a location check is done. For each
ship at the edge of the model, the count of successful transits is up-dated and another ship
is created using the orient-ship subroutine. Next, ships check for skiffs in their area of
perception (7 patch radius). If there is a skiff, they set their speed to max speed.14 If they

14

The max speed for a ship is 2 while the max speed for a skiff is 3.
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perceive no skiffs, they set their speed to half of max speed. Finally, ships check to see if
they are captured; if so they set their heading and speed to match their captor. With these
checks completed, each ship moves forward by the amount of their speed. The color of the
ship is a basic indication of its status. Yellow ships are transiting at half their max speed.
Red ships are moving at max speed. Black ships have been captured and are following their
captor to port.
In the orient-ship subroutine a new ship is created to replace a ship which been
removed from the simulation. In addition to this happening after a successful transit, it
also occurs when a captured ship reaches the port with its captor. A new ship is created
similar to the way they were created at model initiation; however, now they are placed at
either end of the shipping lanes. This ensures a constant movement of ships in the shipping
lanes.
There are no skiffs when the model is initialized. The skiffs are created based on the
number of pirates in the port using a subroutine orient-skiff. Skiffs have seven operational
modes identified with a variable called opmode. The “sail” of the skiff is an indication of its
opmode. Table 6-2 provides a summary of the opmodes.

Table 6-2. Summary of Skiff Operational Modes

Opmode
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
note:

Description
Transiting from the port to patrol area
Loitering on patrol
Chasing a target ship
Captured target; returning to port with prize
Failed attack
Low fuel status, returning to port
In-port
*First sortie Black, then Brown

Sail Color
Black*
Gray
Red
Blue
Yellow
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A newly created skiff is randomly placed along the water edge of the port. The
opmode variable is set to opmode 1 and the prey variable is set to nobody. The skiff is
assigned a random course between 310 and 050 which will send it out to the shipping
lanes. This ensures that multiple skiffs are somewhat spread out in the shipping lanes
before they start patrolling. (Their patrol range is set to 39; this is the distance they must
be from the port before they will shift from transit mode to patrol mode.) Maximum speed
is set at 3 and the skiff’s speed is set to one third of max speed. Maximum fuel is set to 100
and the skiff’s fuel status is set to max-fuel. Skiff attack range (the distance a skiff can
“see”) is set to 6. Their crew is set to the agent numbers of the first three pirates in the list
of port pirates and the list is updated to remove those pirates. At this point, the model
counter for sorties is updated (sorties are counted at the time they commence) and the atsea-tick-counter of the skiff is reset to zero.
Skiffs move depending on their opmode. For every time-step of the model their
Skiff-Runtime is increased and their fuel is decreased. In opmode 1 they transit from the
port to the area of the shipping lanes. They do this with the initial course they were
assigned and at one third of their maximum speed. If they detect a target ship during their
transit, they will shift to opmode 3 (chase mode) and pursue the target. If they have not
detected a ship before they reach the patrol zone (39 patches from the port), they will shift
to opmode 2 (loiter mode). In this mode, they operate at very low speed (one twentieth of
their maximum speed) and randomly shift their heading while searching for ships. Again,
when a ship is detected they shift to opmode 3.
In opmode 3, a skiff will head toward the ship at maximum speed and then adjust
their speed to attack the ship when it is within attack range. Attack success is determined
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by a simple probability: roughly 70 percent of the attacks succeed and 30 percent fail.15
When the attack is successful they will return to port with the prize ship (opmode 4),
otherwise they will return in opmode 5. If, at any time, the skiff’s fuel status gets low they
will shift to opmode 6 and return to port.
When a skiff returns to port, all the dynamic variables are updated; average skiff
runtime, expected reward, and the probability of capturing a prize. For those that came
back due to low fuel or a failed attack, they are considered unsuccessful; their pirate crew
returns to roaming and the skiff is destroyed (the agent “dies”). When a successful skiff
returns with their prize ship, it shifts to opmode 7. In this mode, the skiff waits the
designated amount of time before it may re-sail in opmode 1. Figure 6-5 provides a flow
chart of how a skiff transitions between the various opmodes.

This value is based on the basic data analysis provided in Chapter 5 of the actual and attempted pirate
attacks from 2007 to 2016, as reported in the IMB Annual Reports. See Table 5-2.
15
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Figure 6-5. Flow chart of the skiff decision process

MODEL VERIFICATION
As the model was being developed, adjustments were made to the model code to
correct run-time errors or to clean up obvious issues. Many of these are documented in the
comments at the beginning of the model code, in a comment box labeled “Working
Prototype,” which discusses the differences between the various model versions. These
comments may be reviewed in Appendix B.
Early changes were made to get a basic functioning model where people roamed on
land (and not in the water) and skiffs and ships stayed on the water. Each new version of
the model added or took away something significant. Very early versions of the model
were focused on simply getting the “world” set up properly.
After the model appeared to be operating properly, basic runs were performed in an
attempt to determine which variables – and some hard-coded numbers – had the most
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obvious impacts on piracy. Settings such as attack range, fuel, p-capture, ECO and Reward
were varied, including the presence of maritime security forces in the early versions of the
model. While all of these variables produced interesting results, it was decided to
concentrate on the primary socio-economic ECO factor.
When a flaw in the logic of the model code was identified, corrections were made.
This is what occurred when I realized that new ships were being placed randomly into the
shipping lane just as for model set-up. While it makes sense to randomly place the initial
three ships so that they are somewhat separated, new ships should enter from one side or
the other (not pop into the middle). At other times, the problem may have been caused by
my initial failure to understand the specifics of how certain NetLogo primitives function.16
Sometimes a new version incorporated a new variable to capture more data. The
“pirate-success” variable is an example of this. This variable was added so that the data
could be gathered on the success rate of each pirate.
Other changes were made as more information became available. For instance,
some very basic runs of the model were done to track how long the pirate skiffs were
operational. A BehaviorSpace17 experiment was designed to capture this information.
Based on this data, the average Skiff Run Time (SRT) was calculated. This value got
incorporated into a newer version of the model to provide a seed value for model initiation.
Once skiffs are created and operating in the model this average SRT becomes dynamic,
updating with each completed skiff run. This was an important step in the model design

A primitive is procedure or command that is built into NetLogo to tell agents what to do. Primitives
simplify the model coding process, but care must be taken to understand what the primitive will actually do.
17 BehaviorSpace is a software tool which is integrated with NetLogo. It allows users to perform experiments
with models. The model’s settings can be systematically varied and the number of repetition for each set of
variables can be specified. The results of each model run are recorded.
16
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since people continually assess their opportunity value and compare that to the utility of
pirating. To make a proper comparison, they must consider the total opportunity on land
that they would be giving up to pirate; their average opportunity times the amount of time
they would be at sea. To estimate this, the model uses the average SRT value for the time at
sea.
As the model was being developed it became obvious that some portions of the
model needed to be simplified. An example of this is that security units were eliminated
because it is reasonable to assume they would decrease the success of the pirates by some
factor. While we do not know what that factor is, we can assume that the basic relationship
between the economic opportunity and pirate reward is the same.
Eventually, around version 16 of the model, it was functioning without any run-time
errors and it was time to start experimenting. These experiments also led to newer
versions of the model. The next chapter discusses these experiments and their results.
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CHAPTER 7
MODEL RESULTS

The previous chapter described the design and development of the Piracy
Opportunity Model. It discussed how the original design was simplified to the essential
variables needed to focus on the relationship between the socio-economic variable of
economic opportunity and frequency of piracy. This chapter discusses the experimentation
results from this parsimonious model. The basic experiment runs and their results are
examined. The implications of repeated runs are discussed. To allow repeated models
runs to begin with the same starting point, exported worlds are explored. Finally, a model
version with an improved conceptualization of economic opportunity is created and
compared to the earlier model. The chapter concludes with a discussion of possible model
improvements.
The model path is dependent, so the initial world drives the results. Given the
amount of stochasticity designed into the model, it is no surprise that there is a good
amount of variation between individual model runs. Yet it is this very variation, measured
as variance in the data sets, that allows for different results to emerge as the models runs.
The success or failure of the first few pirate skiffs significantly influences the ability of the
model to sustain pirate operations. Despite a fixed pool of potential pirates (100 people)
and a fixed quantity of targets (3 merchant ships), boom and bust trends of piracy occur.
These trends create an oscillating pattern similar to that of a predator-prey system. Unlike
a true predator-prey system, because the prey population is held constant, a dual
oscillating pattern does not develop. Nevertheless, it is helpful to think about the on-going

192
piracy dynamics of the model in terms of a predator-prey system. What conditions allow
for a stable system which sustains piracy populations and which conditions drive the
system to pirate extinction?

BASIC RUNS
With the model developed enough for it to function well, BehaviorSpace was used to
experiment with the model. As various experiments were run on the model, the model
code was updated to adjust for any issues the experiments identified. In some cases, a new
version of the model merely cleaned up or simplified model code. These changes to the
model are documented with comments at the beginning of the model code and are
available for review in Appendix B. With repeated experiments, some trends emerged in
how the model performed.1
The model parameter space consists of the full range of values that the model can be
initialized with. In my model the two variables that can be varied are the ECO value and
Reward level. The parameter space is therefore composed of the points that represent all
the possible combinations of the ECO and Reward values. This parameter space can be
explored by running experiments involving a subset of all the possible values. This allows
us to see relationships form between different model settings and the behavior of the
system. BehaviorSpace is a NetLogo tool that runs the model many times, systematically
varying the model’s settings depending on those selected for the experiment. The inputs
for each experiment are the variables and the interval to be tested as well as how many
Except for the additional experiment performed to test the hypothesis about ECO levels 1-3, all experiments
were run using the range 4-10 for ECO. This allowed the experiments run more efficiently, since most of the
data for ECO levels 1-3 had zero piracy – exception as note in Figure 7-2. This also allowed for comparison
between data sets.
1
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iterations to run for each combination of settings. BehaviorSpace records the results for
each of the model runs. By running various experiments, we can explore the model’s
parameter space and determine where the behaviors of interest occur.
Having made the decision to concentrate on the primary socio-economic ECO factor
first, BehaviorSpace experiments were setup to explore the relationship between ECO and
Reward. The Reward variable is essential to the pirating utility function, so a reward level
which was expected to allow a fair amount of pirate activity was selected. For the first
experiment, the reward level was set at 300,000. The ECO value was varied from 4 to 10.
By running 100 iterations of the model, for each of the ECO levels, for the specified reward
level, data was gathered concerning how the ECO variable impacts the decision process to
pirate or not-pirate. Since the model is designed to run indefinitely, each of the model runs
was limited to 2000 time-steps. This run time was an adequate length of time for any sort
of piracy pattern to emerge. For each of the runs, the number of people who decide to
pirate was tracked at each time step.
This partial exploration of the ECO parameter was selected with the assumption
pirating would not occur when there was plenty of economic opportunity.2 The change in
the ECO value can be thought of in terms of a step function. The ECO value remains
constant with the 100 iterations of the experiment and then changes to the next ECO value
for the next 100 iterations. No one pirated at ECO 4 and everyone always pirated at ECO
levels 9 and 10. At ECO level 5, if the first few people who pirate were not successful, no
one else would pirate; that was the scenario for most of the runs. If they were successful,

This decision was influenced by the size of the experiment and the time needed to run it. Testing one
Reward value for seven ECO values resulted in 700 iterations of the model rather than 1000 for the full ECO
range.
2
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everyone else pirated. This shows up as the outlying point at 100 on the box plot in
figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1. BehaviorSpace generated data from Model 16E for Reward = 300,000

This is no doubt a result of the expected reward either dropping below the level which
would encourage piracy or remaining high enough to make piracy attractive. The greatest
range of max number of pirates is at ECO 6. Since the number of pirates differs throughout
the simulation, looking at the maximum number to of people who made the decision to
pirate is of limited use.
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A look at the box plots for the median number of pirates (figure 7-2) provides us
some better insight into what was occurring in the model runs at each ECO value.

Figure 7-2. BehaviorSpace generated data from Model 16E for Reward = 300,000

Looking at the results for ECO 5, we again see that in most of the model runs there
were very few people who decided to pirate. But it is also here that we get the largest
number of outliers. These represent the model runs where the first few pirates are
successful. This increases the value of p-capture and more people decide to pirate. The
success rate of those pirates determines how long people will continue to decide to pirate.
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The results from ECO 6 are the most interesting. Why is the mean value of the
median number of pirates so much higher than the it is for ECO 7? It is even higher than
the value for ECO 8. What is going on here? If individual model runs are watched for ECO
6, we observe people gradually making the decision to pirate at the beginning of the
simulation. The pirates make their way to the port and man up skiffs. This happens a few
people at a time and so just a few pirate skiffs are operating at any one time. Just as for
ECO 5, the success or failure of the pirate skiffs matters. However, with the poorer
economic conditions, the pull toward piracy will continue at lower p-capture values, so
more people pirate, and it takes longer for any failures to have an impact on people’s
decision.
By contrast, when we watch the simulation for ECO 7, the pull toward piracy is
strong enough that nearly everyone decides to pirate – as soon as the simulation begins.
This results in a swarm of pirates heading to the port where skiffs are rapidly manned.
Then a swarm of skiffs sets off on pirate runs. Since there are only three ships transiting
the shipping channel, most of these skiffs will return in a low fuel status without ever
having attempted to attack a ship. The value of p-capture drops and most people stop
deciding to pirate. We will even see many of the pirates who were heading to the port,
change their minds (they shift from black to yellow) and return to roaming at this point.
Just as for ECO 5, the future of these simulations is very dependent on the success or failure
of the few skiffs that actually have an opportunity to attack as ship. If they succeed, the
drop in the value of p-capture is slowed and others will decide to pirate. If they fail, pcapture is decreased that much more. At some point, no one else will pirate. We can think
about this swarming effect as a crowd-out event. So many skiffs are operating at the same
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time, with a limited number of ships, that they crowd out the competition. This pattern is
repeated for ECO 8, but to a lesser extent. In the simulations for ECO 9 and 10, the
economic opportunities are so poor, relative to the reward, that the pull toward piracy will
typically continue to be strong long enough for the system to correct after this initial
massive swarming event.
At every ECO value, there was a significant amount of variation between the
individual model runs. This is indicated by the mean values of the standard deviation and
variance for the number of pirates, across the 100 runs for each of the ECO values. Both the
randomness of the initial model setup and the random decisions of the agents contribute to
the variations between model runs.

Table 7-1. Data summary of 11 November 2016 BehaviorSpace
experiment for Reward 300,000 (Model 16E)

Mean Values for 100 Iterations (Number of Pirates)
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

max
0.00
20.92
79.18
91.54
99.56
100.00
100.00

mean
0.00
4.59
23.69
14.09
29.19
38.52
49.66

median
0.00
2.71
20.22
16.01
24.16
31.66
45.72

std
0.00
5.29
15.63
21.57
25.41
24.53
22.33

var
0.00
115.34
262.92
477.10
659.40
625.70
531.00

This simple experiment verified that the model code was performing as intended
and validated that the model portrays how changing ECO levels influence an individual’s
decision process. When the person has adequate economic opportunity, they are content
to continue with their way of life. As their opportunities decline, they are more disposed to
take alternative actions – in this case to turn to piracy.
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Since the decision to pirate also depends on the expected reward, the next set of
BehaviorSpace experiments included variation of the initial reward value. Beginning with
reward set to 200,000 it was varied in increments of 50,000 up to 400,000. The ECO value
was again varied from 4 to 10 and 100 iterations were run for each ECO value. 3 For each
reward level, a similar trend of increasing rates of piracy occurred with increases in the
ECO value. However, at lower reward levels the ECO value had a more dramatic effect on
the trend; while at higher reward levels the ECO value effect was more gradual. With initial
reward value set to 200,000 pirate activities did not begin until ECO level 7. With each
increase in the reward value, the ECO level necessary for piracy decreased, such that by
350,000, piracy activity occurred at all ECO levels (4-10) that were being evaluated. Since
even more pirate activity occurred at all levels for an initial reward of 400,000 it is logical
to assume that piracy could be enticing even at ECO values lower than 4.

Testing these two variables in pairs increased the number of model runs to 3500 iterations – 100 iterations
for each for the 35 possible variable combinations.
3
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Figure 7-3. BehaviorSpace generated data from Model 20 for Reward = 250,000

The data displayed in figure 7-3 is an example of how ECO value has a greater
impact at relatively low reward levels. The data displayed is for 100 runs at each of the
various ECO values. Once the ECO value is high enough for pirating to occur, there is a lot
of variance between individual model runs as indicated by these box and whisker plots.
This variance represents the different piracy patterns which emerge as the model
simulation runs, depending on the random decisions made during model set-up and
operation.
Figure 7-4 shows that at higher levels of reward the impact of the ECO value is more
gradual, but there is still a lot of variation between the individual model runs for each ECO
value.
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Figure 7-4. BehaviorSpace generated data from Model 20 for Reward = 400,000

An additional experiment was run to test this theory that people would decide to
pirate with good economic opportunity if the reward is high enough. With Reward set to
400,000, the ECO level was varied from 1 to 10. And in fact, even at ECO level 3, some
people made the decision to pirate at reward level 400,000. Similar to what happened with
Reward 300,000 and ECO 4, more piracy occurred at ECO 3 for Reward 400,000 than did at
ECO 4. This indicates that even with strong economic opportunity, people might decide to
pirate if the expected rewards are very high. Since only a few people will make this
decision at a time, a low level of piracy might be sustainable in these relatively strong
economic conditions because there is little or no competition between the pirates. This
pattern is similar to the results produced in the earlier experiment. There is a relatively low
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ECO value (for Reward 300,00 it was ECO 6) that allows for a sustained pattern of piracy,
and then the system reaches an ECO value tipping point which causing swarming and
pirate competition to occur. Figure 7-5 provides box plots for each ECO value at reward
level 400,000.

Figure 7-5. BehaviorSpace generated data from Model 20A for Reward = 400,000

RESULTS OF REPEATED SIMULATIONS
Observation of repeated simulations demonstrates some general patterns of the
system dynamics of the model. When the economic opportunity is relatively high and/or
the reward for pirating is relatively low there is no incentive to pirate, since the average
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economic opportunity is always higher than the expected utility of pirating. As economic
opportunity weakens and/or the reward for pirating increases there is a threshold at
which point the situation will shift and some people will decide to pirate. At this threshold,
the first few skiff sorties are very significant. If too many of these early attempts at piracy
are unsuccessful, the expected reward for pirating is lowered enough that the system
crosses back to the condition of no one pirating. If, however, these first few pirate runs are
successful, the expected reward and the piracy probability of success is increased and more
people, even those with slightly better average opportunity, decide to pirate.
On the other end of the spectrum, when the economic opportunity is relatively low
and/or the reward for pirating is relatively high, there is strong motivation to pirate, as the
average economic opportunity is always lower than the expected utility of pirating. In this
situation, all or at least most of the people will initially decide to pirate. This sends a
swarm of pirate skiffs out into a region where the potential targets (merchant ships) are
limited (for the model purposes there is a constant shipping population of just three ships
transiting). Obviously most of these skiffs will not be successful, so they will drive the
expected reward of pirating down. As this occurs, eventually a point is reached when it is
no longer desirable to pirate. When this happens, no one else will make the decision to
pirate.
In between these alternatives there is a range of ECO and expected reward values
which will allow for the system to sustain a certain level of constant piracy. This situation
appears to be as much concerned with the frequency of the pirate runs as with the success
of those runs. If the frequency shifts to the swarming situation, the expected rewards will
be driven down and the frequency of pirate runs will be decreased as the pirating utility is
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decreased. There must be some successful piracy attacks to maintain an adequate level of
expected rewards, along with an adequate probability of success to continue to encourage
the pirating behavior. As already discussed this occurred at ECO 6 for Reward 300,000 and
at ECO 3 for Reward 400,000. However, at very high ECO values, beyond the tipping point
for swarming, the pull for piracy is strong enough for the system to recover and sustain a
pattern for piracy despite the initial crowd-out effect.
These system dynamics parallel those of a predator-prey ecosystem.4 A stable
predator-prey ecosystem is self-sustaining, or in balance. It will continue to maintain itself
despite fluctuations in the population sizes. In contrast, an unstable predator-prey system
will result in extinction of one or more of the species in the system. These types of systems
are grouped together because no matter the kind of species involved, if there is a predatorprey relationship, they display similar system dynamics. “Notably, when the sizes of the
predator and prey populations are compared over many generations, we tend to find
regular oscillations in these sizes that are out of phase; where one increases, the other
tends to decline, and vice-versa.”5 For this reason it may be useful to think of the maritime
piracy issue in terms of a predator-prey system.
In a true predator-prey system, the populations of both the predator and prey
oscillate. These oscillations are out of phase such that as one group is increasing, the other
is decreasing and vice versa. With this model, the amount of shipping transiting the area is
held constant. This is an artificiality that was built into the model design for simplicity. In
For a classic example of a NetLogo model of a predator-prey ecosystem see the Wolf Sheep Predation model:
Wilensky, U. (1999). NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and
Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
5
Wilensky and Reisman, 178.
4
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reality, the amount of shipping transiting an area varies and can be impacted by maritime
security threats. The IMB monitors pirate activity and sends out notices and warnings.
When an area is designated as having a higher likelihood of piracy, insurance rates are
increased and ships may choose to avoid that area if possible. This results in less ship
traffic. When the threat has been abated, the shipping traffic will increase again.
Future versions of the model could allow for a dynamic flow of shipping traffic. This
would allow for the predator-prey relationship between the pirates and ships to be further
explored. Such a model would have to account for more of the economic variables that
impact a ship’s decision concerning what route to sail.

A CLOSER LOOK AT SOME INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVE MODEL RUNS
Given the amount of stochasticity in the model, nearly every model run produces
different results. With specific populations of agents, there is a limit to the possible variety
of results. But given the number of variables that determine these results, even in this
parsimonious model, in conjunction with the decisions the agents in the model make at
each time step, the number of different result is enormous and expands with each time step
the model is run. The chance of the model simulation running the same way twice,
particularly when the initial set-up is random, is extremely slight. It is however possible to
compare the trends that occur in repeated model runs.
Here I present fifteen specific examples, each from a different run of the model to
illustrate some of the patterns that emerge in the pirate population as the model runs. This
allows a discussion of what was occurring during the simulation to cause these patterns. I
use the graphs of “People with pirate” that the model generates while running to illustrate
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these examples. For each scenario presented, a full screen capture of the model interface at
the end of the model run is available in Appendix D.
The model is very sensitive to initial pirating activity. Failure of the first few skiffs
to capture a ship drives the system toward extinction. When pirating activity occurs
slowly, meaning there is time between the individual skiffs departing the port, the model is
better able to absorb failure and has the opportunity to rebound when new skiffs head out.
Another way to think about this is that a lower rate of piracy (measured by the quantity of
skiffs pirating at a particular time), equates to a slower drop in p-capture caused by
unsuccessful skiff runs. However, when the model conditions are such that the people
swarm to the port, a high level of failure will result. A swarm of skiffs ensures a low level of
success and a rapid drop in the p-capture value.
Combinations of the Reward and ECO variables which produced a lot of variation
between the individual model runs were chosen for twelve of the fifteen examples since
these produce a wide variety of results to select from. Six of the examples are from model
runs in an environment where the reward is relatively low and the economic opportunity is
very poor. In this environment, the Reward level is 250,000 with an ECO value of 9. Six
more examples come from model runs in an environment with better economic
opportunity, but with a relatively high reward level for piracy. This environment has a
Reward level of 400,000 and an ECO value of 7. The last three examples use Reward level
300,000 with an ECO value of 6. This combination of variables was discussed earlier in this
chapter. This combination of Reward and ECO produces a wide range of median number of
pirates. It provides scenarios without initial swarming.
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These fifteen examples, although only illustrative, clearly demonstrate the
differences that can occur with the same variables as well as a comparison between the
different variable settings. A graph of the number of pirates versus time supplements the
discussion of each scenario. More details of each scenario are provided in Appendix C.
First a look at the examples from Reward level 250,000 and ECO 9. In each model
run there is an initial swarm of piracy. Everyone, or nearly everyone, decides to pirate in
the early portion of the simulation, so there is a quick ramp-up to a boom of piracy. It is not
possible to sustain this level of piracy, since there is a very limited quantity of target ships.
Therefore, this initial boom of piracy is shortly followed by a bust in the amount of piracy
as failures drive the incentive to pirate down. In scenario 1, the initial boom is followed by
a bust which eventually leads to the extinction of piracy before the end of the 2000 step
model run. Since only one ship was captured extinction happens quickly.

Figure 7-6. Scenario 1: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

The next scenario presents a similar start pattern; however, in this run, extinction has not
yet occurred. By the end of the 2000 steps, there are still three pirates; enough for one skiff
to be operating. If that skiff fails to capture a ship, piracy extinction is highly probable.
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Alternatively, it that skiff is successful, other people may decide to pirate and the system
may rebound if those pirates are also successful.

Figure 7-7. Scenario 2: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

In the third scenario, the piracy bust is followed a very low level of sustained piracy.
Gradually the system recovers and another piracy boom occurs but without the degree of
swarming that occurred in the initial boom.

Figure 7-8. Scenario 3: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

The fourth scenario presents a different initial pattern. Following the nearly immediate
boom of piracy, a bust occurs, but the level of piracy never drops very far. The result is a
fairly stable high level of piracy. This is a less likely scenario as a high rate of pirate success
is needed to sustain this system.
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Figure 7-9. Scenario 4: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

A similar pattern is evident in Scenario 5. In this case, the system levels out to a low level of
piracy. In both this scenario and the previous one, the relatively long run of fairly stable
piracy illustrates the oscillating pattern typical of a predator-prey system.

Figure 7-10. Scenario 5: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

The last scenario provides an example of the initial bust being followed by a gradual
recovery and then a pattern of mini booms and busts. Again, these are just a few of the
many possible patterns that are seen with repeated runs of the model. As long as piracy
extinction has not occurred, the model stochasticity will continue to produce an everchanging pattern.
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Figure 7-11. Scenario 6: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9

Now, I turn to the other environment to provide the last six scenarios, with Reward
set at 400,000 and ECO set at 7. As in the first environment, the combination of economic
opportunity and reward in this environment provide a strong initial pull toward piracy. In
fact, here the pull is even stronger than in the first environment. Everyone is immediately
pulled to pirate and they swarm toward the port. Once at the port, they man the skiffs and
swarms of skiffs venture out. This is evidenced in the graphs for each of the remaining
scenarios with a vertical rise to 100 pirates6. Scenario 7, similar to scenario 1, shows the
bust that shortly follows the initial boom. The results are even more dramatic than in
scenario 1. Only two of the 33 skiffs that initially head out successfully capture a ship.
Then, neither of them are successful when they re-sail, and piracy extinction occurs
relatively rapidly.

The 100th pirate waits in the port until two unsuccessful pirates who have returned to roaming, again decide
to pirate and make their way to the port.
6
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Figure 7-12. Scenario 7: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7

This a good representation of the crowd-out effect that was discussed earlier.
Because the pull toward piracy is so strong at a high level of reward, everyone decides to
pirate at the beginning of the simulation. The resulting swarm of skiffs overwhelm the
target population. At best, only three will find ships to attack. In this particular scenario
only two were successful and the value of p-capture drops enough that people no longer
decide to pirate. Just one more successful ship capture can delay the point at which piracy
extinction occurs, as illustrated by scenario 8. In scenario 8, three captures occur from the
initial swarm which allows piracy to continue. In this scenario, there were six successful
captures, but then no more.

Figure 7-13. Scenario 8: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7
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The graph for scenario 8 does not indicate piracy extinction because there is still
one skiff operating. That one skiff is returning to port unsuccessful (see scenario 8 in
Appendix D). When the skiff reaches the port, extinction will occur and no one else will
pirate. Alternatively, if that skiff had been successful there would have been a chance for a
recovery.
In scenarios 9, there is never a bust. Despite an initial swarm of pirates enough of
them are successful to sustain a high level of piracy. This scenario does illustrate a very
gradual downward trend resulting from the high amount of failures that slowly drive down
the expected reward.

Figure 7-14. Scenario 9: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7

The bust that follows the initial boom is not complete in scenario 10, and its
followed by a recovery rapid enough that everyone again decides to pirate. This allows the
system to settle into a fairly stable pattern of on-going piracy.
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Figure 7-15. Scenario 10: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7

In scenario 11, after the bust there were no successful captures until the last skiff that set
out. This drove the p-capture variable down, so that despite the high reward, no one was
willing to pirate until that last skiff succeeded. After that, the system makes a gradual
recovery. Eventually, it returns to a high level of piracy that is somewhat stable.

Figure 7-16. Scenario 11: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7

Scenario 12 illustrates how just enough pirate success can cause the p-capture value to
cross back and forth across the point where it results in a swarm of pirates. Each time the
system is in decline, a successful skiff run allows the system to recover. The result is a very
jagged saw-tooth pattern of small booms and busts. Initially they trend downward, but
enough successive captures reverse the trend.
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Figure 7-17. Scenario 12: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7

The last three scenarios are just a few illustrative examples of the wide variety of
possible patterns that emerge when piracy starts more gradually. All three of these
scenarios begin in a similar way; people decide to pirate at a much slower pace. It takes
time for there to be enough of them to man a skiff. Meanwhile more of them are making
the decision to pirate and they also head toward the port. Skiffs gradually begin to operate.
When skiffs return without being successful, those pirates return to roaming and the
number of pirates begins to decline. After this point the future is again determined by the
success or failure of the skiffs. In scenario 13, only two of the skiffs were successful and the
system eventually reached extinction. This shows that even when the pirating starts
gradually, the model is still very sensitive to the success of failure of the first few skiffs.

Figure 7-18. Scenario 13: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6

214
The model run for scenario 14 had eight ships captured. This was enough for the
system to ramp-up with a good number of active pirates. Failures decreased the pirate
population but not enough to drive it to extinction. Additional captures encouraged new
pirates. The model run ended with just ten active pirates; nine of them manning three
skiffs and one more waiting in the port. That could be enough to sustain piracy if some of
the skiffs are successful (although one skiff is already returning to port in a low fuel status).
Alternatively, failure by all three of the skiffs would result in piracy extinction. (The pirate
waiting at the port for two more crew members is unlikely to get them, since one pirate has
already decided to return to roaming rather than pirate as indicated by his yellow color.)

Figure 7-19. Scenario 14: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6

The last scenario shows a model run which has a good amount of ongoing piracy.
There have been 23 captured ships and the model has settled into a relatively stable
pattern of piracy. When the model run ended there were 48 pirates. Most of them are out
in skiffs, a few more of them are making their way to the port. This indicates people are
still deciding to pirate. One of the people, who had decided to pirate, has returned to
roaming. That indicates there will be fewer deciding to pirate unless some of the current
skiffs are successful.
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Figure 7-20. Scenario 15: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6

While these scenarios are only representative of the possible combinations of ECO
level and Reward value, they show the wide variety of patterns of pirate population
changes that the model can produce. This indicates that the model is very sensitive to the
level of stochasticity. Because the difference between one more successful skiff run or
another failure can be the difference between extinction or recovery, it would appear there
are threshold effects that matter in each ECO level depending on the Reward value. This
sensitivity is particularly critical as the beginning of a model run. For that reason, I now
shift to a discussion of model initiation.

THE ISSUE OF MODEL INITIATION
When the model is set up and begins to run there is no piracy. This is somewhat
reasonable as there are areas without piracy or times when the conditions do not favor
piracy. However, in this case we are setting the economic opportunity and an expected
reward as initial conditions of the model. Those conditions will result in piracy or not. In
the situations when the combination of opportunity and reward result in no piracy the
system is in equilibrium. People will roam contentedly on land and none of the dynamic
variables will kick in. Alternatively, when that combination lures people to piracy there is a
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start-up time frame for the model to make the shifts from seed values to dynamic values for
the average time of a skiff run, the expected reward, and piracy probability. Each of these
variable transitions are dealt with differently.
The skiff run time (SRT) is seeded with a value which was determined by running
the model multiple times and gathering all the individual skiff run times and then averaging
them. This value was then set into the model code. An artificial history is created by
multiplying this value by 1000 and dividing the average by the same. As skiffs operate,
they track the time they spend at sea and when they return that time is added to the total,
which is then divided by an incremented denominator. As the model simulation runs the
average SRT varies but not by much. It is important to note that SRT is primarily
influenced by the skiff’s maximum fuel, since fuel limits the amount of time a skiff can
remain at sea. If the initial fuel setting is altered a different seed value would be needed for
the model.
The initial expected reward value is determined by the Reward level selected by the
user on the model interface. Using this value, a similar artificial average is created by
multiplying the reward by a factor of 1000 and then dividing the average by that number.
Thus, the initial expected reward is an average which is equal to the reward setting. As
ships are captured, their reward is added to the total and the denominator is increased.
For each unsuccessful sortie, the total remains the same (zero reward for that sortie) but
the denominator is still incremented. As the model simulation runs, expected rewards tend
to trend down since there are far more unsuccessful skiff runs than successful ones. 7

This tendency of expected reward needs further exploration. It may be that the distribution of rewards
among the ships is not ideal. Alternatively, this could be a problem with how the expected reward is
7
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Setting an initial piracy probability is a more difficult challenge. This is the
probability that a pirate skiff will be successful and is used in the utility function. The
lower the probability the less enticing the reward of pirating is. This can be thought of in
terms of risk as well. A low probability of success is the same as a high risk of failure. If the
probability of success is too low no one will pirate; alternatively, if it is too high everyone
will pirate. The range for these all-or-nothing values is relative to the reward level setting.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the real-world probability of a ship being subject to pirate
attack varies depending on the waters the ship plans to sail in. Through some rough
analysis, qualified by the data that is available, it was determined that piracy probability
risk experienced by shipping can be globally bounded as less than 0.005 percent up to a
high of 1.32 percent at the height of the Somali pirate crisis.

Unfortunately, we cannot

estimate the probability of the pirate’s success since we do not know how many pirates
there are. As we do not have good data for the quantity of pirates, it is impossible to set
this value based on real-world data.
In the model, piracy probability, represented by the p-capture variable, is the overall
probability that a pirate skiff will make a capture. This is different from the probability of
an attack being successful since this also accounts for all the times a skiff returns from a
sortie without even encountering a ship to attack. Early versions of the model had a
selector switch to set the piracy probability. The value could be varied between 0 and 10,
in increments of 1. Obviously, if the probability of success is 0, no one will pirate. At 0.1
the model ran reasonably well. Increasing the probability to 0.2 caused everyone to pirate
all the time. There was no need to experiment with higher values. Instead, the scale on the
calculated. In the real-world we clearly see trends of increasing rewards for pirating under certain
conditions. In the model runs, there are small bumps in the expected reward but not an upward trend.
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selector switch was adjusted to allow for smaller increments to be tested. The increments
were changed from 0.1 to 0.01. Following this adjustment, the sensitivity of an initial pcapture was tested for the range 0.08 to 0.12 with the ECO and Reward values held
constant in a range which had previously produced plenty of piracy. Given the amount of
stochasticity in the model it was difficult to determine if this level of discrimination in the
initial p-capture value was significant, it certainly did not appear to be. Since, the ability to
select the initial value of the piracy probability did not appear useful, the selector switch
was eliminated to simplify the model. P-capture was given an initial seed value of 0.1 in the
model code.8
For a person to make the decision to pirate, the combination of reward and risk
must outweigh the opportunity on land (this opportunity is multiplied by the average SRT
since a person gives up multiple opportunities when they make a pirate run). In the utility
function, the expected reward is multiplied by the piracy probability (p-capture) and then
divided by three (the minimum manning level for the skiff). The result of this calculation is
then compared to the individual’s opportunities (their average opportunity times the
average SRT).
Once a ship has been captured, this value becomes dynamic and is a ratio of total
sorties to those that were successful. Shifting directly to the dynamic value would cause an
unrealistic shift in this probability since it all depends on when that ship is captured
compared to how many skiffs have gone out to pirate. The following possible scenarios
bound the issue:
While each data set from a BehaviorSpace experiment varied, when the total number of captured ships and
sorties was record by an experiment on 31 May 2017, the probability of pirate success was 56,010/536,216
or 0.104454. This experiment involved 3,500 runs of the model. This verified that 0.1 was a reasonable seed
value.
8
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Scenario one: The first skiff is successful and no other skiffs have gone out. The
dynamic value, the number of captured ships divided by the number of skiff runs,
would max out at 1. This of course is an unlikely but not an impossible situation and
represents the upper limit for the probability.
Scenario two: There are ten skiffs out when a skiff is successful, this would cause
the value to be 0.1 and no change would occur.
Scenario three: 33 skiffs are out (everyone - except the last guy who needs two
more partners to man a skiff) when a skiff is successful - this would cause the value
to be 0.0303....
Scenario three is close to the lower limit for the probability since they go back to roaming if
they are not successful; however, they could soon decide to pirate again which would drive
the value even lower. At some point, if no pirates capture a ship, it will be too low for
anyone to desire to pirate. This is the point which was described above as piracy
extinction.
These scenarios present three of many possible situations which will occur when
the probability of capture becomes dynamic. Except for scenario two, all the possible
situations will cause a jump or dive in the probability of capture. To mitigate these
potential swings, the element of time passage is added to the calculation of the current
value of the probability. As the model simulation runs, a total is created by adding the
probability value at each time step and then dividing that total by the number of time steps.
This essentially averages the value. During the model start-up phase, while the value is
static, the average is the same as the seed value. Once the value becomes dynamic that

220
value is what gets added to the total. The utility function uses the average value (referred
to as current p-capture).
On model initiation, all these variables function with their seed values until a ship is
captured. After that, they shift to dynamic values. SRT is updated each time a skiff returns
and tends to stay close to the seed value. Total-rewards is updated each time a captured
ship is brought to the port. Expected-rewards is updated every time a skiff returns to port.
The probability of capturing a ship is updated each time increment and changes when a
skiff sorties or a ship is captured.

EXPORTED WORLDS
Every time the model is initiated, it randomly sets up the starting conditions of the
model. Therefore, each model run begins differently dependent upon these initial
conditions; the distribution of economic opportunity on the land and in the experience list
of the people, the location of the people on land, the rewards allocated to the ships and
their location in the shipping lane. These differences between the starting conditions
account for some of the variation that is seen in the results. It is possible to eliminate this
portion of the variation by having each model run begin with the same starting conditions.
This can be accomplished by setting up the model and then exporting the world. The
model is then reset for each model run by importing that world. Although the repeated
simulations use identical starting conditions, each simulation will still be unique because
NetLogo uses a random seed for each model run.9

NetLogo uses a pseudo-random number generator to determine the pattern for random number choices.
This means that while the numbers appear random, they are generated by deterministic process. For each
model run, unless otherwise specified, the number generator is seeded with a random number based on the
9
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Another consideration for model start-up is that it begins with the seeded variable
settings and runs with those until enough activity has occurred to allow those variables to
become dynamic. Because this transition of the model from initial seed values to dynamic
values causes swings, it is useful to look at scenarios that start with ongoing piracy. To do
this, the model is run for a determined amount of time and then stopped. This freezes the
world as it was at that time. The frozen world is then exported and used as the imported
world for further testing of the model. To find scenarios where all the variables have
shifted to their dynamic mode, the model [Model-20A] was run at relatively low levels of
rewards (200,000 – 250,000) at the ECO values where these reward levels saw a shift from
no, or nearly none, piracy to somewhat sustained piracy. For a reward of 200,000 this is an
ECO value of 8 and for a reward of 250,000 it is an ECO value of 7. After running for 500
time-steps, the model was frozen, saved, and then used as a repeated starting point for
additional testing.10 By using the same world as a starting point, the initial conditions of
each model run are the same. Given the amount of stochasticity built into the model, the
results of these runs still had a good amount of variety when repeated runs were made.
But this variety can now be attributed primarily to the functioning of the model rather than
the shift from seed values to dynamic values.

current date and time. For more information on NetLogo random numbers see “Random numbers” in the
NetLogo Programing Guide. Accessed September 19, 2017,
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/docs/programming.html#random.
10 Some initial testing was done with 1000 time-step model runs. The exported worlds that were then tested
did not appear to produce good results. I thought this might have to do how high some of the values had
gotten, (this was before I made the adjustment to the p-capture variable by creating the total-p-capture and
current-p-capture variables) so the amount of time was reduced. However, I later discovered the real issue
was with how BehaviorSpace was importing the frozen world and running it in the experiment. I discuss this
issue more in the Frozen World subsection of the Model Extensions section of Chapter 8.
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CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS FROZEN WORLD SCENARIOS
Obviously, the difficulty is how to determine which of the possible scenarios created
by this method is the best frozen world to use. Here I will discuss some of the possible
scenarios for a frozen world which would then be imported as the starting point for further
experimentation. I will then describe the actual process I used to make this selection.
Figure 7-21 provides an example of a model run with an ECO value of 7 and a
Reward of 250,000 stopped after 500 time-steps (ticks).

Figure 7-21. Model run 1 with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = 500 (Exported World)

In the model run displayed in figure 7-21, there were 14 sorties but no successful
captures. The dynamic values for average SRT and reward are functioning; however,
current-p-capture is still using its seed value since p-capture does not become dynamic
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until a ship has been captured. For this reason, this would not be a good scenario to use as
a starting condition for model runs where we want to see all of the dynamic values
functioning from the start. Therefore, this scenario was discarded.

Figure 7-22. Model run 2 with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = 500 (Exported World)

Figure 7-22 displays another example of a model run with the same variable
settings as figure 7-21. In this case, the first vessel was captured with 9 skiffs out. The pcapture value became dynamic and shifted to 0.111 (1 divided by 9). The current-pcapture, which averages all values of p-capture over time, remains at 0.100 since the
simulation was approximately 300 time-steps along when the capture got tallied in the
port. By the end of 500 time-steps there have been 13 sorties and the current-p-capture
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has dropped to 0.077 (1 divided by 13) and the current-p-capture has become 0.094. One
skiff is returning to port with a captured ship.
If this world is imported as a common starting point, the p-capture will jump to
0.154 when the ship arrives in the port, which will also cause a gradual increase in currentp-capture, even as p-capture gradually declines. The next successful capture will again
cause a jump in p-capture and current-p-capture will continue to gradually increase. This
pattern will continue as long as the utility function continues to cause more people to
pirate. As the simulation continues to run, the impact of each successful capture is less
than the earlier ones.
Figure 7-23 displays the results of the simulation, after approximately 2000 timesteps, using the figure 7-22 frozen world as a starting point, with the same variable
settings.
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Figure 7-23. Model run 3 (Imported World) with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = ~2000

The p-capture variation is most significant when the numbers used to determine it
are relatively small. As the simulation runs, the impact of each new capture still drives an
increase, but to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, current-p-capture has continued to gradually
increase so that even with a general decline of the expected reward (caused by all the
unsuccessful skiff runs) people are still deciding to pirate. This results in a sustained
pattern of piracy for these variable settings. This is clearly illustrated by figure 7-24 which
displays the model after approximately 10,000 time-steps.
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Figure 7-24. Model run 3 (Imported World) with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = 10,000

If the model were allowed to continue to run, it is logical to assume that at some
point the product of the gradually increasing current-p-capture and the gradually
decreasing expected-rewards would not be sufficient to maintain this pattern of piracy
since there is a slight downward trend in the graph which displays this product.
Figure 7-25 shows yet another example of a frozen world after 500 time-steps. It
was also created from a model run with an ECO value of 7 and a Reward of 250,000. In this
scenario, there are 14 pirate sorties and one captured ship. This results in a p-capture
value of 0.071 (1 divided by 14). At the time the scenario freezes, there are 14 pirates.
Twelve pirates are on four different skiffs; one is returning to port with low fuel and three
are on pirate operations. Two additional pirates are making their way to the port. The
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current p-capture value is 0.095, which is high enough for people with low opportunity to
decide to pirate.

Figure 7-25. Model run 4 with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = 500 (Exported World)

If none of those skiffs return successful, it is possible no one else will decide to
pirate. Alternatively, it is possible that one person will make the decision to pirate before
current p-capture gets too low. This would allow just one more skiff to sail. At that point pcapture is 0.067 and current p-capture is gradually decreasing. If that 15th skiff is
unsuccessful, by the time it returns to port the current p-capture value will have dropped
to at least 0.087 and it is highly unlikely anyone else will decide to pirate. Figure 7-26
shows the status following the unsuccessful return of the 15th skiff.
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Figure 7-26. Model run 5 (Imported World) with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, and Ticks = 215

Alternatively, if there is a 15th sortie and it succeeds, at that point p-capture will
increase to 0.133 (2 divided by 15) and current p-capture will begin to increase,
encouraging others to pirate. This increase in p-capture is significant enough to keep
sending more skiffs out and the model will keep producing pirates. As many as 30 sorties
can occur without another successful capture. In that case, p-capture will have again
decreased to 0.67. Figure 7-27 shows the results of a simulation with the 15th skiff
successful, but then no additional successful captures until the 30th skiff (the 30th skiff is
waiting to re-sail and will be successful).
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Figure 7-27. Model run 6 (Imported World) with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, 30 Sorties

At this point, when the captured ship arrives in the port, p-capture will increase to
0.100 (3 divided by 30) and current p-capture has decreased to 0.089 but will begin to
again increase. So long as that skiff is successful when it sails again, the model will keep
producing more pirates. With sortie 31 succeeding, p-capture will increase to 0.129 (4
divided by 31) and even more people will decide to pirate as current p-capture continues
to increase. Figure 7-28 displays the situation shortly after sortie 31 returned to port.
Alternatively, if sortie 31 is not successful, it is unlikely any more people will pirate as the
current p-capture and expected reward will have continued to decrease.
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Figure 7-28. Model run 6 (Imported World) with ECO = 7, Reward = 250,000, 31 Sorties

All these scenarios are created by maintaining the same variables of ECO 7 and
Reward 250,000. The frozen world can also be used to explore other ECO and Reward
levels. A BehaviorSpace experiment, similar to the earlier experiment to determine the
effect of varying the ECO and Reward values, can be run starting each model run with the
same frozen world. While this reduces the stochasticity caused by model initiation, we do
not know if it is a better representation of real life.

DETERMINING A LOGICAL PROCESS FOR FROZEN WORLD SELECTION
Earlier experimentation had determined that at low levels of reward, piracy only
occurred with weak economic opportunity, such as would be found in the more fragile
states. At the higher levels of reward, piracy occurred at most levels of economic
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opportunity except for those with the highest levels of economic opportunity. However, it
was more pervasive with lower economic opportunity. The goal of freezing the world and
exporting it to be a starting point for future experiments is to ensure all variables initially
assigned a seed value are now dynamic variables. This means piracy must be occurring at
the time the model is stopped and the world is exported.
A series of BehaviorSpace experiments were run varying the ECO value from 7 to 8
and the Reward level from 200,000 to 250,000 with 100 iterations for each pair of
variables. The target pairs were ECO 7 with Reward 250,000 and ECO 8 with Reward
200,000. As indicated in figure 7-3, ECO 7 is the environment in which piracy becomes
pervasive for Reward level 250,000. This similarly occurs for ECO 8 with Reward 200,000.
It was reasonable to expect plenty of frozen worlds with on-going piracy in these variable
ranges. For each set of 100 exported worlds, the median numbers for pirates after 500
ticks were analyzed to determine the most frequent value. Then, those worlds with that
number of pirates were evaluated, using the considerations discussed above.
For example, looking at table 7-2, the most common occurrence for the median
number of pirates was 21, which occurred in 15 out of 100 exported worlds.

Table 7-2. Median Number of Pirates in 100 Exported Worlds with ECO 7 and Reward 250,000

Median

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 32

Occurrence

2

2

4

5

12 13 15 11 13

7

5

2

5

1

1

2

Each of these 15 exported worlds, with a median number of pirates equaling 21, were then
individually evaluated. First, any without at least one captured ship were eliminated since
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the p-capture variable would not be dynamic. Then, by comparing the standard deviation
and variance for the number of pirates at the time the world was exported, the worlds with
the lowest values were used for additional experimentation.

Figure 7-29. Initial model-reset for model 20B with imported world 178D11

In the world illustrated in figure 7-29, there were a total of 14 sorties which
resulted in one captured ship. Five ships successfully transited the shipping lane. A
maximum of 29 people pirated and at the time the world was exported 14 of them were
pirates. Twelve of the pirates are out in four skiffs, three of which are active in the shipping
lane, while the last one is returning to the port with a low fuel status. The other two pirates
are making their way to the port. The p-capture value is 0.071 while the current-p-capture
value is 0.095. The expected reward is 246,805 and the SRT value is 169. This is not to say

World 178D was the world produced by model run number 178 of 400 in the fourth BehaviorSpace
experiment to evaluate exported worlds.
11
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that this is absolutely the best exported world for further experimentation; however, this
does explain the logic behind the selection that was made.
Using this world, 178D, as a starting point for further experimentation, the
BehaviorSpace experiment was repeated, varying the ECO and Reward values.12 The
experiment results showed similar trends between the various variable settings for ECO
and Reward when compared with the results from the experiment with random world
starts. The caveat to this is that the minimum numbers for the variables produced by the
model (the number of pirates, sorties, successful transits, and captures) were established
by the imported world.
As expected, the mean values for the standard deviation and variance across the two
data sets were reduced by beginning with the same imported world for each run of the
model. The mean standard deviation went from 13.891 with the randomly setup worlds to
9.888 for the imported world starts. Mean variance dropped from 309.820 to 151.668.
Summaries of the data from these experiments are provided in Appendix D.
Table 7-3 provides a more detailed look at the data for the median number of
pirates by ECO and Reward values. The experiment with Model 20A used random
initialization as the starting point. The experiment with Model 20B imported the frozen
exported world (1787D), so each model run began with that as its starting point. As
discussed above, world 178D has twelve pirates. Importing this frozen world as the
starting condition for future experimentation means that the minimum number of pirates
for each of the model runs is 12. With this as a given, we would expect the values of the
imported world experiment to be equal to or higher than the values from the earlier

12

ECO values were varied from 4 to 10. Reward values were varied from 200,000 to 400,000.
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experiment. However, a review of the data produced by the experiment, shows exceptions
to this for some of the ECO and Reward level combinations. The most dramatic example of
this is highlighted with a box in the table. For ECO 8 and Reward 200,000; the mean of the
median number of pirates was greater than 24 in the original experiment. For the
imported world experiment, it was less than two. The lower starting value for current
p-capture might explain this, but there also might be something else going on which would
require further experimentation to determine. As we saw in the earlier experiments, there
is a threshold or tipping point that causes swarming to occur. When this happens, the
competition crowds out pirate success. Instead of more pirating, we get less pirating.

Table 7-3. Comparison of Model 20A (random initialization) to Model 20B
(Frozen World 178D) for 100 iterations per variable pair

Mean of Median Number of Pirates
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Model
20A
20B
20A
20B
20A
20B
20A
20B
20A
20B
20A
20B
20A
20B

200000
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
24.1
1.7
40.8
35.3
50.6
54.1

250000
0.0
2.0
0.0
2.0
0.8
2.0
34.8
7.5
35.8
41.4
44.8
58.5
60.4
68.5

300000
0.0
5.6
3.1
8.5
29.0
18.2
31.1
42.1
45.1
54.8
63.9
66.6
76.2
76.8

350000
15.5
15.1
24.1
34.9
24.4
40.9
38.7
57.3
64.3
65.9
75.5
75.6
83.8
86.1

400000
19.6
29.5
27.8
37.3
43.0
54.1
61.0
66.1
72.1
76.6
84.5
87.0
88.4
90.8

Figure 7-30 provides a comparison of the box plots for reward level 400,000 from
the two BehaviorSpace experiments. These make it easier to see the reduction of the
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standard deviation and variance in the experiment that used an imported world as the
starting point for each of the model runs.

Figure 7-30. Box Plots of the median number of pirates for Reward 400,000 for 30 May 2017 BehaviorSpace
experiment with Model 20B importing Exported World 178D for simulation initialization compared to 18
May 2017 BehaviorSpace experiment with Model 20 using random simulation initialization

IMPROVING HOW ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IS DEPICTED
Since the primary purpose of the model is to gain insight into the relationship
between the socio-political variables on the land and piracy at sea, an improvement was
made to the model, intended to bring refinement to the land portion of the model.
Specifically, how the people encounter their economic opportunity. There are many
refinements which could be made to the merchant ship flow and other aspects of the water
portion of the model. However, since, the purpose of the water side is to just provide the
necessary feedback to the land side with either the success or failure of the pirates, a
simplistic representation is adequate and no changes were made to the water side.
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In the basic model, each patch of the land environment was randomly assigned an
economic opportunity value during the set-up of the model, with the range of these values
determined by the ECO slider on the model interface. The resultant random patterns of
opportunity values across the land were depicted in figure 6-3 for ECO 1 and figure 6-4 for
ECO 10. While this served as an abstract representation of economic opportunities
available to the people, the representation can be improved by smoothing out the
landscape to create a pattern that better represents areas of varying economic opportunity,
with more gradual changes between the areas. This is done by diffusing13 the initial
random values assigned to the land. Figure 7-31 shows how the environment is displayed
with ECO 1. The variations are smoothed out and while the economic opportunity values
still vary from 91 to 100, the landscape appears much more uniform.

In Netlogo the diffuse command “Tells each patch to give equal shares of (number * 100) percent of the
value of patch-variable to its eight neighboring patches. number should be between 0 and 1. Regardless of
topology the sum of patch-variable will be conserved across the world. (If a patch has fewer than eight
neighbors, each neighbor still gets an eighth share; the patch keeps any leftover shares.) Netlogo
Dictionary. Accessed September 4, 2017, http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/docs/dictionary.html#D.
13
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Figure 7-31. Initial Model setup with a diffused economic environment – ECO =1, Economic Opportunity on

Meanwhile figure 7-32 shows how the landscape is depicted when the ECO value is set at
the other end of the scale at ECO 10. Here it is easier to see the variation, but much of the
stochasticity has been reduced. Now when a person roams and experiences economic
opportunity the values do not create drastic swings with each move.
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Figure 7-32. Initial Model setup with a diffused economic environment – ECO =10, Economic Opportunity on

REPEATED SIMULATIONS WITH A DIFFUSED ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Once the model code was adjusted to diffuse the economic environment, similar
BehaviorSpace experiments were conducted to compare the model performance between
these two model variations. First, a BehaviorSpace experiment was done starting with the
initial seed values of the model. Next an experiment was completed to provide a variety of
exported worlds. These worlds were evaluated in the same manner as the exported worlds
for the earlier model version. Then another BehaviorSpace experiment was conducted
using one of these worlds as the initial conditions (starting with an imported world).
The world which was selected to be imported for the initial conditions was again a
world resulting from an ECO setting of 7 and a Reward value of 250,000. At the time the
world was frozen, there were a total of eight sorties which resulted in one captured ship.
Six ships had successfully transited the shipping lane. A maximum of 18 people pirated and
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at the time the world was exported there were eight pirates. Six of the pirates are out in
two skiffs, one of which was active in the shipping lane, while the other was waiting in the
port to re-sail. Of the other two pirates, one was making his way to the port and the other
pirate was waiting in the port for two more to man a skiff. The p-capture value is 0.125
while the current-p-capture value is 0.1. The expected reward is 248,227 and the SRT
value is 170. Figure 7-33 provides a visual of the frozen world.

Figure 7-33. Initial model reset for model 21A with imported world 339E 14

The expected result of running the model with the diffused environment was a
reduction of the stochasticity. While people were still roaming to determine their
opportunity, the eco-op values they encountered changed more gradually from patch to
patch. However, the results of the BehaviorSpace experiment with the diffused
World 339E was the world produced by model run number 339 of 400 in the fifth BehaviorSpace
experiment to evaluate exported worlds.
14
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environment resulted in greater standard deviation and variance, not less. The mean value
for the standard deviation across the complete data set for the experiment, which used
Exported World 339E as the initial starting condition for each model run, was 14.494. In
comparison, the standard deviation for the non-diffused environment experiment, which
used Exported World 178D as initial starting conditions for each model run, was 9.888.
Mean variance was 327.4 as opposed to 151.668. Summaries of the data from these
experiments are provided in Appendix D.
Figures 7-34 and 7-35 provide a comparison of the box plots of the median number
of pirates for reward level 200,000 and reward level 400,000 from the two BehaviorSpace
experiments. These show that the increases in standard deviation and variance are not
consistent across all the ECO values. Given, that these results were not what was expected,
further experimentation is warranted. It is possible that the model code is not functioning
as intended. Alternatively, something unexpected may be occurring with this environment.

Figure 7-34. Box Plots of the median number of pirates for Reward 200,000 for 30 May 2017 BehaviorSpace
experiment with Model 20B importing Exported World 178D for simulation initialization compared to 7 June
2017 BehaviorSpace experiment with Model 21 (Diffused Environment) importing Exported World 338E for
simulation initialization
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Figure 7-35. Box Plots of the median number of pirates for Reward 400,000 for 30 May 2017 BehaviorSpace
experiment with Model 20B importing Exported World 178D for simulation initialization compared to 7 June
2017 BehaviorSpace experiment with Model 21 (Diffused Environment) importing Exported World 338E for
simulation initialization

Table 7-4 provides a more detailed look at the data for the median number of
pirates by ECO and Reward values for the two experiments conducted with a frozen world
as the starting condition. The experiment that used the diffused landscape generally
produced a lower number of pirates, with some exceptions at the lower ECO values and
reward levels.15 Typically, the mean of the median increases as the ECO values increases.
This was always true when the landscape was random (Model 20B). However, the data
from the diffused environment (Model 21A) provides two anomalies to this.16 These data
anomalies also support the need for additional experimentation. A logical next step would
be to repeat the BehaviorSpace experiments; but switch the frozen worlds used as the
starting condition (use 339E for Model 20B and world 178D for Model 21A). This would
There 10 occurrence of Model 21A producing MORE pirates than Model 20B: At ECO 4 it occurs for Reward
levels 300000, 350000, and 400000, for ECO 5 it occurs at Reward levels 300000 and 350000, for ECO 6 it
occurs at Reward levels 250000 and 300000, for ECO 7 it occurs at Reward levels 200000 and 250000, and
for ECO is occurs at Reward level 200000.
16 For Model 20B the mean of median number of pirates DECREASED as the ECO value increased at Reward
level 300000 (going from ECO 7 to ECO 8) and at Reward level 350000(going from ECO 6 to ECO 7).
15

242
allow for additional comparisons between the two models, starting with the same frozen
world.

Table 7-4. Comparison of Model 20B (random ECO values) to Model 21A
(diffused ECO values) for 100 iterations per variable pair. Model 20B used
frozen world 178D. Model 21A used frozen world 339E

Mean of Median Number of Pirates
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Model
20B
21A
20B
21A
20B
21A
20B
21A
20B
21A
20B
21A
20B
21A

200000
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
1.7
2.2
35.3
11.9
54.1
25.8

250000
2.0
0.0
2.0
0.4
2.0
6.2
7.5
19.7
41.4
26.1
58.5
37.1
68.5
37.5

300000
5.6
13.9
8.5
22.3
18.2
25.9
42.1
38.2
54.8
36.6
66.6
39.2
76.8
52.1

350000
15.1
29.7
34.9
35.9
40.9
34.2
57.3
34.0
65.9
48.2
75.6
59.8
86.1
69.3

400000
29.5
40.2
37.3
32.3
54.1
40.2
66.1
53.5
76.6
59.8
87.0
68.5
90.8
79.4

SUMMARY
Let us review the motivation for the Piracy Opportunity Model and some of the main
efforts that went into its development. First the motivation; while there were other piracy
models, none of them focused on the sociological factors that motivate piracy. This model
offers a different approach from currently existing models. It explores how conditions on
land impact maritime piracy. Only by focusing on the socio-economic and socio-political
variables that encourage piracy can the true complexity of the issue be understood.
Because the data available to address this issue is very limited, an ABM provides a way to
critically think about the problem. The purpose of this model is not to predict future pirate
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attacks or even piracy trends, but rather to illuminate core dynamics between the
sociological conditions on the land and the piracy at sea.
The model was intentionally developed with light agents. By simplifying the details
of certain aspect of the model, the focus is placed on the issues at the heart of the problem.
As D. Scott Bennett has said, “Large models may run the risk that fundamental patterns will
become lost as the parameter space for evaluations grows, and the effects of other assumed
parameters become large, possibly concealing the possible dynamics of interest.”17 For this
reason, just one of the possible sociological variables associated with piracy was selected.
The model uses economic opportunity on land, specifically the individual agents’
experience of this variable, to represent possible economic conditions that would motivate
piracy. This allows for a parsimonious model that focuses on the specific relationship
between the economic opportunity on land and the reward of pirating at sea. This does not
mean that other sociological variables are not important. This model provides a baseline
that can be easily extended in further work to explore those other variables.
The model takes a unique two models in one approach. It is comprised of two
primary submodels; a land model and a water model. The land model uses a deductive
approach that models the economic opportunity in a highly abstract manner. The water
model, the primary function for which is to provide feedback to the land model, uses a
more inductive approach by using the work already done in other piracy models, but in a
simplified manner. There are no specific units assigned to the parameters in the model,
these are kept generic. Relationship between units are relative with respect to time,

17

Bennett, 1.12.

244
distance and value. This allows for the model to remain non-specific, with utility across
many regional domains.
In many ways, the model is simple. However, this does not mean that designing the
model was a simple task. Much of the early part of the model development was focused on
getting the right relative relationships between the agents and variables. For example,
both the ships and skiffs operate at various speeds depending on the current operational
situation. These speeds are increments of their max speed. Yet the max speed for a ship is
2, while the max speed for a skiff is 3. This allows a skiff to travel faster than a large
merchant ship, and in the real world, this is in fact true. Another example is the amount of
fuel the skiffs start with. Each skiff has 100 units of fuel, which is decreased at a rate
related to the speed it operates at. However, the amount of fuel is clearly related to how
successful the skiffs are, as it determines how long they can remain at sea. Assign too much
fuel and the pirate success rate will increase; assign too little and none of the skiffs will
capture a ship. What these examples point to is the need for generic values to be balanced
such that the model performs in a way that represents realistic basic behaviors.
Once this was accomplished, we could see what kind of interactive dynamics are
generated from the simple rules the agents use to make decisions. While we could
anticipate a clear interaction between the ECO values and Reward levels, it is the
distinctive patterns that emerge from these interactions which are interesting. For each
reward level, a similar trend of increasing rates of piracy occurred with increases in the
ECO value. However, at lower reward levels the ECO value had a more dramatic effect on
the trend; while at higher reward levels the ECO value effect was more gradual. The
simulations suggest an ECO value tipping point at which the system moves from a state that
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can sustain piracy, to one in which pirating competition drives down pirate activity. The
implications of the model experimentation results are discussed in further detail in the
Chapter 8.
Obviously, there is no lack of interesting potential additions to the current model.
Some of these are relatively simple changes, that might need just a bit of experimentation
to verify that the model changed as intended. Other additions could lead to far more
interesting experiments. Even in the model’s current relatively simple form, there is a
great deal more that could be looked at and evaluated. Additionally, the model provides a
base for far more complex modeling efforts.
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CHAPTER 8
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

By keeping the model generic and relatively simple, the model utility is expanded.
Unlike other models of maritime piracy, the parsimonious model developed in this work
has utility across many specific regional domains. Model simulations suggest a clear
interaction between the ECO value and the Reward level as figures 8-1 and 8-2 show.

Figure 8-1. Median Number of Pirates for Model 20B 30 May 2017 BehaviorSpace Experiment

There are relatively stable regions of interaction between the variables, as
measured by pirate population produced, at both ends of the tested spectrum (Low ECO
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value with low reward level, and high ECO value with high reward level). These relatively
stable regions reinforce the expectation of the relationship between opportunity and
pirating. In the middle ranges of the interactions, there is a lot of volatility, with apparent
thresholds for the transition from the stable to volatile ranges. It is here, in these areas of
dynamic interaction, where we find the more interesting results of the model.

Figure 8-2. Mean Standard Deviation for Number of Pirates for Model 20B 30 May 2017 BehaviorSpace
Experiment

IMPLICATIONS
These results have important real-world implications. When the ECO value is low,
the economic opportunities are very good. In an environment with a healthy economy, it
makes sense that a low reward for piracy would have little or no pull. Thus, we see no
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piracy occurring in these ranges. Alternatively, when the ECO value is high, the economic
opportunities are poor. In a weak economic environment, the model shows a lot of piracy
with the highest incidences of piracy at the high reward levels. However, the transition
across the range of values is not linear. The system dynamics which are occurring in
between these two alternatives are the most interesting.
For each value of ECO, there is a range of low reward values where no piracy occurs.
This implies conditions where the reward for piracy is not adequate to compensate for the
risks, including the cost, of pirating. As the reward level increases, there is a point at which
a few people become willing to pirate. At this threshold, the model is very sensitive to the
outcome of the initial pirate sorties. If the first few pirate skiffs fail to capture a ship, no
one else will pirate. If the first few skiffs are successful, others will decide to pirate. If
some of these skiffs succeed in capturing a ship a stable pattern of piracy will emerge. The
sensitivity of the model to the success or failure of the initial skiffs suggests that a strong
international response, early in the development of pirate activity in a region, may be
particularly critical. Counter-piracy operations which stop or at least limit the initial
successes are likely to play an important role in preventing the development of an
entrenched pirating culture in a region.
The simulations suggest the existence of an ECO value tipping point. Below this
point the model produces stable patterns of on-going piracy. Between the threshold for
piracy and this tipping point, the number of people who decide to pirate generally
increases as the ECO value increases (indicating progressively poorer economic
opportunities). The ECO value at which this tipping point occurs increases in conjunction
with the reward level. Once this tipping point is passed, the number of people who decide
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to pirate is significantly decreased. This implies that when the system crosses this tipping
point, the system cannot support the level of piracy pulled by the expected reward. Pirate
competition creates a crowd-out effect which dampens the system and the success rate of
the skiffs significantly decreases.
The real-world implications of this are that a crowd-out effect can significantly
reduce the overall success rate of pirating. This provides a possible explanation for why
there was a decrease in the percentage of successful attacks during the height of the Somali
pirate crisis (See figure 5-1). From 2009 through 2011, the success rate of global pirate
attacks dropped to approximately 50 percent from the average of 70 percent (See table 52). The data for just the Horn of Africa, where the Somali pirate crisis occurred, also
supports the idea of competition crowding out the success rate of pirate attacks. The data
is provided in table 8-1. From 2004 to 2007, the success rate was about 30 percent.
Starting in 2008, the number of attacks began to really spike. Initially the success rate
increases, but then in 2009 the total number of attacks more than doubles. The number of
successful attacks remains almost steady. With a significant increase in the number of
failed attacks (attempted attacks) the success rate drops. The number of attacks more than
doubled, while the success rate was nearly cut in half. In 2010, the success rate
temporarily improved. This can be attributed to the extended range of the pirate attacks as
discussed in Chapter 2.1 The number of attacks continued to rise in 2011, and we again see

The Piracy Opportunity Model has a fixed generic area for the attacks. Skiffs currently have a standard
amount of fuel which limits their range. An increase the fuel could simulate extending the skiff’s range.
1
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a drop in the success rate. After 2011 all the numbers trend downward, but we know there
was a variety of counter-piracy operations being conducting at that time.2

Table 8-1. Actual and Attempted Pirate Attacks for the Horn of Africa 2004-20163
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ATTACKS

2015

2016

ACTUAL

3

16

6

12

44

48

65

48

16

2

0

0

0

ATTEMPTED

7

29

14

32

67

167

152

189

59

13

11

0

2

TOTAL

10

45

20

44

111

215

217

237

75

15

11

0

0

% successful

30

35

30

29

40

22

30

20

21

13

0

0

0

It should, however, be noted that the parameters used to test the model might be
amplifying this emerging behavior. Both the ECO value and Reward levels are integer
values. We therefore do not have continuous data. It is possible that what appears to be a
tipping point is brought on by the integer nature of the variables. Additionally, while the
increment between the ECO values is as small as possible at one, the increment between
the Reward levels is 50,000. This means there are many untested variable combinations
between the values the BehaviorSpace tool sampled. Further experimentation should be
done to test small increments of Reward levels.
When stable patterns of piracy emerge, there are oscillations in the quantity of
pirates that resemble the patterns produced by a predator-prey model. These patterns

It is necessary to again emphasize the limitation of available piracy data. We do not know what percent of
all attempted attacks were reported. It is also possible that the increased risk of a pirate attack, in
conjunction with the presence of operating maritime security forces, provided added incentive for reporting
attempted attacks. If so, this would skew the trend by amplifying the decrease in pirate success rates.
3 This data was compiled from the ICC IMB Annual Reports from 2004-2016.
2
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emerged despite the model limiting the ships to a constant population of three. It would be
interesting to further investigate the predator-prey relationship of piracy.
The model was not designed to predict occurrences of piracy. Yet, when thinking
about these implications, the critical question is whether real-world patterns of maritime
piracy can be reproduced from a simulated environment that begins with socio-economic
and socio-political conditions ashore? Can we grow piracy? The decision to use the Fragile
State Index variables was encouraged by the ability to later compare the model results with
real-world piracy data. The model could be run using a specific state’s index values and the
results compared to the data for that region. But we should hold that thought for now.
The real value of a parsimonious model is its ability to elegantly portray the
relationship between the fewest possible predictor variables. Since I was thinking I needed
to represent the various socio-economic and political variables that influence piracy I
began looking for data sources to support the process which would later help me validate
the model’s performance. When I needed to simplify the parameters, I selected the variable
that I felt had the most influence on the issue. As Murphy says, “unless there is money to be
made piracy will not happen.”4 Therefore I selected the economic opportunity variable to
start with.
By this very process I was biasing my model design and limiting the opportunity
variable to being “economic” opportunity. In reflecting on the results of the model and the
possible broader applications, I realize the variable, as abstract as it is, could simply
represent opportunity. Without the bias of thinking it represents economic opportunity
the variable becomes more powerful. Simple, generic opportunity can represent the wider

4

Murphy, 2012, 509.

252
variety of variables. It can represent economic opportunity as intended in my model, but it
can also represent a permissive legal environment that allows piracy to happen and the
limitations imposed by the physical environment due to demographic pressures.
For this reason, further work should be done with the model to explore this more
general opportunity variable. (The broader interpretation of the variable would be
considered when making changes to how opportunity is represented in the world
environment.) An important reason for modeling is to illuminate the core dynamics of the
system. These dynamics should be further explored without the bias of the variable being
limited to economic opportunity. As the saying goes – even the best models are wrong
because they are after all just a model. But as Epstein has emphasized, “Simple models can
be invaluable without being ‘right’ in an engineering sense… They are illuminating
abstractions.”5 These thoughts will be expanded on in the future work portion of the
chapter.
Now we return to the thought about the expansion of the model to possibly predict
piracy. The model developed for this dissertation uses just the one economic variable.
Since we know that there are multiple variables that contribute to piracy we should not
expect to find good results when comparing this model with real-world data. By that I am
referring to trying to compare the amount of piracy produced from the model at specific
ECO values to the amount of piracy resulting from states with similar ECO values. The
reasons for this are twofold. First, the current model uses an abstraction that does not
allow for the variable to quantified, and as just discussed, this means it may better
represent generic opportunity than economic opportunity. Secondly, we know that

5

Epstein, 2008, 1.12.
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extracting just one of the indicators from the FSI does not allow us to represent a particular
state very accurately. Rather, the current model should be considered a baseline model
which can be expanded to include other sociological variables. Then the model results for a
particular combination of variable setting for ECO, DP, SEC and SL could be compared with
the amount of piracy attributed to a state with that same combination of variable values.
Bayes’ analysis can be used to think about how adding other sociological variables to the
model would affect the decision to pirate or not-pirate.

BAYES’ ANALYSIS
Bayes’ analysis allows us to think about conditional probabilities. From the baseline
model, we could calculate the probability that a person will decide to pirate or not-pirate
based on the ECO value and Reward level. This would result in a series of utility functions;
one for each ECO value which estimate the probability for pirating at each possible reward.
Then when we have additional information about the environment, we would want to
update our expectations with that new information. To do this we can use Bayes’ theorem:
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)

The theorem states the probability of A given outcome B, is the probability of A
times the probability of B given outcome A, divided by the probability of B. It is primarily
used to apply new information to revise probabilities based on old information. The
probability of A occurring can be updated with what we know about the occurrence of B.
These probabilities are often referred to by these terms: P(A) is the prior probability;
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P(B|A) is the conditional probability, sometimes referred to as the likelihood; P(B) is the
marginal probability; and P(A|B) is the posterior probability.
The total probability law allows for us to consider multiple prior probabilities such
that:
P(B) = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 )𝑃(𝐵|𝐴𝑖 )
Applying this to Bayes’ rule we get:
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 )𝑃(𝐵|𝐴𝑖 )

Thus, “Bayes’ rule provides a means for computing posterior probabilities from the
known prior probabilities P(A) and the conditional probabilities P(B|A1) for a particular
situation or experiment.”6 With an understanding of Bayes’ rule we can next consider the
technique of Baysesian inference. This technique allows us to update the validity of a
hypothesis (H) as we gain additional evidence (e) related to the hypothesis:
𝑃(𝐻|𝑒) =

𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝑒|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝑒|𝐻) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐻))(𝑃(𝑒|𝐻′)

Where P(e|H) is the probability for the evidence if the hypothesis is true and P(e|H’) is the
probability for the evidence being observed if the hypothesis is false. The values assigned
to P(e|H) and P(e|H’) are values based on expert judgement. [P(e|H) + P(e|H’) does not
have to equal 1]
As described by Pinto and Garvey in their book Advanced Risk Analysis in
Engineering Enterprise Systems, the hypothesis and evidence can be thought of as nodes.
Figure 8-3 depicts the evidence node e1 acting on the hypothesis node H. The equation can
be rewritten to specifically reflect e1:
6

Pinto and Garvey, 57.
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𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1) =

𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝑒1 |𝐻)
𝑃(𝐻)𝑃(𝑒1 |𝐻) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐻))(𝑃(𝑒1 |𝐻′)

Figure 8-3. Evidence acting on Hypothesis

As additional evidence presents itself the equation can be updated to reflect the
impact of that evidence. This is depicted in figure 8-4.

Figure 8-4. Additional evidence acting on Hypothesis

The equation can first be updated to reflect the impact of e2:
𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 𝑒2 ) =

𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 )𝑃(𝑒2 |𝐻)
𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 )𝑃(𝑒2 |𝐻) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 ))(𝑃(𝑒2 |𝐻′)
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And again, to reflect the impact of e3:
𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 ) =

𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 𝑒2 )𝑃(𝑒3 |𝐻)
𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 𝑒2 )𝑃(𝑒3 |𝐻) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐻|𝑒1 𝑒2 ))(𝑃(𝑒3 |𝐻′)

Additional evidence nodes can be added by following this pattern.
This can be used to help us think about how the environmental conditions could
impact a person’s decision to pirate. Let us return to the additional socio-economic and
socio-political variables from the Fragile State Index that were discussed above. Take an
individual living in a coastal state who is deciding if they should turn to piracy. Let us
assume that the individual is initially ambivalent about the decision so there is a 50%
chance they will decide to pirate and 50% chance that they will not pirate. Instead of the
generic H for hypothesis we can substitute a p to represent the probability of pirating.
Therefore, the P(p) is 0.50 and the P(p’) is 0.50, where p represents pirating and p’
represents not-pirating.

Figure 8-5. Environmental conditions acting on piracy probability

However, the conditions in that state present the individual with certain challenges
which would influence that decision. Evidence of a worsening economic condition (ECO)
could be judged to impact the individual decision such that P(e1|p) is 0.90 and P(e1|p’) is
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0.25. With this information, we can calculate the revised probability that the individual will
decide to pirate using the equation above for 𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1).
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 ) =

𝑃(𝑝)𝑃(𝑒1 |𝑝)
𝑃(𝑝)𝑃(𝑒1|𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑝))(𝑃(𝑒1 |𝑝′)

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1) =

(0.50)(0.90)
(0.50)(0.90) + (1 − 0.50)(0.25)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1) = 0.783

Next let us consider the impact of demographic pressures (DP). The individual sees
evidence of climate change which is reducing his ability to earn a decent living. In this case
perhaps P(e2|p) is 0.85 and P(e2|p’) is 0.30. Using the equation for 𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 ) we calculate:
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2) =

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 )𝑃(𝑒2 |𝑝)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 )𝑃(𝑒2|𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 ))(𝑃(𝑒2 |𝑝′)

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 ) =

(0.783)(0.85)
(0.783)(0.85) + (1 − 0.783)(0.30)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2) = 0.911

Last let us consider the impact of a weak state security apparatus (SEC) such that an
individual does not think there will be legal repercussion for engaging in piracy. Here we
will assume P(e3|p) is 0.75 and P(e3|p’) is 0.10. Using the equation for 𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 ) we
calculate:
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3) =

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 )𝑃(𝑒3 |𝑝)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 )𝑃(𝑒3 |𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 ))(𝑃(𝑒3 |𝑝′)

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 ) =

(0.911)(0.75)
(0.911)(0.75) + (1 − 0.911)(0.10)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3) = 0.986
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From this we can see that an individual who is initially ambivalent about pirating,
can, with mounting evidence of a lack of alternatives, be nearly sure to make the decision to
pirate.

Figure 8-6. Multiple factors acting on piracy probability

Obviously, this merely an illustrative example since we do not have real values for
each of these situations. More importantly, each individual would likely have different
values for each of these evidence nodes based on their own personal values and their
estimation of the risks involved in the situation. Still, this mental exercise illuminates how
various environmental variables could have a cascading impact on individual’s probability
of turning to piracy. In the example described here each of the nodes increased the
probability that a person would decide to pirate. Improving conditions could instead
decrease the probability. To think about this situation, we would simply use the
appropriate probabilities in the conditional probability equation. Just imagine that node e1
provides evidence of an improving economic condition (ECO) such that P(e1|p) is only 0.25
and P(e1|p’) is 0.80. With this information, we would calculate the revised probability that

259
the individual will decide to pirate, just as we did before, using the equation above for
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1).
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1 ) =

𝑃(𝑝)𝑃(𝑒1 |𝑝)
𝑃(𝑝)𝑃(𝑒1|𝑝) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑝))(𝑃(𝑒1 |𝑝′)

𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1) =

(0.50)(0.25)
(0.50)(0.25) + (1 − 0.50)(0.80)
𝑃(𝑝|𝑒1) = 0.238

In the scenario of a weakened economy the probability went from 50 percent to
nearly 80 percent, while in the improving economy scenario the probability dropped to just
a little more than 20 percent.

ENHANCING CURRENT RESULTS
On the simple side of future work, more experimentation could be done to improve
the evaluation of the trends that emerged from the given parameter space. This should be
done with the consideration of a more generic meaning for opportunity. There are three
methods for expanding the experiments already done on the model. These would allow for
more precise analysis of the sensitivity of the model by more fully exploring the parameter
space of the model. First, the model produced clear trends despite the amount of variation
between the runs of the BehaviorSpace experiments. It is possible that the amount of
variance would be more precisely quantified if the experiments are conducted with a
higher number of iterations per variable pair. Second, most of the BehaviorSpace
experiments were conducted with a 2000 time-step limit. Since many of the model runs
still had pirate activity occurring at this time, it would be useful to expand the time-step
limit to evaluate how long the system can sustain pirate activity. For efficiency purposes, a
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stop condition could be added to the model code to end a simulation when pirate extinction
occurs. This would allow only the simulations with active pirating to continue and would
aid in evaluating the conditions which sustain piracy. Third, the increments between the
Reward levels could be reduced to provide a more complete set of data. This would be
useful for better understanding the apparent thresholds and tipping points in the
frequency of piracy.
Lastly, the focus of this work was on the number of pirates produced by the
economic opportunity conditions of their environment when evaluating the relative risk
and reward of piracy. This may not be the best parameter to concentrate on. Alternatively,
the individual skiffs might provide a better indication of the emerging dynamics. Table 8-2
provides the mean of the captured ships data from three separate BehaviorSpace
experiments. The data from model 20A was done with random initial starting conditions.
model 20B used exported world 178D as the initial starting condition. Exported world
339E was used as the initial starting condition for the diffused environment produced by
model 21A.
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Table 8-2. Comparison of capture data

Mean of Captures
Model 20A 13 Sep 2017
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

200000
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
11.3
18.3
20.7

250000
0.0
0.0
0.1
12.4
15.5
17.6
22.1

300000
0.0
1.6
12.6
12.8
17.5
23.2
26.4

350000
7.4
10.9
10.6
15.4
23.5
25.7
27.8

400000
9.2
11.9
16.5
21.8
24.5
27.8
28.4

350000
9.4
16.3
17.6
23.9
26.3
27.3
29.9

400000
14.2
16.1
22.4
26.4
28.3
29.6
30.3

350000
14.0
16.4
15.1
15.5
19.0
22.6
24.6

400000
18.4
14.7
17.1
20.1
22.2
24.2
26.5

Model 20B EW178D 13 Sep 2017
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

200000
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
17.7
23.6

250000
1.0
1.0
1.1
3.9
18.5
24.9
27.8

300000
4.5
5.2
8.8
18.5
23.3
26.3
27.8

Model 21A EW339E 8 June 2017
ECO
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

200000
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
5.9
11.5

250000
0.0
0.1
3.2
10.0
12.5
16.6
15.6

300000
7.4
10.9
12.4
17.2
15.7
16.6
20.3

Looking at capture data emphasizes the effect of beginning the simulation with a
world that already has three active skiffs. We see ships captures in zones where we
previously had none. Generally, each zone also had more captures; however, there are
exceptions. For example, with Reward 200,000 there were just over 11 captures for ECO 8
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with the random starts. With the imported world, there were less than 2 captures for that
same reward level. Comparing the results for the model with the diffused landscape
(model 21A) to the earlier model 20 results emphasizes the generally lower rate of
captures, but again, a reminder that further experimentation is warranted for model 21 to
verify that it is operating as intended.
Since the focus of the modeling effort was to provide insights into the dynamics
occurring on the land, we should be cautious about shifting the focus to the skiffs. The
focus should remain on the people/pirates but could be expanded to include consideration
of the skiff success rate. This would also lay the ground work for exploring different skiff
manning requirements and different types of piracy.

MODEL IMPROVEMENTS
There are two types of improvements that can made to the model. The first are
what I like to call housekeeping improvements. These are improvements that tweak the
model code to clean-up various items which were not accounted for, or to allow for
additional testing of the model as it now exists. The second kind of model improvements
would expand the scope of the model or increase the utility of the model. These can be
thought of in terms of model extensions.

Housekeeping Improvements
Port Deadtime: As discussed in Chapter 6, the time a pirate waits in the port for
other pirates to man a skiff is not accounted for. Since three pirates are required to man
the skiff, this time varies depending on which one of three pirates is waiting. The first
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pirate to arrive waits the longest while the third pirate does not wait at all. Because this
waiting time is not accounted for, the utility function that people use to determine if they
are going to pirate ignores this issue. This could be accounted for by creating a variable
that measures how many time-steps (ticks) a pirate roams around the port until they are
assigned to a skiff. Similar to the variable SRT, that measures how long a skiff is gone from
the port on a sortie, this new variable, call it Port Deadtime (PDT), could be averaged and
then added to average-SRT.
Recall the equation for pirating utility:

𝑈𝑝 =

𝑅∗𝑝
𝑚

− (𝑂 ∗ 𝑡)

Where t is the average-SRT value. Now we would have t = (average-SRT + averagePDT). The average-PDT would need to be seeded with an initial value, just like averageSRT was. This would require running some basic experiments while measuring PDT,
calculating the average of these values, and using that to seed the model. An artificial
average would initially be used until the first skiff is manned. At that time, the value could
shift from static to dynamic and be continually updated with each pirate’s real-time wait to
man a skiff. This improvement would decrease the pirating utility. How much effect it
would have on the functioning of the model would depend on how significant the value of
this new variable, PDT, turns out to be.
Related to the issue of time spent waiting for a skiff, there is no limit to how long a
pirate will wait. This is unrealistic. Once the data is gathered to determine what an
average wait time is, a reasonable limit could be established. If a pirate is in the port
beyond this amount of time, they would simply return to roaming on the land without ever
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going on a pirate sortie. A pirate is apt to wait in the port an excessive amount of time if
they arrive just before a skiff returns from an unsuccessful sortie. The failure to capture a
ship drives the pirating utility below what is need for people to decide to pirate. If there
are other sorties in progress, this might be a temporary situation – until a capture drives
the pirating utility back up. If, however, it is the last sortie, or there are no future captures,
it will be a permanent issue and pirating activity will cease for that model run. In this case
imposing a limit on how long a pirate will wait in the port is academic and would have no
real effect on how the model simulation runs. In the former situation, where the low
pirating utility is only a temporary situation, a limit on port wait time would prevent the
average-PDT variable from becoming skewed by the few pirates who would be waiting in
the port an excessive amount of time. Alternatively, preventing a pirate from lingering in
port for an indefinite amount of time would make it more difficult for the model to recover
from a near extinction scenario, because it would be unlikely for three pirates to
accumulate over an extended amount of time.
Additional Sliders: The current model is set up to provide the same number of
people (100) and the small number of ships in the shipping channel (3) for each model run.
Each of these could instead be determined by a slider switch on the model interface which
would allow for a range of values for these variables to be explored. It is reasonable to
consider modifying the model to allow this since these two values were arbitrarily selected.
Similarly, a slider could be added to the model interface to determine the minimum
manning requirement for the pirate skiffs. In the current model, this is set to three as this
seemed to be a reasonable number for a small skiff. A slider would allow for exploration of
the impact of other manning levels.
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Model Extensions
The development of the diffused world was an extension to the basic model. As
discussed in Chapter 7, the initial results of testing this environment call for further
experimentation. Since it would be useful to shift between the two models, with and
without the diffused environment, a slider could be added to the interface to allow this.
Four other potential model extensions will be discussed in this section. All these
extensions build on the current model without significantly changing its basic design. Each
of them is focused on the people/pirates. Extensions to the water side of the model will be
discussed in the section about model expansions.
Pirates Returning to Roaming: An easy extension could add a variable that tracks
the individual people’s status as pirate or non-pirate. This would allow analysis of the
conditions under which they are most influenced by the changing risk associated with
pirating. Currently, pirates continue to assess their opportunities as they make their way
to the port. If the situation changes while they are headed to the port, they can return to a
non-pirate status and go back to roaming on land. The model does not track the frequency
with which people flip back to non-pirates before they reach the port. This phenomenon is
readily visible when the model is running. People, originally green, turn red when they
decide to pirate and black once they reach the port. If they decide not to pirate before they
get to the port and flip back to roaming, they turn yellow. (Pirates who return to port after
an unsuccessful sortie turn purple when they return to roaming.) Thus, the model clearly
depicts this behavior of flipping from pirate to non-pirate but does not provide a way to
easily quantify it or assess it. This ability could be particularly illuminating in evaluating
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the model with the diffused landscape as it should highlight the impact of different
landscape values on the piracy dynamics.
Pirates Learning: A second extension to the model would allow pirates to learn. In
the current versions of the model, the pirates gain no advantage from successful sorties.
Yet we know that pirates do learn and become more successful as their tactics improve. A
model extension that allows the pirates to adapt to their success would depict this
advancement of pirate tactics. This could easily be simulated by increasing the amount of
fuel the pirate skiff has, since that determines how long the skiff can hunt for a target.
Having more time to patrol would increase the probability of finding a ship to attack. The
success of each pirate is currently tracked by the variable “pirate-success.” This variable
keeps track of the number of successful pirate attacks each pirate is involved in. The sum
of the variable for the pirates assigned to the skiff could be used along with some multiple
to increment the amount of fuel the skiff has.
Interestingly, an increased amount of skiff fuel will impact the SRT value. Rather
than remaining near the seed value of 170, it would gradually increase as skiffs are able to
patrol longer. This in turn would impact the pirating-utility function. As SRT increases, the
lost opportunity for pirating will increase. Therefore, the perceived reward for pirating
would need to be greater for a person to make the decision to pirate. This would be a
reasonable reflection of the fact that as individuals engage in a behavior, they often need to
have increasing gains to continue with that activity.
Social Interaction: Third, people could have social networks. In the current model,
people are assumed to be rational actors and are able to constantly assess the value of
pirating. Each person acts individually, without directly considering what the other people
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are doing. By endowing the people with social networks, the model would be able to
account for the influence other people often have on a person’s decisions. People who are
networked would have greater influence than those that are not.
Frozen Worlds: The last extension returns to the issue of using a frozen world as a
starting point for model experimentation. As described in the Exported World section, it is
extremely difficult to determine which world is the best to use. A wide variety of potential
frozen worlds exists. These worlds can be categorized by how many people decide to
pirate and how successful they are. Adding a selector switch for multiple frozen worlds
would allow more than one world to be evaluated and compared in the same experiment.
This would allow for greater exploration of interesting initial model conditions.
Each frozen world would represent a possible scenario. They could be worlds
which were frozen at different points in the boom and bust cycles the model typically
traverses. In terms of the predator-prey model, one world could portray piracy on an
upswing of the cycle and another world could portray piracy on a downswing. There could
be a world selected relatively early in a simulation before the system had a chance to
stabilize and a world which was frozen during a more stable phase of the simulation.
Alternatively, the worlds could be classified by the success of the pirates up to the time the
world was frozen, especially if this extension is combined with the extension to allow
pirates to learn. This would allow a world with a few very successful pirates (pirates with
advanced skills) to be compared to a world with more, but less successful pirates.
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MODEL EXPANSIONS
Here I consider future work which would involve much greater changes to the basic
model.
Predator-Prey: The model produced patterns of piracy similar to those of the
predator in a predator-prey system. This occurred despite the lack of ability of the ship
(prey) quantity to adjust to the pirate attacks. Real-world factors impact the shipping
density along designated sailing routes and shipping lanes. Adding a dynamic flow of
shipping traffic7 would allow the predator-prey relationship between the pirates and ships
to be further explored. Such a model would have to account for more of the economic
variables that impact a ship’s decision concerning what route to sail. Some of these
variables might be the cost of marine insurance, cost of added counter-piracy measures, the
presence or lack of maritime security units along the route, as well as the availability of
alternative routes. A cost-based analysis of these factors, versus the risk of a pirate attack,
would determine if the ship sails through that shipping channel or not.
To fully explore this relationship, sliders should be added for the population of
people and the quantity of ships considering transit of the shipping lane. Additionally,
since the current model uses a static representation of opportunity, the predator-prey
exploration should be combined with further refinements to how opportunity is portrayed
such that opportunity is consumed and restored at varying rates.
Additional Fragile State Index Variables: As already discussed in the implications
section, more than one sociological variable influences a person’s decision to pirate. The
current model was reduced to one variable for simplicity. This was a necessary step in the

7

This sort of simulation for shipping traffic was discussed in some of the models reviewed in Chapter 3.
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development of the model. Following more sensitivity testing of the current model,
additional variables could carefully be added one at a time. Some of these variables, such
as demographic pressures could be added to the patches. Other variables, like state
security, would be better represented as another agent set. Each additional variable adds a
layer of complexity to the model and exponentially expands the model’s parameter space.
Agent Enhancements: This model assumes the agents are rational actors and that
they all perceive risk in the same way. Clearly this also is a simplification of reality. In the
real-world how people view risk varies from person to person. Some are risk averse while
others are more willing to take risks. Adding a risk perception trait to the people would
allow for this dynamic to be explored. Not only would this impact the individual decisions
to pirate or not, but the risk perceptions of the skiff crews could be factored into the
decision of the skiff to go after a particular target. In real life, pirates likely go through a
decision process on whether they should attack a particular ship. In a model where each
ship has its own risk profile, based on the type of ship and its preparedness, some ships
would be riskier targets than other. The pirates might be better off waiting for an easier
capture or higher reward.
We also know that while it is easier to think about people being rational actors who
make logical decisions, real people make emotional decisions. Joshua M. Epstein has done
work to create agents with greater cognitive realism.8 He calls these Agent_Zero; they are
endowed with passion as well as reason. Each Agent_Zero develops their own relationship
between these entities as a result of their social interactions. This description simplifies
Epstein’s work which is based on neurocognitive research of human behavior. The point is

8

Epstein, 2008.
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that as work such as Epstein’s continues to advance, agents such as his Agent_Zero could be
used to evaluate which conditions on land grow piracy.
Water Model Enhancements: Much could be done to enhance the waterside of the
model. As already discussed in some of the other enhancements, real world shipping
volume is not static. A more sophisticated method for providing ships (not just a quantity
slider) could be added to the model to make the flow of ships more realistic. Ships could
vary by their type, flag, readiness etc., each presenting their own unique risk profile.
Currently, the ships only vary in their reward value. An even more sophisticated
enhancement would account for the pressures to the system that result from increasing
insurance rates. The ship’s ability to detect the pirates could be improved, allowing for
evasive actions to occur. In this event, the water model depth delineations would take on
new meaning as ships would be more limited in where they could go than the skiffs.
Another way to enhance the water model would be to put maritime security forces
back into the model. These could be added with a selector switch determining if they are
present or not. The addition of security forces would be particularly interesting in
evaluating the predator-prey relationship since this would add an additional factor to the
system. When piracy is intense, this should attract naval units which will drive down the
reward of piracy, but when piracy is less intense, naval units are likely to be redeployed
away, creating more opportunity for piracy.
Ultimately, the model could evolve to the extent that it will provide a risk
assessment of the piracy potential for a given region based on the socio-economic and
socio-political variables for that state. This information could be used as an additional
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factor to assess overall risk profile of a ship.9 Only by understanding the whole picture, to
include what motivates the pirates, can a merchant vessel truly assess its piracy risk.

ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON MODEL ENHANCEMENTS
Great care should be taken before embarking on the process to include any of the
above-mentioned enhancements. Clear goals should be defined for the enhancement. Once
that is done, the enhancement should be implemented in an incremental process that
allows verification that each added element is performing as intended. As Wilensky and
Rand advise: “Start simple and build toward the question you want to answer.”10
Throughout this work one should remember that “simple explanations are better than
complicated ones if both are equally good at explaining.”11 The more that gets added to a
model, the more difficult it is to focus on the basic relationship between the essential
elements of the system. Eventually, the model will reach what is sometimes referred to as
the paradox of enrichment. At this point, an increase is resources no longer improves the
system; instead the system becomes less stable.12

Chapter 4 discussed maritime risk assessment processes used by ships.
Wilwensky and Rand, 196.
11 Gilbert, 32.
12 This idea is developed from the Leigh Van Valen’s “Red Queen Hypothesis” (1973).
9

10

272

CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this dissertation is on a small subsystem of a larger complex system. By
concentrating on the impact of maritime piracy on the international shipping enterprise, a
gap in our understanding of the motivation for piracy was identified. The purpose of the
model developed in this work is to help us study the impact of socio-economic and political
variables on incidences of maritime piracy by providing insights into the relationship
between specific variables. The model serves as a proof of concept. Rather than trying to
account for all the elements of this issue, the model focuses on core components of the
relationship we want a better understanding of. The insights gained here can then be
applied back to the larger system to improve our overall understanding of maritime safety
and security.
The research design for this work borrowed from the emerging discipline of
engineering enterprise systems. Maritime piracy is a complex problem that impacts a
complex enterprise system. Given these complex dimensions, the challenge was to
determine how we can improve our understanding of the piracy problem. The goal of the
research was to provide an enriched understanding of pirate activity which can be used to
inform relevant policy making. The critical question, for dealing with maritime piracy: Is it
more effective to concentrate efforts on land than to expend limited resources on added
maritime security?
The research began by surveying existing models of maritime piracy. This
highlighted the fact that all the models are focused on the dynamics of piracy that occur on
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the water. None of the models consider what motivates piracy in the first place. To
develop a more holistic understanding of the social, political, and economic environments
associated with maritime piracy, its history and evolution were reviewed. The concept of
risk was next considered with a multidisciplinary approach. Enriched with this
background, I set about to develop a model which would provide new insight into the
problem of maritime piracy.
By keeping the Piracy Opportunity Model generic and relatively simple, the model
utility is expanded. Unlike other models of maritime piracy, the parsimonious model
developed in this work has utility across many specific regional domains. Model
simulations suggest a clear interaction between the ECO value and the Reward level. These
results have important real-world implications. The transition across the range of values
which allow incidences of piracy to increase is not linear. The model is very sensitive, at
threshold values, to the outcome of the initial pirate sorties. This suggests that an
international response, early in the development of pirate activity in a region, may be
particularly critical.
Most importantly, the simulations suggest the possible existence of tipping points
and crowd-out effects. While the basic findings from the model reinforce the static
implication that poverty and lack of governance drive piracy. The dynamic findings
illuminate the non-linear relationship between the variables. Further research to better
understand the sensitivity of this issue should be conducted. This would begin to allow
policy makers to determine if it is better to expend limited resources on humanitarian
efforts ashore or on counter-piracy operations at sea. Better insight into these dynamics
could identify when it is better to focus on improving conditions on the shore and when it
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is necessary to reduce, and if possible eliminate, pirate capabilities ashore. These two
options represent the proverbial carrot and stick methods of dealing with the problem.
The model indicates that there are situations when one method would be better employed
than the other and vice versa.
As already stated, maritime piracy is a complex problem. We know that there are
multiple variables associated with the issue. Economic opportunity is just one of these
variables. There is value in further exploring the dynamics produced by the model with a
more generic interpretation of opportunity. While in some ways it may appear that the
parsimonious model produced by this work is overly simplistic with its focus on simple
piracy, I argue that this is exactly what we need to do with complex problems. They need
to be dissected into digestible bites. A parsimonious model may appear simple, but they
are not simple to construct and fully test. Their elegance is revealed by the basic
relationships they illuminate. These relationships are typically hidden from us by all the
chaff in a complex system. Therefore, the Piracy Opportunity Model is a small, but
important, step in the process of fully understanding maritime piracy.
The model has broader application for other security issues where actors decide to
engage in illegal activities because of a lack of other opportunities and/or the high payoff
for the activity. Drug running and transiting of migrants are examples of other activities
that could be similarly modeled. Additionally, while this work is explicitly concerned with
maritime security, there are broader implications for security studies in general. Complex
problems lend themselves to being thought of in terms of a system. That system is part of a
larger, more complex system. When dealing with a specific issue, expanding the scope of
consideration can provide new insights. Cross-disciplinary approaches are particularly
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well suited to this since they offer varying approaches to the problem under consideration,
highlighting information which would have been overlooked by a narrower approach.
Of course, it is necessary to conclude by pointing out some of the other attributes of
maritime piracy, which some may consider critical, that are not present in this model. For
example, there is no agent identity in terms of ethnicity or tribal relation, political or
religious affiliation. Yet, I have made the argument in Chapter 2 that maritime piracy has
strong cultural connections. The role of the media is ignored. The amount of media
attention incidences of piracy get may directly impact the perception of how high the risk
of an attack is. Conversely, media coverage of the judicial consequences of pirate
apprehension may impact the pirate’s risk calculations. The role of insurers is not
considered, but we know it adds another layer of complexity to the problem.
In closing, I would like to circle back, one more time, to the distinction between
dangers and risks which Beck makes. Dangers are caused by nature, while risks are caused
by people. Maritime piracy is a man-made issue. It is a risk we can trace back to ancient
times. It emerged as a contemporary security issue in the first modernity, but now must be
considered in light of the characteristics of the second modernity. Underemployment and
global risks such as climate change and financial market crashes have a role in defining our
21st century risks. If we want to address the risk of maritime piracy more effectively, we
must expand our understanding of the problem. We must consider the issue with an
understanding of the pluralization of modernity and account for the socio-economic and
socio-political variables involved.

276

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson III, H. Edwin. “Risk, Shipping, and Roman Law,” Tulane Maritime Law Journal 34,
no. 1 (December 2009): 183-210. Accessed September 21, 2017.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=47598624&site=ehostlive.
Andersson, Maria and Ronnie Johansson, “Multiple sensor fusion for effective abnormal
behavior detection in counter-piracy operations,” Conference paper for International
Waterside Security Conference (WSS), December 2010.
Antony, Robert J. Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in
the Greater China Seas. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010.
Arnoldi, Jakob, Risk: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009.
Axelrod, Robert. “Comparing Modeling Methodologies” March 18, 2004. Axelrod’s Selected
Papers, University of Michigan, March 18, 2004. Accessed October 18, 2016, http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~axe/research/Comparing_Modeling_Methodologies.pdf.
Bahadur, Jay. The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World. New York: Panheon
Books, 2011.
Balmat, Jean-Francois, Frederic Lafont, Robert Maifret, and Nathalie Pessel. “A decisionmaking system to maritime risk assessment.” Ocean Engineering 38, (2011): 171–176.
Balmat, Jean-Francois, Frederic Lafont, Robert Maifret, and Nathalie Pessel. “MAritime RISk
Assessment (MARISA), a fuzzy approach to define an individual ship risk factor.” Ocean
Engineering 36, (2009): 1278–1286.
Baylis, John, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, Strategy in the Contemporary
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
Beckner, Christian. “Missing Homeland Security PPD’s – why not online.” Homeland
Security Watch website: http://www.hlswatch.com/2013/07/11/missing-homelandsecurity-ppds-why-not-online/ May 22, 2014, (accessed October 8, 2014).
Bennett, D. Scott, “Governments, Civilian, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the
Early Dynamic of Insurgencies,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 11, no. 4
7 (October 311, 2008).

277
Bernstein, Peter L. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc, 1996.
Brittin, Burdick H. International Law for Seagoing Officers, Fourth Edition. Annapolis, MD:
United States Naval Institute Press, 1981.
Burnett, John S. Dangerous Waters; Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas. New York:
Plume, 2003.
Cable, James. Navies in Violent Peace. London: Macmillian, 1989,
Caldwell, S. L. “Coast Guard: Security Risk Model meets DHS Criteria, but More Training
Could Enhance its Use for Managing Program and Operations,” GAO Reports: 12-14.
Washington, D.C.: Office of the GAO, 2011.
Caplan, Joel M., William D. Moreto, and Leslie W. Kennedy. “Forecasting Global Maritime
Piracy Utilizing the Risk Terrain Modeling Approach to Spatial Risk Assessment.” Crime and
Terrorism Risk: Studies in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Edited by Leslie W. Kennedy and
Edmund F. McGarrell, New York and London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011.
Carafano, J. J. and A. Kochems, Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime
Security and Counterterrorism. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005.
Chalk, Peter. “Assessing the Utility of Current Counterpiracy Initiative Off the Horn of
Africa,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35, no. 7-8 (August 2012) accessed September 22,
2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.684653.
Chalk, Peter. “Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses,”
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 16, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010): 89-108. Accessed
September 23, 2017,
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.odu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=433
d742f-ba2c-4429-8fa8-cdec908fd0ef%40sessionmgr4009.
Chalk, Peter, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and
Challenges for the United States. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008.
Chalk, Peter, and Stig Jarle Hansen. “Present Day Piracy: Scope, Dimensions, Dangers, and
Caused,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35, no. 7-8 (August 2012): 497-506. Accessed
September 22, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.684647.
Combined Maritime Forces website http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counterpiracy/ (accessed February 12, 2014).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, International Maritime Organization, March 10, 1988. Accessed

278
September 26, 2017,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUATreaties.aspx.
Cordingly, David. Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among the
Pirates. New York: Random House, 2006.
Dabrowski, Joel Janek and Johan Pieter de Villiers, “Maritime piracy situation modelling
with dynamic Bayesian networks” Information Fusion, 23 (2015): 116-130.
Dean, Gary. “The Importance and Consequences of Trade in Southeast Asia; Until 1870,”
Okusi Associates Website, 1999, accessed August 7, 2017,
https://okusiassociates.com/garydean/works/seatrade.html.
Economist, July 29, 2017. “Coping with Catastrophe; How to deal with Venezuela: Sanction
should target officials, not the country.” Accessed 23 September 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725559-sanctions-should-target-officialsnot-country-how-dealvenezuela?cid1=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/20170727n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/na/50844/n.
Edmonson, R.G. “Beyond Calculation.” Journal of Commerce 4, no. 34 (2003): 38.
Eklöf, Stefan. Pirates in Paradise; A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders.
Cppenhagen: NIAS Press, 2006.
Ellen, Eric “Piracy Today,” in Pirates: Terror on the High Seas from the Caribbean to the
South China Sea, Edited by David Cordingly,236-243. Atlanta, GA: Turner Publishing, Inc.,
1996.
Epstein, Joshua M., Agent_Zero; Toward Neurocognitive Foundations for Generative Social
Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Epstein, Joshua M. and Robert Axtell. Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the
Bottom Up. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1996.
Epstein, Joshua M. (2008). “Why Model?” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation 11, no. 4, 12 (2008). Accessed September 1, 2017,
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/12.html.
European Union, Naval Forces, “Countering Piracy Off the Coast Of Somalia,” EU NAVFOR
Somalia website (2017). Accessed August 8, 2017, http://eunavfor.eu/.
Fund of Peace. “Fragile State Index website; The Indicators.” Accessed March 10, 2017,
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/indicators.
Gilbert, Nigel. Agent-Based Models. London: Sage Publications, 2008.

279
Gilmore, Grant and Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty, 2nd edition. New York: The
Foundation Press, 1975.
Gosse, Philip. The History of Piracy. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2007.
Greenberg, Michael D., Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, and David S. Ortiz,
Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
Hansen, J., G. Jacobs, L. Hsu, J. Dykes, J. Dastugue, R. Allard, C. Barron, D. Lalejini, M.
Abramson, S. Russell and R. Mittu. “Information Dominance: Dynamically Coupling METOC
and INTEL for Improved Guidance for Piracy Interdiction,” NRL Review, 2011, 109-119.
Hansen, James. “Operational Pirate Attack Risk Surface (PARS) and its Validation.” (Power
Point Presentation) September 19, 2013.
Hayden,Caitlin. “Official Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden on the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Plan.” White House webpage.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/30/statement-nsc-spokespersoncaitlin-hayden-national-maritime-domain-aware, December 30, 2013 (accessed October 8,
2014).
Hooper, Alfred. Makers of Mathematics. New York: Random House, 1948.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2000. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2001.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2001. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2002.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2002. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2003.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2003. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2004.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2004. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2005.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2005. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2006.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2006. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2007.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2007. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2008.

280
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2008. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2009.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2009. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2010.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2010. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2011.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2011. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2012. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2013. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2014.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2014. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2015.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2015. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2016.
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships; report for the
Period 1 January – 31 December 2016. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2017.
InSight Crime Website, Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Venezuela Economic Crisis Fueling
Piracy on Caribbean Coast,” Thursday, 08 December 2016. Accessed July 28, 2017,
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/venezuela-economic-crisis-fueling-piracycaribbean-coast.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Live Piracy Map. http://www.iccccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map (accessed February 5, 2014).
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, International Maritime
Organization. Accessed February 16, 2016,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx.
International Maritime Bureau. Best Management Practices against Somalia Based Piracy
(BMP): Suggested Planning and Operational Practices for Ship Operators, and Masters of
Ships Transiting the High Risk Area. 2011.

281
International Maritime Organization. IMO Circular IMO MSC/Circ 443. Accessed August
15, 2014, http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUATreaties.aspx.
International Maritime Organization. IMO Circular SN.1/Circ.281 “Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia,”, 3 August 2009, accessed
September 22, 2017,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/
SN.1-Circ.281.pdf#search=SN%2E1%2ECirc%2E281.
International Maritime Organization. IMO Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
Convention) December 14, 2005. Accessed September 26, 2017,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUATreaties.aspx.
International Maritime Organization. IMO resolution A.584(14). Accessed August 15, 2014,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx.
International Maritime Organization. IMO website “About Conventions.” IMO resolution
A.584(14), http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUATreaties.aspx (accessed August, 15, 2014).
International Maritime Organization. IMO website “About Conventions,” Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Treaty), 1988.
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx
(accessed August 15, 2014).
International Maritime Organization. IMO website “About the IMO.”
http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 18 Aug 2014).
International Maritime Organization. IMO Website “International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code),” SOLAS Chapter XI-2. Accessed August 20, 2014,
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/ispscode.aspx.
International Maritime Organization. IMO website “SOLAS 1974: Brief History,” Accessed
February 16, 2016,
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Doc
uments/SOLAS%201974%20-%20Brief%20History%20%20List%20of%20amendments%20to%20date%20and%20how%20to%20find%20them
.html#xi2.
International Maritime Organization, Knowledge Centre. Accessed February 5, 2014,
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/Statisticalreso
urces/Piracy/Pages/default.aspx.

282
Jakob, Michal, Ondřej Vanek, Branislav Bošanský, Ondřej Hrstka and Michal Pěchoučcek.
“AgentC: Agent-basd System for Securing Maritime Transit (Demonstration).” AAMAS ’11
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems 3, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sytems
(www.ifaamas.org) May 2011.
Jakob, Michal, Ondřej Vanek, Ondřej Hrstka and Michal Pěchoučcek. “Agent vs. Pirates:
Multi-Agent Simulation and Optimization to Fight Maritime Piracy.” AAMAS ’12
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sytems
(www.ifaamas.org) May 2012.
Jin, W. “Maritime Risk Modelling and Decision Making” Quality & Reliability Engineering
International, 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-2.
Khondaker, A. N., Syed Masiur Rahman, and Rouf Ahmad Khan, “Dynamics of piracy in
maritime transportation,” Journal of Transportation Security, 6, (2013): 193-207.
Kleinen, John and Manon Ossewijer. Pirates, Ports and Coasts in Asia: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives. Singapore: ISEAS and IIAS, 2010.
Konstam, Angus. Piracy: The complete History. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
Lane, Richard O., David Nevell, Steve Hayward, and T.W. Beaney, “Maritime anomaly
detection and threat assessment,” Conference Paper for 13th Conference on Information
Fusion (FUSION), Edinburgh, UK 26-29 July 2010: 1-8. Accessed (via Research Gate) May
26, 2017,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224218677_Maritime_anomaly_detection_and_
threat_assessment.
Marchione, Elio and Shane D. Johnson, “Space-time Dynamics of Maritime Piracy,” Journal
of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50, no. 4 (January 2013): 504-524.
Marchione, Elio, Shane D. Johnson and Alan Wilson, “Modeling Maritime Piracy: A Spatial
Approach,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 17, no.2 (2014). Accessed
December 8, 2015 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/2/9.html.
Maritime Executive, “Anti-Piracy Operation Atalanta Mission Extended,” November 28,
2016. Accessed September 23, 2017, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/antipiracy-operation-atalanta-mission-extended.
McKnight, Terry, RADM USN (RET) and Michael Hirsh. Pirate Alley; Commanding Task Force
151 Off Somalia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

283
Messner, J.J., ed., The 2016 Fragile States Index; The Book. Washington, DC: The Fund for
Peace, 2016. Accessed September 26, 2017,
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2016.pdf.
Murphy, Martin. “Counterpiracy in Historical Context: Paradox, Policy, and Rhetoric,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35, No. 7-8 (July/August 2012): 507-522. Accessed
September, 23, 2017,
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.odu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=e23
8b114-b772-4fc6-a027-f4b64e45e4b7%40sessionmgr4009.
Murphy, Martin N. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge of Piracy. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
Murray, Dian H. Pirates of the South China Coast 1790-1810. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1987.
Murray, Dian H., “Chinese Pirates,” in Pirates: Terror on the High Seas from the Caribbean to
the South China Sea, edited by David Cordingly, 212-235. Atalanta, GA: Turner Publishing,
Inc., 1996.
Mutenga, Stanley and Christopher Parsons, “Marine Insurance,” in Wayne K. Talley, ed., The
Blackwell Companion to Maritime Economics. West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2012.
Mythen, Gabe. Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. London: Pluto Press,
2004.
Osinowo, Adeniyi Adejimi. “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” Africa Security Brief,
no. 30 (February 2015): 1-8. Accessed September 23, 2017, http://africacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/ASB30EN-Combating-Piracy-in-the-Gulf-of-Guinea.pdf.
Payne, John C. Piracy Today; Fighting Villainy on the High Seas. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan
House Inc. 2010.
Peterson,Gordon I. “Risk-based approaches to maritime security,” Naval Forces Volume 26,
no. 4, (2005): 7.
Phillips, Richard with Stephan Talty, A Captain’s Duty; Somali Pirates, Navy Seals, and
Dangerous Days at Sea. New York: Hyperion, 2010.
Pinto, C. Ariel and Paul R. Garvey. Advanced Risk Analysis in Engineering Enterprise Systems.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2013.
President of the United States. PPD-18, National Strategy for Maritime Security. August 14,
2012.

284
Psarros, George Ad, Rolf Skjong, and Magnus S. Eide. “The acceptability of maritime security
risk.” Journal of Transportation Security 2, no. 4, (December 2009): 149-163.
Psarros, George Ad, Alexander Christiansen, Rolf Skjong, and Gjermund Gravir, “On the
success rates of maritime piracy attacks,” Journal of Transportation Security 4, no. 4,
(December 2011): 309-335.
ReCAAP, “About ReCAAP ISC.” Accessed September 26, 2017,
http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.
ReCAAP, Commemorating A Decade of Regional Cooperation 2006-2016: The Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.
Accessed August 28, 2017,
http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=C
ore_Download&EntryId=432&PortalId=0&TabId=78.
ReCAAP, Homepage. Accessed September 26, 2017, http://www.recaap.org/.
Rediker, Marcus. Villains of All Nations. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2004.
Rubin, Alfred P. The Law of Piracy. Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2006.
Search Security. Accessed November 25, 2013,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/Risk-assessment-vs-risk-analysis-vs-riskmanagement.
Sekhar, C.S.C. “Fragile States: The Role of Social, Political and Economic Factors,” Journal of
Developing Societies, 26, no. 3 (September 2010): 263-293.
Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law, 6th Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008.
Slootmaker, Leslie A.,“Countering Piracy with the Next Generation Piracy Performance
Surface Model.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA March 2011.
Smalley, Dave. “ONR Global and Prague: A Winning Combination.” Office of Naval Research
press release, February 23, 2012, http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/PressReleases/2012/ONR-Global-Prague-Anniversary.aspx (accessed September 30, 2014).
Steffen, Dirk. “Essay: Quantifying Piracy Trends in the Gulf of Guinea – Who’s Right and
Who’s Wrong?” USNI News, June 16, 2015. Accessed September 23, 2017,
https://news.usni.org/2015/06/19/essay-quantifying-piracy-trends-in-the-gulf-of-guineawhos-right-and-whos-wrong.
Talley, Wayne K. Maritime Safety, Security and Piracy. London: informa, 2008.

285
Talley, Wayne K., ed. The Blackwell Companion to Maritime Economics. West Sussex, UK:
Blackwell Publishingm Ltd., 2012.
Thomson, Janice E. Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
Trocki, Carl A. Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and
Singapore 1784-1885. Singapore, NUS Press, 2007.
United Nations. 1982. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982.
Accessed September 23, 2017,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with
respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. October 7, 2016, UNSC
#S/2016/843. Accessed September 23, 2017,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/843.
U.S. Government. “International Crimes Affecting US Interests (Piracy),” International Crime
Threat Assessment. December 15, 2000. Accessed August 8, 2017,
http://fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270index.html.
U.S. Government. National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington D.C.: The White
House, 2005.
U.S. Government. National Strategy for Maritime Security: National Maritime Domain
Awareness Plan. December 2013.
U.S. Government. United States Counter Piracy Maritime Security Action Plan. June 2014.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Maritime Security; Actions Needed to Assess and
Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off
the Horn of Africa, GAO Report #GAO-10-856, September 2010, accessed September 22,
2017, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10856.pdf.
Varol, A. Emre and Murat M. Gunal, “Simulating Prevention Operations at Sea Against
Maritime Piracy,” Journal of Operational Research Society, 66, no. 12, (13 May 2015): 20372049.
Wang, J. “Maritime Risk Assessment and its Current Status,” Quality and Reliability
Engineering International, 22, no. 1 (2006): 3-19.
Wang, J., H.S. Sii, J.B. Yang, A. Pillay, D.Yu, J., Lui,J. and A. Saajedi, “Use of Advances in
Technology for Maritime Risk Assessment,” Risk Analysis, 24, no. 4, (February 2004): 10411063.

286
Wilensky, U. NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected
Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 1999.
Wilensky, U. NetLogo Rebellion model.
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/Rebellion. Center for Connected Learning
and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2004.
Wilensky, Uri and William Rand. An Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling; Modeling
Natural, Social and Engineered Complex Systems with NetLogo. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2015.
Wilensky, U. & Reisman, K. “Thinking like a Wolf, a Sheep or a Firefly: Learning Biology
through Constructing and Testing Computational Theories – an Embodied Modeling
Approach.” Cognition & Instruction 24, no. 2 (2006): 171-209. Accessed September 26,
2017, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.odu.edu/stable/pdf/27739831.pdf.
Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2008.
Woodward, Colin. The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Story of the
Caribbean Pirates and the Man who Brought them Down. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publishing Company, 2015.
Zacks, Richard. The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission
of 1805. New York: Hyperion, 2005.

287

APPENDIX A
PIRACY OPPORTUNITY MODEL CODE

This appendix provides the final version of the computer code for the Piracy
Opportunity Model. It has been annotated to make it more understandable.

GENERAL NOTES ABOUT NETLOGO CODE
NetLogo automatically color codes portions of the model code, those color codes
have been used with this code:
Green – Keywords [breeds, end, globals, patches-own, to, to-report, turtles-own]
Blue – Primitives: Commands and reporters that are built into NetLogo.
Commands are actions for the agents to carry out. Reporters carry out some
operation and report a result either to a command or another reporter.
Red – Inputs: Values that the command or reporter uses in carrying out its actions.
Purple – Built-in variables
Semicolons are used to add comments to the program. These comments can make
the code easier to read and understand. To simplify this appendix those semicolons have
been removed and the comments are italicized. The exception to this are lines of code
which have been commented out – those are still preceded with a semicolon.

GENERAL NOTES PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL CODE
•
•

The world is set to be 200x100 with the origin in the center.
Patch size is 6.

288
•
•
•
•
•
•

Wrapping is turned off.
Updates are set to happen on ticks.
Water patches are shaded to represent a shipping lane with shallower water on the
landward side (bottom).
Land patches CAN be shaded by their eco-op value IF economic-opportunity is turned
on. The patch values are not affected by the switch.
There are three breeds of agents: people, (pirates), skiffs, ships (Merchant ships aka
pirate targets).
The shape for "merchant ship" was created with the shape editor while "boat" and
"person" shapes were imported from the library for skiffs and pirates.

ABM CODE
globals
[
threshold
land - patches that are land
port - patches that make up the port (they are also land patches)
port-pirates - list of pirate’s turtle numbers that made it to the port
minimum-manning - number of pirates it takes to man a skiff
successful-transits - number of times a merchant makes a successful crossing
captured-ships - list of merchants captured
pirating-utility - value for pirating, calculated using Piracy-Probability, reward and
opportunity
p-capture - probability of successful piracy
total-p-capture - sum of the p-capture values for each tick
current-p-capture - total-p-capture divided by ticks
total-rewards - total value pirated
expected-reward - average payoff
sorties - number of skiff sorties
victory-party - amount of time that a skiff remains in port after a successful capture
SRT-list - list holding skiff run times, to be used in earlier version to determine the seed value
of average-SRT
total-SRT - total of all skiff at sea time
average-SRT - average number of ticks a skiff is at sea - initially seeded with historical data
and then dynamically determined
number-of-pirates - list consisting of the number of people with pirate Boolean true each
tick
average-number - mean of number-of-pirates
]
- Globals with Capital First Letters are set on the interface
- Reward is a slider on the interface to set the initial/seed value of pirating reward
- Economic-opportunity is a switch on interface, used to display the land in shades of brown
depending on the value of eco-op
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- ECO is a slider on the interface to adjust the opportunity of land patches
patches-own
[
eco-op - random number related to ECO slider that people use to compute expected value of
wandering
land-patch - a Boolean to make it easier to keep the wandering people on land patches
]
turtles-own []
breed [people person]
people-own
[
opportunity - average of the last ten eco-op values they have encountered by wandering.
pirate - Boolean which determines if they will pirate or not, false - no pirating, true - make
way to port and pirate.
assigned-to-skiff - Boolean
skiffnumber - ID of skiff person is assigned to (this is not being used, for now the skiff keeps
track of the pirates-on-board)
experience - pirate's experience goes up for successful captures, down for empty cruises
pirate-success - count of the times a person successfully pirates
decision-list - a list of eco-op values obtained as person wanders to different patches. The
decision-list is initially seeded with values using the same equation used to assign values to
patches.
]
breed [skiffs skiff] (Pirates in small boats)
skiffs-own
[
opmode - operating mode of skiff
maxspeed
speed
max-fuel
fuel
attack-range - this is a combination of how far the skiff can see and the range where it
decides to attack
course
patrol-range - distance from port that the skiff travels before it starts patrolling
prey when a merchant is detected, it is assigned as the current 'prey', in case there is
another merchant nearby
return-to-port-tick - remembers the tick when the skiff returned port after a cruise
pirates-on-board pirates on board is a list of the turtle numbers of people associated with
that skiff
at-sea-ticks - measures how many ticks a skiff spends at sea
]
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breed [ships ship] (Ships - Pirate targets)
ships-own
[
maxspeed
speed
eastbound (Boolean)
captured (Boolean)
captor - ID of skiff that made attack
successful-passage
payoff
]
***Main Setup***
to Setup
clear-all
setup-global-values
setup-patches
setup-people
setup-ships
reset-ticks
end
to setup-global-values
set sorties 0 - running total of pirate sorties (normally would be in setup skiffs, but that is
not called during setup)
set victory-party 50 - skiff stay-in-port time after a successful capture, in ticks
set successful-transits 0
set captured-ships [] - initial list contains nobody
set expected-reward Reward - seed until first capture
set minimum-manning 3 - sets the crew size of a skiff, skiff cannot sail without full crew
set number-of-pirates []
set p-capture 0.1
set total-p-capture p-capture
set current-p-capture p-capture - this is set because the calculation doesn't start until there
are ticks and current-p-capture would otherwise initially be ZERO
set SRT-list [] - used to get some data for SRT to get initial seed value
set total-SRT 170000 - total Skiff at sea time, starts large to mitigate initial swings
set average-SRT 170 - initial seed value of SRT
end
to setup-patches
set land (patch-set patches with [pycor < 1]) - land is at the bottom
set port (patch-set patches with [(distancexy 0 0) < 4 and (pycor < 1)]) – the port is
located around the origin
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ask patches - Water patches are colored to create a shallow zone toward the land, half of the
world is land
[
if pycor < 11 and pycor > 0 [ set pcolor 76 ] - shallow water near land
if pycor > 10 and pycor < 21 [ set pcolor 85 ] - territorial water
if pycor > 19 [ set pcolor 94 ] - international water/shipping lane
set land-patch false - used to test for land when people are moving to neighbors
]
ask land
[
set pcolor 35
set eco-op (100 - (ECO * random 10)) - assigns an eco-op (economic opportunity) value to
each land patch INCLUDING THE PORT - based on the ECO value selected on the slider on the
Interface.
set land-patch true
]
;; repeat 5 [diffuse eco-op 0.5] This is the code used to diffuse the land patches if desired
if economic-opportunity
[ ask land [set pcolor scale-color brown eco-op 0 100 ]
] - displays eco-op values in shades of Brown - somewhat chaotic looking.
ask port
[
set pcolor 58
set eco-op 100
]
end
to setup-people
set port-pirates [] - a list of the people that are pirates in the port area, but not assigned to
a skiff. Available for crew
create-people 100
ask people
[
move-to one-of land with [not any? turtles-here]
set shape "person"
set color lime
set size 3
set pirate false
set assigned-to-skiff false
set skiffnumber -1
set experience 0
set pirate-success 0
set decision-list n-values 10 [100 - (ECO * random 10)] - this seeds the initial values of
'decision-list' with numbers similar to those assigned to land patches
]
end
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to setup-ships (Merchant ships)
create-ships 3
ask ships
[
set shape "merchant ship"
set size 6
set color yellow
set maxspeed 2
set speed (.5 * maxspeed)
set successful-passage false
set captured false
set captor nobody
set payoff random-normal Reward 30000
ifelse random 2 = 1 (coin flip)
[set eastbound true
set heading 90
set xcor (-99 + random 40)
set ycor 40 - random 3]
[set eastbound false
set heading 270
set xcor (99 - random 40)
set ycor 46 - random 3]
]
End
***Main Loop***
to Initiate
move-people
move-ships
move-skiffs
calculate-intercept-probability
if ticks = 500 - amount of ticks prior to exporting the world: can be changed
[
export-world "ECOpiracy.cvs"
stop
]
tick
end
to Reset
let tempECO ECO
let tempreward reward
import-world "ECOpiracy.cvs" - the file name can be changed to import a specific world
reset-ticks
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clear-all-plots
random-seed new-seed
set ECO tempECO
set reward tempReward
ask skiffs
[
set return-to-port-tick 500 - return-to-port-tick - this accounts for the ticks getting reset to
0 so the resail happens at the right time for skiffs already inport; it will set the variable to 500
for skiffs at sea but that will get set to the current tick if they return with prey
]
update-variables
end
to update-variables
setup-patches
set total-rewards Reward * 1000 – reduces model sensitivity to the first few skiff runs
set expected-reward Reward - seed until first capture
set number-of-pirates []
end
to Go
move-people
move-ships
move-skiffs
calculate-intercept-probability-forIW - Uses the calculation for the imported world
tick
end
***Main loop subroutines***
to move-people
analyze-pirate-statistics
ask people
[
Check pirate status
if not pirate
[
if any? neighbors with [(not any? people-here) and land-patch] - check to make sure
adjacent land patches are not all occupied
[
move-to one-of neighbors with [(not any? people-here) and land-patch] - move to a
random empty neighboring patch, making sure that it is on land
]
set decision-list fput eco-op but-last decision-list - update decision-list with new eco-op
and drop off 10th value
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set opportunity sum decision-list / 10 - calculate average of decision-list,
set pirating-utility (expected-reward * current-p-capture / minimum-manning) (opportunity * average-SRT)
if pirating-utility > opportunity - compare opportunity to reward for pirating
[
set pirate true
set color red
]
]
The rest of this loop controls the people that have 'pirate' set to true
if (pirate and color = red)
[
face one-of port
forward 1
set pirating-utility (expected-reward * current-p-capture / minimum-manning) (opportunity * average-SRT)
if pirating-utility < opportunity - compare opportunity to reward for pirating, may
change decision while on the way to the port
[
set pirate false
set color yellow - so we can see when someone changed decision to pirate on the way to
the port
]
]
if (pirate and (member? patch-here port)) - arrived at the port
[
set color black
if (not assigned-to-skiff and not member? who port-pirates)
[set port-pirates lput who port-pirates] - add turtle ID to back end of list that contains
all the available pirates in the port area
]
if (pirate and color = black)
[
face one-of port - mill around port
forward 1
if count people with [(pirate and not assigned-to-skiff) and color = black] >= minimummanning - enough unemployed pirates in port, hatch a skiff and associate skiff with these
pirates
[
let crew sublist port-pirates 0 minimum-manning - crew is the first group of pirates
available in the port (accounts for two or more pirates arriving during same tick)
hatch-skiffs 1 [orient-skiff self crew] - send the skiff turtle number and the crew to the
subroutine
foreach crew
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[ask turtle ? - sets boolean for each pirate onboard outbound skiff, then hide them, so
they don't show in the port. They will be unhidden if the skiff returns to port unsuccessful so
they can return to roaming
[set assigned-to-skiff true
hide-turtle
]
]
set port-pirates sublist port-pirates minimum-manning (length port-pirates)
- removes the pirates (crew) from the list port-pirates
]
]
]
end
to orient-skiff [skiff crew] - initializes the new skiff
ask skiff
[
set shape "boat"
set color black
set size 4
set xcor random 4 - 3
set ycor 0
set opmode 1 - transiting out to patrol area opmode, skiff's sail color changes with most
changes of status
set prey nobody
set course random 100 - 50
set heading course
set patrol-range 39
set maxspeed 3
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set max-fuel 100 - seems to affect p-capture greatly
set fuel max-fuel
set attack-range 6
set pirates-on-board crew - assigns the turtle numbers of the 'crew' to this skiff
set sorties sorties + 1 - counter for total number of skiff cruises
set at-sea-ticks 0
]
end
to move-ships (Merchant ships)
ask ships
[ - check to see if merchant reached the edge of the map
if ((xcor = 100 or xcor = -100) and not successful-passage)
[
set successful-passage true
set successful-transits successful-transits + 1
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hatch-ships 1 [orient-ship self]
hide-turtle - hide the ship, hatch a new one
] - now check to see if any skiffs close by
ifelse any? skiffs in-radius 7 and not captured
[
set speed maxspeed – try to outrun the skiff
set color red
]
[
set speed .5 * maxspeed
set color yellow
]
if captured - test to see if captured
[
set color black - merchant follows pirate back to port
set heading towards captor
set speed ([speed] of captor)
]
forward speed - continue on course
]
end
to orient-ship [ship] - initializes the new merchant ship
ask ship
[
set shape "merchant ship"
set size 6
set color yellow
set maxspeed 2
set speed (.5 * maxspeed)
set successful-passage false
set captured false
set captor nobody
set payoff random-normal Reward 30000
ifelse random 2 = 1 (coin flip)
[
set eastbound true
set heading 90
set xcor -99
set ycor 40 - random 3
]
[
set eastbound false
set heading 270
set xcor 99
set ycor 46 - random 3
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]

]
end
to move-skiffs
- opmode 1 is transiting from the port to a patrol area; generally black sail
- opmode 2 is loitering on patrol
- opmode 3 is chasing a target ship; sail turns gray
- opmode 4 is when a target is captured; sail turns red
- opmode 5 is attacked a target - but target not captured; sail turns blue for repelled attack
- opmode 6 is low fuel status - transiting back to port; sail turns yellow
- opmode 7 is inport; sail turns brown when skiff resails after “victory party” (50 ticks)
ask skiffs
[
let attack-failed false - temporary boolean to flag deterred or repelled attacks
if ((opmode = 1 or opmode = 2 or opmode = 3) and fuel - 3 < (distancexy 0 0)) - running
out of fuel, return to port
[ set opmode 6
set color yellow
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
] - now test for each opmode and conditions needed to shift opmodes
if opmode = 1 and (any? ships in-radius attack-range with [not captured]) - merchant
detected while in transit
[chase]
if opmode = 1 and ((distancexy 0 0) > patrol-range) - made it to patrol distance, shift to
opmode 2 loiter
[
set opmode 2
set speed (.05 * maxspeed)
set course one-of [90 270]
]
if opmode = 2 and (not any? ships in-radius attack-range) - loiter/patrol
[
if ycor < 30 [set course 320 + random 80] - stay out where ships are
if ycor > 46 [set course 140 + random 80] - stay away from northern edge of world
if not can-move? 1 [set course (course + 100 + random 100)] - turn away from eastwest edge of world and perform patrol wiggle
set course course + random 20
set course course - random 20
]
if opmode = 2 and (any? ships in-radius attack-range with [not captured]) - merchant
detected while loitering
[chase]
if opmode = 3 and (not [captured] of prey) - opmode 3 is chasing mode
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[

set course towards prey
let templist1 list (maxspeed) (1.4 + distance prey)
set speed min templist1
]
if (opmode = 3 and ([captured] of prey) and (([captor] of prey) != self))
[ set opmode 1 - merchant is captured by someone else, return to patrolling
]
if opmode = 3 and distance prey < 2 and (not ([captured] of prey)) - this tests to make
sure skiff caught up to; also checks to make sure the ship has not been captured by another
skiff
[
if random 10 < 4 - 3 in 10 chance that the merchant repels attack, based on 70% realworld success rate
[
set attack-failed true
set color blue
]
ifelse attack-failed
[
set opmode 5 - attack failed or was deterred, return to port
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
set prey nobody
]
[
set opmode 4 - successful capture, return to port, tell merchant to follow
set color red
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
ask prey
[
set captured true
set captor myself
]
]
] - end of the big captured in opmode 3 if loop
- opmode 4 and 5 tests
if opmode = 4 and (member? patch-here port) - reached port with a prey, shutdown
[
set opmode 7
set SRT-list lput at-sea-ticks SRT-list
set total-SRT total-SRT + at-sea-ticks
set average-SRT total-SRT / (1000 + sorties)
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ask prey
[
set captor nobody
set captured false
set captured-ships lput who captured-ships - update the list of those ships that have
been captured, for later analysis
set total-rewards total-rewards + payoff
set expected-reward total-rewards / (sorties + 1000) - adjustment for initializing
model sensitivity
hatch-ships 1 [orient-ship self] - hatch new ship, call subroutine to initialize it
die
]
foreach pirates-on-board
[ask turtle ?
[
set experience experience + 10 - crew get experience for successful capture – not
used in the current model.
set pirate-success pirate-success + 1 – keeps track of how many times this pirate has
been successful.
]
]
set speed 0
set prey nobody
set return-to-port-tick ticks - time holder, this skiff will sail after a cool-down
]
if (opmode = 7 and (ticks > return-to-port-tick + victory-party)) - successful cruise, send
them back to sea
[
set opmode 1
set color brown
set prey nobody
set course random 100 - 50
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set fuel max-fuel - consideration for future version - experienced skiffs carry more fuel?
set at-sea-ticks 0
set sorties sorties + 1 - counter for total number of skiff cruises
]
if (opmode = 5 or opmode = 6) and (member? patch-here port) - reached port due to
repelled attack or low fuel - shutdown
[
set expected-reward total-rewards / (sorties + 1000) - adjustment for initializing
model sensitivity
set SRT-list lput at-sea-ticks SRT-list
set total-SRT total-SRT + at-sea-ticks ;;
set average-SRT total-SRT / (1000 + sorties)
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foreach pirates-on-board - send the crew back to roaming, in port, but colored violet,
opportunity should stay high inside port area
[ask turtle ?
[show-turtle
set pirate false
set color violet
set assigned-to-skiff false
set skiffnumber -1
set experience experience - 5 – reduce experience after failed sortie
]
]
Die - kill this skiff, no reason to keep it
]
set heading course
forward speed
set fuel fuel - speed
set at-sea-ticks at-sea-ticks + 1
] - end of ask skiffs loop
end
to chase - skiff sighted a merchant, gives chase
set opmode 3
set prey one-of ships in-radius attack-range
set speed maxspeed
set course towards prey
set color gray
end
to calculate-intercept-probability
let total-ships length captured-ships
let total-time ticks + 1 - this accounts for the 0 tick and the divisor is never zero when
calculating current-p-capture
if (ticks > 0) and (total-ships >= 1) - there has be a ship captured before p-capture will
become dynamic
[
let ideal-p-capture total-ships / sorties - this is the actual value based on captures, but we
can't tolerate rapid jumps. Also, it changes when a skiff leaves port, not when it returns - pros
and cons to this.
ifelse (ideal-p-capture - p-capture > .03)
[
set p-capture p-capture + .01
]
[ - small change, use the new ideal
set p-capture ideal-p-capture
]
]
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if ticks > 0
[
set total-p-capture total-p-capture + p-capture
set current-p-capture total-p-capture / total-time
]
end
to calculate-intercept-probability-forIW - calculation used for “to Go” with an inported world
let total-ships length captured-ships
let total-time ticks + 501 - this account for the 0 tick and the 500 ticks of the inported world
if (ticks > 0) and (total-ships >= 1) - there has be a ship captured before p-capture will
become dynamic
[
let ideal-p-capture total-ships / sorties - this is the actual value based on captures
set p-capture ideal-p-capture
]
if ticks > 0
[
set total-p-capture total-p-capture + p-capture
set current-p-capture total-p-capture / total-time
]
end
to analyze-pirate-statistics
set number-of-pirates lput (count people with [pirate]) number-of-pirates
set average-number mean number-of-pirates
end
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APPENDIX B
MODEL CODE WITH DEVELOPMENT NOTES

This appendix provides expanded computer code which shows the process of
evolution for the Piracy Opportunity Model. Lines of code which are “commented out”
using semicolons remain to show how the code evolved. The lines of code that are
highlighted show aspects of the model which were totally deleted when the model concept
was significantly changed or simplified. The same general notes found in Appendix A about
NetLogo color coding of the computer code pertain. General comments which remained in
the final version of the model have been italicized to distinguish them from the older
commented out code and to simplify the code presented here.

GENERAL NOTES PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL CODE
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The world is set to be 200x100 with the origin in the center.
Patch size is 6.
Wrapping is turned off.
Updates are set to happen on ticks.
Water patches are shaded to represent a shipping lane with shallower water on the
landward side (bottom).
Land patches CAN be shaded by their eco-op value IF economic-opportunity is
turned on. The patch values are not affected by the switch
There are three breeds of agents: people, (pirates), skiffs, ships (Merchant ships aka
pirate targets)
The shape for "merchant ship" was created with the shape editor while "boat" and
"person" shapes were imported from the library for skiffs and pirates.

RECORD OF WORKING PROTOTYPES
The following notes reflect the model’s evolution:
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The _1 version sets up the patches with colors for shipping lane and does initial setup of pirates, ships and units
The _2 version only made minor changes
The _3 version adds in a variable for the number of security units
The _4 version begins to add set-up details
The _5 version starts to work with fragility and corruption. Fragility come from the
Fragile State Index where 0 = most stable. Corruption comes from Transparency
International's Corruption Perception Index - lower score is more corrupt
The _6 version expands the world to 200 x 100 and moves the origin to the center.
This allows for half of the world to be "land" represented by brown patches - this is
where pirates will begin
The _7 version shifts the orientation from vertical to horizontal to account for the
added complexity of having the breed of people. Pirates are changed to skiffs and
are hatched when there are enough pirates (people who decide to pirate)
The _8 version only made minor changes
The _9 version solved the issue of assigning specific people (turtle ID) to a hatched
skiff using the list port-pirates and the sublist command
The _10 version shifts the variables from Fragility and Corruption to individual
indicators from the fragile state index:
Demographic Pressures (DP)
Poverty and Economic Decline (ECO)
State Legitimacy (SL)
Security Apparatus (SEC)
The _11 version incorporated skiff, ship, and unit operation from an earlier project
The _12 version incorporates calculations for the utility of wandering on land and
compares that to utility of pirating
The _13 version incorporates the utility function for pirating. This function uses the
piracy-probability, reward and the individual's opportunity value to determine the
value of pirating.
The _14 version adjusts the utility function for pirating to use dynamic values for
total-rewards and p-capture. Since the utility function will not work with zeros
these variables are given initial values and do not become dynamic until after the
first ship is captured.

304
The _15 version includes the skiffs resailing after a successful cruise (with a victoryparty delay). Unsuccessful skiffs discharge their crews (violet) and die. Still
working on the pirating utility equation
The _16 version adds a variable to measure how long a skiff is at sea, another
variable is added for the averageSRT (skiff-run-time), averageSRT is seeded with
historical data but becomes dynamic when the model is run and is used to calculate
loss opportunity. This version also makes corrections to the utility function used to
calculate pirating utility.
The_17 version adds people variable for pirate-success which counts the number of
times the agent successfully pirates. This data is captured in a histogram on the
interface.
The _18 version corrects an error in the code for orient-ship and sequentially
numbers the opmodes 1-7. This version also deletes the code for maritime security
units.
18A version changes the ship reward distribution by a factor of 100.
The_19 version exports and imports the world. This is done with “Setup” and
“Initiate” to get the exported world; then reset and go. The multiple for the initial
total reward was adjusted from 100 to 1000 to decrease the sensitivity of the
expected reward
The-20 version makes a correction to how p-capture is calculated to account for
time. It introduces two new globals: “total-p-capture” and “current-p-capture.”
20A has a separate calculate-intercept-probability for “Go”
20B adds code to the Reset loop to allow temp values so BehaviorSpace
Experiments will run properly.
The 21_version adds code to the patch setup for diffusion of the economic
opportunity values. Also adjusts the reset code to adjust the report-to-port-ticks for
any skiffs
The 22_version removes the slider for piracy-probability and hard codes it to 0.1

ABM CODE
globals
[
threshold
land - patches that are land
port - patches that make up the port (they are also land patches)
port-pirates - list of pirate’s turtle numbers that made it to the port
minimum-manning - number of pirates it takes to man a skiff

305
successful-transits - number of times a merchant makes a successful crossing
captured-ships - list of merchants captured
pirating-utility - value for pirating, calculated using Piracy-Probability, reward and
opportunity
p-capture - probability of successful piracy
total-p-capture - sum of the p-capture values for each tick
current-p-capture - total-p-capture divided by ticks
total-rewards - total value pirated
expected-reward - the average payoff
sorties - the number of skiff sorties
victory-party - amount of time that a skiff remains in port after a successful capture
naval-deterrence-range ;; range that a security unit has to be within to deter a skiff attack
SRT-list - list holding skiff run times, to be used in earlier version to determine the seed value
of average-SRT
total-SRT - total of all skiff at sea time
average-SRT - average number of ticks a skiff is at sea - initially seeded with historical data
and then dynamically determined
number-of-pirates - list consisting of the number of people with pirate Boolean true each
tick
average-number - mean of number-of-pirates
]
Globals with Capital First Letters are set on the interface
Reward is a slider on the interface to set the initial/seed value of pirating reward
Economic-opportunity is a switch on interface, used to display the land in shades of brown
depending on the value of eco-op
ECO is a slider on the interface to adjust the opportunity of land patches
Maritime-Security is a switch on interface, turns maritime security forces on and off
Number-of-security-units is a slider on interface
Piracy-Probability slider, the probability of pirating before there are any sorties
patches-own
[
eco-op - random number related to ECO slider that people use to compute expected value of
wandering
land-patch - a Boolean to make it easier to keep the wandering people on land patches
]
turtles-own []
breed [people person]
people-own [
risk-aversion ;; 0-1 but currently not in use
perceived-hardship ;; 0-1 but currently not in use
opportunity - average value of the last ten eco-op they have encountered by wandering. The
decision-list is initially seeded with values using the same equation used to assign values to
patches.
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pirate - Boolean which determines if they will pirate or not, false - no pirating, true - make
way to port and pirate.
assigned-to-skiff - Boolean
skiffnumber - ID of skiff person is assigned to (this is not being used, for now the skiff keeps
track of the pirates-on-board)
experience - a pirate's experience goes up for successful captures, down for empty cruises
pirate-success - count of the times successfully pirate
decision-list - list of eco-op values obtained as person wanders to different patches
;;pirating-utility - value for pirating, calculated using Piracy-Probability, reward and
opportunity (moved to globals 10/24/16 so it could be seen on a monitor)
]
breed [skiffs skiff] (Pirates in small boats)
skiffs-own [
opmode - operating mode of skiff
maxspeed
speed
max-fuel
fuel
attack-range - this is a combination of how far the skiff can see and the range where it
decides to attack
course
patrol-range - distance from port that the skiff travels before it starts patrolling
prey when a merchant is detected, it is assigned as the current 'prey', in case there is another
merchant nearby
return-to-port-tick - remembers the tick when the skiff returned port after a cruise
pirates-on-board - pirates on board is a list of the turtle numbers of people associated with
that skiff
at-sea-ticks - measures how many ticks a skiff spends at sea
]
breed [ships ship] (Ships - Pirate targets)
ships-own [maxspeed speed eastbound captured captor successful-passage payoff ]
eastbound and captured are Boolean; captor is ID of skiff that made attack
***Main Setup***
to Setup
clear-all
setup-global-values
setup-patches
setup-people
setup-ships
reset-ticks
end
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to setup-global-values
set sorties 0 - running total of pirate sorties (normally would be in setup skiffs, but that is
not called during setup)
set victory-party 50 - skiff stay-in-port time after a successful capture, in ticks
set successful-transits 0
set captured-ships [] - initially list contains nobody
;; set total-rewards Reward set total-rewards Reward * 1000 ;; model is too sensitive at
iniation to the first few skiff runs
set expected-reward Reward - seed until first capture
set minimum-manning 3 - sets the crew size of a skiff, skiff cannot sail without full crew
set number-of-pirates []
set p-capture 0.1 - changed from slider value to 0.1 (8/22/17)
set total-p-capture p-capture
set current-p-capture p-capture - this is set because the calculation doesn't start until there
are tick and current-p-capture would otherwise initially be ZERO
set SRT-list [] - used to get some data for SRT to get initial seed value
set total-SRT 170000 - total Skiff at sea time, starts large to mitigate initial swings
set average-SRT 170 - initial seed value of SRT
end
to setup-patches
set land (patch-set patches with [pycor < 1]) - Land is at the bottom
set port (patch-set patches with [(distancexy 0 0) < 4 and (pycor < 1)]) - Port is located
around the origin
ask patches - Water patches are colored to create a shallow zone toward the land, half of the
world is land
[
if pycor < 11 and pycor > 0 [ set pcolor 76 ] - Shallow water near land
if pycor > 10 and pycor < 21 [ set pcolor 85 ] - Territorial water
if pycor > 19 [ set pcolor 94 ] - International water/shipping lane
set land-patch false - Used to test for land when people are moving to neighbors
]
ask land
[
set pcolor 35
set eco-op (100 - (ECO * random 10)) - assigns an eco-op (economic opportunity) value to
each land patch INCLUDING THE PORT - based on the ECO value selected on the slider on the
Interface.
set land-patch true
]
;; repeat 5 [diffuse eco-op 0.5] - This is the code used to diffuse the land patches if desired
if economic-opportunity
[ ask land [set pcolor scale-color brown eco-op 0 100 ]
] - Displays eco-op values in shades of Brown - somewhat chaotic looking.
ask port
[
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set pcolor 58
set eco-op 100

]
end

to setup-people
set port-pirates [] - list of the people that are pirates in the port area, but not assigned to a
skiff. Available for crew
create-people 100
ask people
[
move-to one-of land with [not any? turtles-here]
set shape "person"
set color lime
set size 3
set pirate false
set assigned-to-skiff false
set skiffnumber -1
set experience 0
set pirate-success 0
;; set decision-list (list ([eco-op] of patch-here) ([eco-op] of neighbors))
;; set decision-list []
set decision-list n-values 10 [100 - (ECO * random 10)] - This seeds the initial values of
'decision-list' with numbers similar to those assigned to land patches
]
end
to setup-ships (Merchant ships)
create-ships 3
ask ships
[
set shape "merchant ship"
set size 6
set color yellow
set maxspeed 2
set speed (.5 * maxspeed)
set successful-passage false
set captured false
set captor nobody
set payoff random-normal Reward 30000
;; this may need to be adjusted -- adjusted
by factor of 100 4/12/17
ifelse random 2 = 1 (coin flip)
[set eastbound true
set heading 90
set xcor (-99 + random 40) ;; check for other ships within 20?
set ycor 40 - random 3]
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[set eastbound false
set heading 270
set xcor (99 - random 40)
set ycor 46 - random 3]

]
end

***Main Loop***
to Initiate
move-people
move-ships
move-skiffs
calculate-intercept-probability ;; don't call this every tick?, changes with sorties
if ticks = 500 - The amount of ticks prior to exporting the world: can be changed
[
export-world "ECOpiracy.cvs"
stop
]
tick
end
to Reset
let tempECO ECO
let tempreward reward
import-world "ECOpiracy.cvs" - the file name can be changed to import a specific world
reset-ticks
clear-all-plots
random-seed new-seed
set ECO tempECO
set reward tempReward
ask skiffs
[
set return-to-port-tick 500 - return-to-port-tick - this accounts for the ticks getting reset to
0 so the resail happens at the right time for skiffs already inport; it will set the variable to 500
for skiffs at sea but that will get set to the current tick if they return with prey
]
update-variables
end
to update-variables
setup-patches
set total-rewards Reward * 1000 - model is too sensitive at initiation to the first few skiffs
runs
set expected-reward Reward - seed until first capture
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;; set p-capture current-p-capture
;; if you reset the p-capture there will be a jump
downward in value because the first calculated ideal-p-capture isn't buffered in the
current-p-capture calculation
;; set total-p-capture current-p-capture
set number-of-pirates []
end
to Go
move-people
move-ships
move-skiffs
calculate-intercept-probability-forIW - Uses the calculation for the imported world
ADJUSTMENT MADE 23 May 2017
;;calculate-intercept-probability
tick
end
***Main loop subroutines***
to move-people
analyze-pirate-statistics
ask people
[ - Check pirate status
if not pirate
[
if any? neighbors with [(not any? people-here) and land-patch] - Check to make sure
adjacent land patches are not all occupied
[
move-to one-of neighbors with [(not any? people-here) and land-patch] - Move to
empty neighboring patch, making sure that it is on land
]
set decision-list fput eco-op but-last decision-list - Update decision-list with new eco-op
and drop off 10th value
set opportunity sum decision-list / 10 - Calculate average of decision-list,
;; if (risk-aversion + perceived-hardship) > 1.6 ;; this number is just for testing, and
doesn't change (yet)
;; set pirating-utility (Piracy-Probability * Reward) - ((1 - Piracy-Probability) *
opportunity)
;;set pirating-utility (total-rewards * p-capture) - ((1 - total-rewards) * opportunity)
;; I think this equation is wrong see next line
;; set pirating-utility (total-rewards * p-capture) - ((1 - p-capture) * opportunity)
;;
This doesn't work because as soon as there is at least one tick p-capture gets set, but there
are no total ships yet and so it become ZERO
;; set pirating-utility (expected-reward * p-capture) - ((1 - p-capture) * opportunity *
average-SRT) ;;
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;;set pirating-utility (expected-reward * p-capture / minimum-manning) - (opportunity
* average-SRT) ;;
set pirating-utility (expected-reward * current-p-capture / minimum-manning) (opportunity * average-SRT) ;; change made 18 May 2017
if pirating-utility > opportunity - Compare opportunity to reward for pirating
[
set pirate true
set color red
]
]- The rest of this loop controls the people that have 'pirate' set to true
if (pirate and color = red)
[
face one-of port
forward 1
;; set pirating-utility (total-rewards * p-capture) - ((1 - total-rewards) * opportunity)
;; set pirating-utility (Piracy-Probability * Reward) - ((1 - Piracy-Probability) *
opportunity)
;; as they move toward port, still need to check pirating utility
;; set pirating-utility (total-rewards * p-capture) - ((1 - p-capture) * opportunity)
not working-- should be average payoff
;; set pirating-utility (expected-reward * p-capture) - ((1 - p-capture) * opportunity *
average-SRT)
;;set pirating-utility (expected-reward * p-capture / minimum-manning) - (opportunity
* average-SRT)
set pirating-utility (expected-reward * current-p-capture / minimum-manning) (opportunity * average-SRT) - change made 18 May 2017 to average_SRT as a factor
if pirating-utility < opportunity Compare opportunity to reward for pirating, may
change decision while on the way to the port
[
set pirate false
set color yellow - So we can see when someone changed decision to pirate on the way to
the port
]
] - Moves pirates ahead towards port as long as pirating-utility > opportunity
if (pirate and (member? patch-here port)) Arrived at the port
[
set color black
if (not assigned-to-skiff and not member? who port-pirates)
[set port-pirates lput who port-pirates] - Add turtle ID to back end of list that contains
all the available pirates in the port area
] - Reached the port
if (pirate and color = black)
[
face one-of port - mill around port
forward 1
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if count people with [(pirate and not assigned-to-skiff) and color = black] >= minimummanning
;; enough unemployed pirates in port, can hatch a skiff and associate skiff with these
pirates
[
;;show "made it to 3" ;; testing note, delete from final code
let crew sublist port-pirates 0 minimum-manning - Crew is the first group of pirates
available in the port (accounts for two or more pirates arriving during same tick)
;; show crew ;; testing note, to show those pirates on the skiff, delete from final code
hatch-skiffs 1 [orient-skiff self crew] ;;send the skiff turtle number and the crew to the
subroutine
foreach crew
[ask turtle ? - Sets boolean for each pirate onboard outbound skiff, then hide them, so
they don't show in the port. They will be unhidden if the skiff returns to port unsuccessful so
they can return to roaming
[set assigned-to-skiff true
hide-turtle
]
]
set port-pirates sublist port-pirates minimum-manning (length port-pirates)
] - Removes the pirates (crew) from the list port-pirates
]
]
end
to orient-skiff [skiff crew] - Initializes the new skiff
ask skiff
[
set shape "boat"
set color black
set size 4
set xcor random 4 - 3
set ycor 0
set opmode 1 - transiting out to patrol area opmode, skiff's sail color changes with most
changes of status
set prey nobody
set course random 100 - 50
set heading course
set patrol-range 39
set maxspeed 3
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set max-fuel 100 - seems to affect p-capture greatly
set fuel max-fuel
set attack-range 6
set pirates-on-board crew - assigns the turtle numbers of the 'crew' to this skiff
set sorties sorties + 1 - counter for total number of skiff cruises
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set at-sea-ticks 0
;; calculate-intercept-probability ;; seems to get less swarming when called every tick,
than each sortie
]
end
to move-ships (Merchant ships)
ask ships
[ - Check to see if merchant reached the edge of the map
if ((xcor = 100 or xcor = -100) and not successful-passage)
[
set successful-passage true
set successful-transits successful-transits + 1
hatch-ships 1 [orient-ship self]
hide-turtle Hide the ship, hatch a new one
] - Now check to see if any skiffs close by
ifelse any? skiffs in-radius 7 and not captured
[
set speed maxspeed
set color red
;; call for naval vessel help? this something that still needs to be developed
;; it would get the navy to the area that the pirates are operating in
;; even if they didn't arrive in time to help the one that called for help
]
[
set speed .5 * maxspeed
set color yellow
] - Test to see if captured,
if captured
[
set color black - Merchant follows pirate back to port
set heading towards captor
set speed ([speed] of captor)
]
forward speed - Continue on same course
]
end
to orient-ship [ship] - Initializes the new merchant ship
ask ship
[
set shape "merchant ship"
set size 6
set color yellow
set maxspeed 2
set speed (.5 * maxspeed)
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set successful-passage false
set captured false
set captor nobody
set payoff random-normal Reward 30000 - altered by a factor of 100 on 4/12/17
ifelse random 2 = 1 (coin flip)
[set eastbound true
set heading 90
set xcor -99
set ycor 40 - random 3]
[set eastbound false
set heading 270
set xcor 99
set ycor 46 - random 3]
]
end
to move-skiffs
opmode 1 - transiting from the port to a patrol area; generally black sail
opmode 2 - loitering on patrol
opmode 3 - chasing a target ship; sail turns gray
opmode 4 - when a target is captured; sail turns red
opmode 5 - attacked a target - but target not captured; sail turns blue for repelled attack
opmode 6 - low fuel status - transiting back to port; sail turns yellow
opmode 7 - inport; sail turns brown when skiff resails after “victory party” (50 ticks)
ask skiffs
[
let attack-failed false - Temporary Boolean to flag deterred or repelled attacks
if ((opmode = 1 or opmode = 2 or opmode = 3) and fuel - 3 < (distancexy 0 0)) - running
out of fuel, return to port
[
set opmode 6
set color yellow
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
] - now test for each opmode and conditions needed to shift opmodes
if opmode = 1 and (any? ships in-radius attack-range with [not captured]) - Merchant
detected while in transit
[chase]
if opmode = 1 and ((distancexy 0 0) > patrol-range) - Made it to patrol distance, shift to
opmode 2 loiter
[ set opmode 2
set speed (.05 * maxspeed)
set course one-of [90 270]
]
if opmode = 2 and (not any? ships in-radius attack-range) - loiter/patrol
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[
if ycor < 30 [set course 320 + random 80] - stay out where ships are
if ycor > 46 [set course 140 + random 80] - stay away from northern edge of world
if not can-move? 1 [set course (course + 100 + random 100)] - turn away from eastwest edge of world and perform patrol wiggle
set course course + random 20
set course course - random 20
]
if opmode = 2 and (any? ships in-radius attack-range with [not captured]) - merchant
detected while loitering
[chase]
if opmode = 3 and (not [captured] of prey) - opmode 3 is chasing mode
[
set course towards prey
let templist1 list (maxspeed) (1.4 + distance prey)
set speed min templist1
; even with the speed cap, still getting some overshoots when prey is at 45 relative,
; results in a sawtooth chase pattern which continues until pirate needs to return to
port for low fuel state.
; To avoid, test for this case, then shorten one leg of the saw to change relative
bearing
;;let fortyfive (course + 45) mod 90 ; tests for all 4 situations where target angle about
45
;if distance prey < 2 and (fortyfive < 10 or fortyfive > 80) ; within 10 degrees of target
angle 45
; [set speed 1.5]; should end up astern of target, now just eat him with speed, or not if
experience low
]
if (opmode = 3 and ([captured] of prey) and (([captor] of prey) != self))
[ set opmode 1 - merchant is captured by someone else, return to patrolling
;;show "breaking off, already captured" ;; this is a testing report, remove from final
code
]
if opmode = 3 and distance prey < 2 and (not ([captured] of prey)) ;; this tests to make
sure skiff caught up to,
;;but also checks to make sure the ship has not been captured by another skiff
[
;;show "within 2" ;; this is a testing report, remove from final code
if random 10 < 4 - 3 in 10 chance that the merchant repels attack, based on 70% realworld success rate
[
set attack-failed true
set color blue
]
ifelse attack-failed
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code

[
;; show "attack deterred or repelled" ;; this is a testing report, remove from final
set opmode 5 - attack failed or was deterred, return to port
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
set prey nobody
]
[

set opmode 4 - successful capture, return to port, tell merchant to follow
set color red
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set course towards one-of port
;;show "successful capture"
;; this is a testing report, remove from final code
ask prey
[set captured true
set captor myself
]

]
] - end of the big captured in opmode 3 if loop

opmode 4 and 5 tests
if opmode = 4 and (member? patch-here port) ; reached port with a prey, shutdown,
[
set opmode 7
set SRT-list lput at-sea-ticks SRT-list
set total-SRT total-SRT + at-sea-ticks ;;
set average-SRT total-SRT / (1000 + sorties)
ask prey
[
set captor nobody
set captured false
set captured-ships lput who captured-ships - update the list of those ships that have
been captured, for later analysis
set total-rewards total-rewards + payoff
;;let total-ships length captured-ships
;;set expected-reward total-rewards / (total-ships + 1)
;;set expected-reward total-rewards / (sorties + 1) ;; this accounts for there being no
reward for an unsuccessful skiff run
set expected-reward total-rewards / (sorties + 1000) - adjustment for initializing
model sensitivity
hatch-ships 1 [orient-ship self] - hatch new ship, call subroutine to initialize it
;;hide-turtle
;; hide the old ship (should it die?)
die
]
foreach pirates-on-board
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[ask turtle ?
[
set experience experience + 10 - crew get experience for successful capture – not
used in the current model.
set pirate-success pirate-success + 1 - crew get credit for successfully pirating.
]
]
set speed 0
set prey nobody
set return-to-port-tick ticks - time holder, this skiff will sail after a cool-down
;; calculate-intercept-probability ;; update p-capture
]
if (opmode = 7 and (ticks > return-to-port-tick + victory-party)) - successful cruise, send
them back to sea
[
set opmode 1
set color brown
set prey nobody
set course random 100 - 50
set speed (.3 * maxspeed)
set fuel max-fuel - Consideration for future version - experienced skiffs carry more fuel?
set at-sea-ticks 0
set sorties sorties + 1 - counter for total number of skiff cruises
]
if (opmode = 5 or opmode = 6) and (member? patch-here port) - reached port due to
repelled attack or low fuel - shutdown
[ ;;set opmode 5 ;; delete after sure we are going to die
;;set speed 0 ;;; delete after sure we are going to die
;;set prey nobody ; delete after sure we are going to die
set expected-reward total-rewards / (sorties + 1000) - adjustment for initializing
model sensitivity
set SRT-list lput at-sea-ticks SRT-list
set total-SRT total-SRT + at-sea-ticks ;;
set average-SRT total-SRT / (1000 + sorties)
foreach pirates-on-board - send the crew back to work, in port, but colored violet,
opportunity should stay high inside port area
[ask turtle ?
[show-turtle
set pirate false
set color violet
set assigned-to-skiff false
set skiffnumber -1
set experience experience - 5
]
]
die - kill this skiff, no reason to keep it
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;; calculate-intercept-probability ;;update p-capture
]
set heading course
forward speed
set fuel fuel - speed
set at-sea-ticks at-sea-ticks + 1
] end of ask skiffs loop
end
to chase - skiff sighted a merchant, gives chase
set opmode 3
set prey one-of ships in-radius attack-range
set speed maxspeed
set course towards prey
set color gray
end
to calculate-intercept-probability
let total-ships length captured-ships
let total-time ticks + 1 - this accounts for the 0 tick and the divisor is never zero when
calculating current-p-capture below ADJUSTMENT MADE 18 May 2017
if (ticks > 0) and (total-ships >= 1) - There has be a ship captured before p-capture will
become dynamic
[
let ideal-p-capture total-ships / sorties - This is the actual value based on captures, but we
can't tolerate rapid jumps. Also, it changes when a skiff leaves port, not when it returns - pros
and cons to this.
ifelse (ideal-p-capture - p-capture > .03)
[
set p-capture p-capture + .01
;; show "p-capture increase limited"
]
[ ;; small change, use the new ideal
set p-capture ideal-p-capture
]
]
if ticks > 0
[
set total-p-capture total-p-capture + p-capture
set current-p-capture total-p-capture / total-time
]
end
to calculate-intercept-probability-forIW - Calculation used for GO with an inported world
let total-ships length captured-ships
let total-time ticks + 501 - This account for the 0 tick and the 500 ticks of the inported world
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if (ticks > 0) and (total-ships >= 1) - There has be a ship captured before p-capture will
become dynamic
[
let ideal-p-capture total-ships / sorties - This is the actual value based on captures
set p-capture ideal-p-capture
]
if ticks > 0
[
set total-p-capture total-p-capture + p-capture
set current-p-capture total-p-capture / total-time
]
end
to analyze-pirate-statistics
set number-of-pirates lput (count people with [pirate]) number-of-pirates
set average-number mean number-of-pirates
end
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENT DATA SET SUMMARIES

Table C-1. Behavior Space Experiment Run #1 on Model 18A (18A adjusted the normal distribution
for ship reward)
14 April
Max Number

Mean Number

Median No.

Stand Deviation

Variance

Min

0

0

0

0

0

1st Quarter

6

1.909

0

1.345

1.808

Median

98

15.267

3

18.718

350.355

Mean

69.69

25.160

20.83

16.327

386.776

3rd Quarter

100

44.716

42

25.271

638.620

Max

100

86.433

87

36.751

1350.662

Table C-2. Behavior Space Experiment Run #2 on Model 18A
16 April
Max Number

Mean Number

Median No.

Stand Deviation

Variance

Min

0

0

0

0

0

1st Quarter

5

1.722

0

1.301

1.692

Median

98

13.630

2

19.114

365.352

Mean

68.72

21.779

16.77

16.535

399.352

3rd Quarter

100

38.556

34

26.039

678.046

Max

100

81.933

82

38.135

1454.250
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Table C-3. Behavior Space Experiment Run #3 on Model 18A ECO 1-10 (5000 observations)
11 Sept
Max No.

Mean No.

Median No.

Std Dev

Variance

Sorties

Captures

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1st Quarter

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Median

61

6.776

1

11.28

127.2

16

1

Mean

49.34

15.780

12.37

11.77

282.0

51.33

6.308

3rd Quarter

100

28.442

24

22.76

518.2

91.25

12

Max

100

80.388

80

37.68

1419.6

285

39

Table C-4. Behavior Space Experiment on Model 20 (20 Adjusted how p-capture is calculated)
18 May
Max Number

Mean Number

Median No.

Stand Deviation

Variance

Min

0

0

0

0

0

1st Quarter

8

3.103

1

1.823

3.325

Median

96

35.178

31

13.687

187.323

Mean

68.7

37.885

35.94

13.891

309.820

3rd Quarter

100

68.226

71

22.718

516.125

Max

100

97.469

98

42.768

1829.113
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Table C-5. Behavior Space Experiment Run on Model 20B (uses 178D imported world as initial
conditions)
30 May
Max Number

Mean Number

Median No.

Stand Deviation

Variance

Min

14

0.355

0

1.221

1.491

1st Quarter

15

2.423

2

3.131

9.806

Median

80

45.801

47

8.727

76.158

Mean

63.89

40.121

39.90

9.888

151.668

3rd Quarter

98

69.449

70.62

14.644

214.436

Max

100

95.210

96

31.729

1006.727

Table C-6. Behavior Space Experiment Run #2 on Model 20B (uses 178D imported world as initial
conditions ECO 7 Reward 250K)
24 May
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Min

14

0.358

0

1.280

1.639

0.02174

0.03720

14

1

1st Qtr

15

2.420

2

2.954

8.725

0.07143

0.07607

17

1

Median

79

44.130

44

8.712

75.891

0.09641

0.08412

168

19

Mean

63.27

39.373

38.99

9.786

148.596

0.09440

0.08696

153.2

16

3rd Qtr

98

69.015

70

14.392

207.126

0.11321

0.09839

261.0

28

Max

100

95.726

96

33.306

1109.288

0.18750

0.14060

379.0

42
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Table C-7. Behavior Space Experiment Run #3 on Model 20B (uses 178D imported world as initial
conditions ECO 7 Reward 250K)
13 Sep
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Min

14

0.358

0

1.276

1.629

0.02041

0.03588

14

1

1st Qtr

15

2.419

2

3.049

9.294

0.07143

0.07607

17

1

Median

79

43.848

44

8.718

75.997

0.09677

0.08433

167

19

Mean

63.25

39.308

38.88

9.735

145.801

0.09466

0.08723

152.8

15.92

3rd Qtr

98

68.259

69.25

14.256

203.240

0.11278

0.09871

258.0

27

Max

100

95.025

96

33.811

1143.197

0.19231

0.14053

370.0

41

Table C-8. Behavior Space Experiment Run on Model 21 (uses 339E imported world as initial
conditions ECO 8 Reward 250K)
7 June
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Min

8

0.829

0

1.427

2.038

0.02128

0.03851

9

1

1st Qtr

14

3.789

2

3.600

12.957

0.10000

0.09317

16

1

Median

79

35.219

32

12.807

164.030

0.11111

0.10687

130

17

Mean

63.52

35.444

33.97

12.712

236.740

0.11462

0.10591

331.7

15.28

3rd Qtr

100

59.388

60

19.266

371.161

0.12839

0.11461

218

25.25

Max

100

69.035

97

37.126

1378.374

0.27273

0.19266

364

40
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Table C-9. Behavior Space Experiment Run on Model 21A – FUSION (uses 339E imported world as
initial conditions ECO 8 Reward 250K)
8 June
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Min

0

0.000

0

0

0

0.0200

0.02535

0

0

1st Qtr

15

6.042

2

3.286

10.8

0.1000

0.09131

16.76

1

Median

86

28.603

21

15.195

230.9

0.1020

0.10000

99

12

Mean

63.51

33.004

30.91

14.494

327.4

0.1058

0.09865

115.68

12.79

3rd Qtr

100

56.573

57

23.240

540.1

0.1221

0.11076

201.00

23.00

Max

100

97.651

98

41.318

1707.2

0.3333

0.14930

359.00

40

Table C-10. Behavior Space Experiment Run on Model 20A – Just Setup & Go – just done to compare pcapture etc.
8 June
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Min

0

0.000

0

0

0

0.01370

0.02197

0

0

1st Qtr

7

2.62

1

1.661

2.762

0.09091

0.08176

5.75

0

Median

96

36.24

32

13.897

193.124

0.10000

0.09859

123.5

14

Mean

69.02

38.36

36.46

13.857

306.566

0.09814

0.09106

13387

13.74

3rd Qtr

100

68.54

71

22.508

506.632

0.11042

0.10000

244.00

25.00

Max

100

97.38

98

41.894

1755.103

0.50000

0.14297

362.00

41.00
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Table C-11. Behavior Space Experiment Run on Model 20A for Expanded ECO Range 1- 10
13 Sep
Max

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Variance

P-cap

C-P-cap

Sorties

Captures

Transits

Min

0

0

0

0

0

0.01282

0.02289

0

0

4

1st Qtr

0

0

0

0

0

0.09840

0.08809

0

0

15

Median

63

12.10

1

6.79

46.11

0.10000

0.10000

32

1

29

Mean

49.46

27.22

25.76

10.04

223.42

0.09855

0.09373

94.78

9.742

23.3

3rd Qtr

100

56.23

58

18.88

356.51

0.10246

0.10000

196.00

22

30

Max

100

97.45

98

40.61

1649.35

0.50000

0.14205

365.00

39

30

326

APPENDIX D
INDIVIDUAL ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL RUNS

These figures show the state of each of the model runs used in the model scenarios
described in Chapter 7, at tick 2000 when the model stopped. The selector switches on the
left side of the model world indicate the model settings for the run. In addition to the graph
of “People with pirate,” which was already provided in Chapter 7, graphs of “Expected
reward,” “p-capture,” “current-p-capture,” “pcap*exprew” (current-p-capture times the
expected reward), and “pirating utility” provide additional information about the model
run history. A histogram of the pirate success rates shows number of pirates with various
success rates. At the beginning of a model run, the histogram shows 100 pirates with zero
success. When the first skiff returns to port with a capture, it updates to 97 pirates with
zero success and three pirates with one success. Each capture will result in an update of
the histogram. Early in a model run this is typically in increments of three; however, later
when the pirates that man a skiff might have different individual success rates, the updates
are less predictable. Monitors below the model world provide individual variable values.
While it is difficult to determine exactly what occurred during the model run from
just the end state snapshot, the figures do provide quite a bit of insight. In addition to the
information we get from the graphs and monitors, we visually see how many pirates there
are, what state they are in (heading to the port (red), waiting in the port (black), or in a
skiff). The color of the skiff’s sail indicates its status as described in table 7-1. The color of
the people indicates their status. Any green people have never decided to pirate. Purple
people have returned to roaming after an unsuccessful pirate run. Finally, any yellow
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people indicate a person decided to pirate, but then changed their mind before getting to
the port.

Figure D-1. Scenario 1: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.
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Figure D-2. Scenario 2: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.

Figure D-3. Scenario 3: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.
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Figure D-4. Scenario 4: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.

Figure D-5. Scenario 5: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.
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Figure D-6. Scenario 6: Model 20, Reward = 250,000, ECO = 9.

Figure D-7. Scenario 7: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.
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Figure D-8. Scenario 8: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.

Figure D-9. Scenario 9: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.

332

Figure D-10. Scenario 10: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.

Figure D-11. Scenario 11: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.
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Figure D-12. Scenario 12: Model 20, Reward = 400,000, ECO = 7.

Figure D-13. Scenario 13: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6.
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Figure D-14. Scenario 14: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6.

Figure D-15. Scenario 15: Model 20, Reward = 300,000, ECO = 6.
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